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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Health, education and economic crisis: The role
of safety nets
When an economic crisis hits, a primary policy concern in developing countries is how
the social sectors can be protected and, in particular, how access to social services for
the poor can be maintained. Targeted price subsidies, reducing the costs of access for
vulnerable groups, are often used as a policy response to macro economic shocks. These
could take the form of governments bearing part of the costs of education and health
care treatment through reducing fees for public services, reductions in travel time as a
result of new facilities being built near poor areas, or price subsidies targeted at speciÞc
population groups.
Why should we worry about the delivery of health and education services in times of
economic crisis in developing countries?
First of all, accumulation of human resources by investing in health and education is
generally considered a key strategy in preventing poverty from being transmitted from one
generation to another.1 Investment by households in health and education are compro-
mised when resource and credit constrained households are faced with unexpected tran-
sient income shocks.2 Under typically incomplete credit markets households have limited
scope for transferring wealth across periods, and need to formulate alternative strate-
gies for smoothing consumption. These strategies may include production decisions, such
as choosing sub-optimal asset portfolios to reduce income risk, or reallocate household
1For a broad discussion see, for example, the World Development Reports of 1990 and 2000/2001
(World Bank, 1990 and 2001, respectively).
2E.g. Jacoby and SkouÞas (1997).
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labour in response to unexpected income shocks.3 Nevertheless, the literature indicates
that households are far from successful in smoothing consumption in response to income
shocks.4 The poor are particularly vulnerable to shocks, given their stringent credit and
resource constraints. It is especially hard to insure against covariate shocks, such as a
drought or an economic crisis, as both market based and informal insurance and coping
mechanisms can break down under macro economic shocks.5 Households consumption
smoothing strategies may then involve reducing investments in education and health, and
drawing on child labour to increase the household income.6 These decisions aﬀect future
income generating capabilities, as reduced investment in education and health decrease
human capital accumulation. Households thus face a trade oﬀ between current consump-
tion and future productivity, and even a temporary shock can have negative long term
welfare eﬀects for the poor if the health and education sectors are not protected.
By lowering the eﬀective price of public social services, government spending enhances
access for the poor. However, such a policy of broad targeting may also result in greater
leakage of subsidies to the rich.7 If the rich are more price responsive than the poor, or use
the public services more often to start with, they will receive a more than proportional
share of the price subsidies. Lowering prices can also have negative consequences for
the eﬃciency of delivery of public services. Especially in health, there is the risk of
overconsumption if users, and doctors, are not facing market prices. For these obvious
reasons, most developing countries subsidise education and health but do not provide it
for free. An important question for policy makers is how changes in prices aﬀect the use
of education and health facilities and how these responses vary by income group.
Recently several authors have argued that narrowly targeted social safety nets can
play a pivotal role in protecting the poor from macro-economic shocks.8 Social safety
3E.g. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993), Murdoch (1995), and Kochar (1999).
4See, for example, Morduch (1995 and 1999) and Townsend (1995). Using a Resource Mobilisation
survey, Gertler and Gruber (2002) show how Indonesian households are not able to smooth consumption
when faced with large income shocks due to illness of the head of household.
5E.g. Glewwe and Hall (1998), Morduch (1999), Ravallion (2003), SkouÞas (2003). In the case of the
Indonesian economic crisis, Frankenberg, Smith and Thomas (2003) Þnd that real per capita consumption
declined by about 20 percent in 1998, despite the fact that households adopted multiple strategies to
smooth consumption (varying from reorganising household composition to increasing labour supply and
selling assets and valuables). See also chapter 2 for a discussion of the Indonesian crisis.
6See, for example, Flug, Spilimbergo and Wachtenheim (1998), Dehejia and Gatti (2002), Beegle,
Dehejia and Gatti (2003) on the eﬀects of income shocks on schooling and child labour. For empirical
work on Indonesia, see Cameron and Worswick (2001) and Fitzsimons (2003). Both papers show that
investments in schooling are sensitive to aggregate shocks. In Indonesia, the economic crisis brought
about decreased spending on education, especially for primary school children in poor, rural households
(Thomas et al., 2004).
7E.g. Van de Walle (1998).
8E.g. Morduch (1994 and 1999), Ravallion (2003), Ferreira, Prennushi and Ravallion (1999), and
SkouÞas (2003).
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nets can help prevent households adopting coping strategies in a crisis situation that
cause long term damage to households productive capacity and hence economic growth.
For example, targeted transfers to speciÞc types of households or employment creation
programmes reduce the need for households to sell productive assets or forgo health and
education expenses or revert to child labour. Ravallion (2003) argues that the empirical
evidence tips the balance in favour of these interventions, despite some bad experiences.
He puts a case that in developing countries inequality is not favourable for economic
growth due to uninsured risks in the presence of incomplete markets and resource con-
straints. A main contribution of safety nets is to reduce the threat of dynamic poverty
traps by protecting the poorest from transient shocks. "Market imperfections point to
a potential for eﬃcient redistributions, which help alleviate the constraints arising from
those market imperfections."9
Additional support for targeted safety nets in health and education comes from the
demand literature. Both ex-ante and ex-post studies have emphasised the eﬀectiveness
of stimulating the demand for public services amongst the poor through price subsidies.
Empirical studies on the demand for health and education typically Þnd high income elas-
ticities, implying large inequalities between poor and rich, but rather low price elasticities
that tend to be larger for the poor.10 Targeted prices subsidies or waivers for costs of
medical care and education are therefore often advocated as means to increase access to
medical care for the poor. Several studies have further shown that conditional cash trans-
fers and education stipends have positive eﬀects on enrolment and reduce child labour,
especially amongst the poor.11
However, narrow targeting is not without problems. A large body of literature has
been devoted to the diﬃculties of targeting speciÞc individuals and households.12 Identify-
ing those eligible for a social programme is constrained by the availability of information,
but collecting information is costly. A variety of targeting strategies can be devised, de-
pending on the type of information source and the associated costs. Individual targeting
can, for example, be based on centrally collected administrative data such as tax records,
or means tests based on a set of individual characteristics. Alternatively, when such infor-
mation is not available, one can use regional welfare indicators to target regions instead of
individuals, or exploit local knowledge by relying on a community based targeting design
or the individual private information by introducing a self selection mechanism. How-
9Ravallion (2003), p. 14.
10E.g. Jimenez (1995), Gertler and Hammer (1997), World Development Report 2004.
11E.g. Ravallion and Wodon (2000), SkouÞas and Parker (2001), Bourguignon, Ferreira and Leite
(2003), Rawlings and Rubio (2003), Maluccio and Flores (2004), Schultz (2004).
12See, amongst others, Besley and Kanbur (1993), Van de Walle (1998), Ravallion (2003), and Coady,
Grosh and Hoddinott (2004).
4 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
ever, when part of the targeting process is decentralised to lower administrative levels,
this may introduce incentive problems through asymmetric information between policy
makers, programme managers and local oﬃcials implementing the programmes. In each
case, choosing a targeting design will involve a trade oﬀ between the costs of collecting
information, the quality of that information, and the degree of control over the targeting
process. The empirical literature shows ambiguous results regarding the eﬀectiveness on
diﬀerent targeting mechanisms, with a large degree of heterogeneity both between and
within alternative targeting strategies.13 Success stories are often context speciÞc and
there seems to be no clear recipe for successful targeting of social programmes.
1.2 The Indonesian Social Safety Net
In 1997 Indonesia was hit by a severe and unexpected economic crisis, triggered by a
Þnancial crisis that aﬀected the whole Southeast Asian region. The economic crisis was
characterised by aggregate income shocks and rapid inßation. Up to the crisis, Indonesia
had enjoyed a steady improvement in both health and education outcomes. At the onset
of the Indonesian crisis, an important concern was whether the achievements made in the
social sectors over the past decades could be sustained. To safeguard real incomes and
access to social services for the poor, the Indonesian government, with help of donors,
introduced the Indonesian Social Safety Net - Jaring Pengaman Sosial (JPS) - interven-
tions, which included a health and education programme.
This dissertation addresses a few of the issues raised above, using the JPS interventions
in health and education as case study. Chapter 2 sets the stage for the chapters that follow,
sketching the context of the Indonesian Social Safety Net. The chapter describes the pre-
crisis distribution of health and education services, and the changes in the distributions
over the course of the crisis.
The crisis does not seem to have halted the positive trend in enrolment, but it did
frustrate improvements in primary and junior secondary enrolment for a year. There is
also evidence that expenses on health and education were reduced to smooth consumption
during the crisis, in particular for the rural poor.14 1999 saw a full recovery, bringing
enrolment levels higher than they were before the crisis.
The eﬀects of the crisis are also visible with households health care utilisation. In-
creased costs of health care, negative income shocks and deteriorating health services were
followed by a strong decrease in health care utilisation, especially at public health care
13See Coady, Grosh and Hoddinott (2004) for an extensive review of the empirical literature on the
targeting eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent social intervention programs.
14E.g., Frankenberg, Smith, and Thomas (2003), Thomas et al. (2004).
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facilities. Quality and supply of public care suﬀered considerably from rising costs of
medicine and reduced public health care expenditures, turning people away from public
care. In 1999 the public sector enjoyed a revival, but pre-crisis utilisation rates were not
achieved.
Chapter 3 contains a detailed description of the JPS interventions, and how the edu-
cation and health care programmes have been implemented in the Þrst year.
The education programme started in August 1998, at the beginning of the 1998/1999
school year. Almost 4 million scholarships had been made available for primary and sec-
ondary schools students. Allocation scholarships followed a partly decentralised process.
In a Þrst targeting phase district scholarship quota were set, depending on regional
poverty. Poor districts received relatively more scholarships than rich districts. The
second phase involved community based targeting, where JPS allocation committees in
districts and schools selected children for the programme. The scholarships were monthly
cash transfers, which increased in size with enrolment level and amounted to about 7 to
18 percent of average per capita household consumption.
The health care was introduced in the last quarter of 1998. This programme consisted
of a targeted price subsidy in combination with a public spending component. The price
subsidy operated through a health card - Kartu Sehat - scheme. Health cards were
targeted to households that were thought to be most vulnerable to eﬀects of the crisis.
The health card entitled all household members to the price subsidy at public health care
providers. Similar to the education programme, targeting and allocation of health cards
was decentralised to districts and village communities. The public spending component of
the programme was meant to compensate the public health care facilities for the increased
demand due to the health cards. The facilities that provided the subsidised care received
extra budgetary support in the form of monthly block grants. However, there was a loose
relationship between the utilisation of the health card and the compensation that the
health care providers received in return. The block grants were based on the estimated
number of households eligible for the health card programme and not on actual utilisation
of the health cards.
Both programmes were of considerable size. By February 1999 the programmes were
still expanding, yet 11 percent of Indonesians (approximately 22 million people) lived in
a household with a health card, while 5 percent of children aged 10 to 18 (approximately
2.1 million children) had received a scholarship.
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1.3 Local and geographic targeting
Chapter 3 further addresses the targeting performance of the two JPS programmes, in light
of the decentralised design. Particular focus is on the eﬀectiveness of regional targeting
policy in contrast to within-district targeting by the local allocation committees. While
both programmes have clearly been targeted pro-poor, there is also a large degree of
leakage to the non-poor. Targeting problems occurred at both national and local level.
The results conÞrm concerns of other authors that targeting of the JPS programmes
was hampered by a lack of reliable data. At the time of implementation only pre-crisis
information on regional poverty was available for geographic targeting. But not only did
the crisis have a strong heterogenous impact across regions, there was also very little
correlation between this impact and pre-crisis poverty.
At local level, the health card programme has not eliminated all barriers to access to
health care for the poor. Conditional on receiving a health card, the non-poor are less
likely to use it for medical care. Opportunity costs of time and travel costs are relatively
high for poor rural households, and the availability of and distance to public facilities
determine the eﬀectiveness of the health care subsidy.
Chapter 4 delves into the measurement of marginal beneÞt incidence. The recent
literature on beneÞt incidence has proposed a number of methods to measure the marginal
beneÞts of social programmes.15 These methods supplement traditional average beneÞt
incidence in that they investigate to what extent an expansion of an existing programme
will be to the beneÞt of the poor. However, these methods do not tell us whether marginal
changes in beneÞt incidence are due to changes in geographic or local targeting. Chapter
4 proposes a simple micro-simulation based approach to disentangle the eﬀects of local
and geographic targeting on distributional outcome of social programmes. This method
builds on recent extensions to Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition methods.16
The method is applied to the JPS health and education programmes, both of which
have expanded from 1999 to 2002. After 1999, when more accurate information on regional
poverty became available, the geographic targeting rules were altered. The programmes
are targeted pro-poor but the marginal distribution of beneÞts shows quite diﬀerent pat-
terns. The poor have been the main beneÞciaries of an increase in scholarships, whereas
the expansion of the health card does not show a pro-poor pattern. The simulation based
decomposition approach investigates to what extent the distributional outcome of the
programmes expansion is a result of changes in geographical targeting, changes in local
targeting, or simply due to the expansion of the programmes.
15For an overview see Younger (2003) and van de Walle (2004).
16See Bourguignon, Ferreira and Lustig (2005).
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The simulation method can provide more nuance to the observed patterns in targeting
of social programmes, and facilitate understanding and interpretation of conventional
marginal beneÞt incidence results. The exercise with the scholarship programme has
shown that existing measures for dynamic marginal beneÞt incidence can sometimes be
misleading for social policy advice. The pro-poor marginal incidence observed with the
scholarship programme seems to be driven by improved local and geographical targeting
over time. Expanding the programme without considering the targeting process would in
fact increase leakage to the non-poor. For the health card programme, the decomposition
results do not conßict with marginal incidence results. Instead, the results highlights
which targeting instruments would be most eﬀective in reallocating health cards to the
poor.
1.4 Impact evaluation
Measuring the eﬀect of the scholarships programme on enrolment, school attendance and
child labour is dealt with in chapter 5 (which is based on Sparrow, 2004). The main
challenge with ex-post evaluations is to obtain a reliable estimate of the counterfactual:
what would have happened if the JPS programme had not been implemented? Because
of non-random programme placement and data limitations, it requires non-experimental
methods to answer this question. The eﬀects of the scholarships are identiÞed by virtue
of random geographic mis-targeting at the initial stage of allocation, due to incomplete
information on the regional poverty proÞle and the impact of the crisis. Instrumental
variables are constructed from this mis-targeting, using data on the selection rules and
ex-post information on the regional poverty.
The scholarship programme has been eﬀective in protecting the access to education,
despite the problems with geographic targeting. The programme has increased enrolment,
especially for those who were most vulnerable to the eﬀects of the crisis: primary school
aged children from poor rural households. The scholarships were also found to increase
school attendance of enrolled children, and reduce working activities. Although it was
not an explicit goal of the programme, the scholarships raised the reservation wage for
students. The cash transfers relieved the pressure on households to draw on the labour
of their children to smooth income, especially for the rural poor. However, Þnding statis-
tically signiÞcant and positive eﬀects does not mean that the programme is a complete
success. A large part of the funds has been allocated to students who would not have
dropped out of school in absence of the programme. For example, the large number of
scholarships targeted at secondary schools had little to no impact on enrolment. This im-
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plies that more accurate targeting, and redeÞning target groups, would greatly improve
the programmes eﬀectiveness.
Chapter 6 (based on Pradhan, Saadah and Sparrow, 2004) investigates the impact
of the health cards on outpatient utilisation. The particular design of the programme
provides an interesting policy experiment, and allows a comparison of the eﬀects of a
targeted price subsidy with those of increased public health care spending. Because of
the weak link between the health card programme and the lump sum grants to facilities,
these two components of the programme in eﬀect operated as two separate interventions.
The transfers made to public sector providers beneÞtted all potential users while the price
subsidy was available only to those who received a health card. In chapter 6 an attempt
is made to disentangle the eﬀects of both programmes.
The results provide a mixed message. First, the price subsidy was clearly eﬀective in
increasing health care demand amongst the poor, as the health card increased utilisation
and led to a substitution eﬀect from private to subsidised public care. For the non-poor
the health card aﬀected only their choice of health care provider without increasing overall
utilisation. Second, the revival of public heath care utilisation in 1999 can be attributed
to the JPS health programme, but most of this eﬀect is due to improved quality and
extra supply of medical care through the budgetary support to public providers. The
price subsidy appears to account for only 20 percent of the programme s overall impact.
Third, in absence of clear incentive mechanisms for health care providers, general increases
in public spending are ineﬀective in reaching the poor. The supply induced eﬀect appears
to be concentrated with the non-poor. The poor are responsive to a price subsidy but
not to a supply impulse, while utilisation of the non-poor is mainly supply driven. In the
end, most of the beneÞts of the programme have gone to the non-poor, despite pro-poor
targeting of health cards and their clearly positive eﬀect for the poor.
Chapter 2
The Indonesian Economic Crisis:
Trends in Health and Education
2.1 Introduction
In the fall of 1997 Indonesia was hit by a severe economic crisis, exacerbated by social and
political turmoil in 1998. Up to the crisis, Indonesia had enjoyed a steady improvement
in both health and education outcomes, which went together with economic growth.
Educational attainment increased strongly in Indonesia during the 1970s and 1980s.
The trend in gross enrolment from 1971 to 1997 is shown in Þgure 2.1. In a period of 15
years gross primary school enrolment increased by almost 50 percentage points, exceeding
100 percent by 1985. Secondary school attainment also increased, but is still far from
universal. From 1971 to 1996 gross junior secondary enrolment almost quadrupled as it
increased from 18 to 67 percent, while senior secondary enrolment increased from 9 to 37
percent. A notable feature of these improvements are the distributional aspects.1 First,
primary enrolment in rural areas has almost caught up with urban enrolment. The urban-
rural gap for primary school age children (7 to 12) has decreased from 9 percentage point
in 1978 to about 3 percentage point in 1997. For junior secondary age (13 to 15) the gap
has decreased from 26 to 16 percentage point. This is partly due to the increased supply of
primary and junior secondary education, resulting from large infrastructural investments
initiated in the 1970s. This is also reßected by the improvements in education attainment
amongst the poor, who have been the main beneÞciaries of increased primary education.
The diﬀerence in primary school age enrolment between the poorest 40 percent and the
1For an analysis of enrolment and beneÞt incidence of public education spending in 1978 and 1987
see Meesook (1984), Chernikovski and Meesook (1985), and van de Walle (1992). Lanjouw, Pradhan,
Saadah, Sayed and Sparrow (2002) discuss the trend in enrolment over the last three decades.
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richest 30 percent of the population has decreased from 11 in 1979 to 5 percentage point
in 1997. Nevertheless, despite the pro-poor trend in secondary education large disparities
remain between poor and non-poor. In 1997, school enrolment of rich children aged 16 to
18 is still about twice as high than that of the poor (34 and 64 percent, respectively).
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Figure 2.1: Gross enrolment 1971 to 1997, by enrolment level. Source: Lanjouw,
Pradhan, Saadah, Sayed and Sparrow (2002).
Similar improvements can be seen for health outcomes. Figure 2.2 shows that from
1962 to 1995 infant mortality dropped from 133 to 51 per 1000 births. The mortality
rate amongst children under 5 decreased from 216 per 1000 births in 1960 to 75 per 1000
births in 1995. In that same period life expectancy at birth increased from 42.5 to 64.1.
With the expansion of the public health sector the public health centres (Puskesmas) have
become the most widely used facility, especially amongst the poor and in rural areas.2
Amongst the poorest 40 percent of the population, almost half of the (self reported) ill
did not seek formal care, while approximately a quarter visited a public health clinic. The
use of private health care and hospitals is still very much distributed pro-rich.
At the onset of the Indonesian Þnancial crisis, an important concern was whether the
achievements made in the social sectors over the past decades could be sustained. The
Indonesian government, with help of donors, reacted swiftly by introducing a number of
interventions aimed at safeguarding real incomes and access to social services for the poor.
The main interventions of this Social Safety Net - Jaring Pengaman Sosial (JPS) - were
in health and education. Together these constituted 62 percent of the allocated budget
2E.g. Chernikovski and Meesook (1986), van de Walle (1992 and 1995), and Lanjouw et al. (2002).
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for the Social Safety Net programmes in 1998/1999.3
This chapter describes the pre-crisis distribution of education and primary health care
services, and the changes in the distributions over the course of the crisis. The design
and the implementation of the JPS programmes will be discussed in chapter 3. This
chapter is setup as follows. The next section gives a short account of the economic crisis
and the eﬀect on poverty and public expenditures. As we will see, the crisis was marked
by an explosive increase in poverty and real food prices, while the social sectors suﬀered
budget cuts. The last two sections describe the changes in enrolment and outpatient care
utilisation, as observed in the Indonesian National Socioeconomic Survey (Susenas) from
1995 to 1999, and how this relates to Þndings from other studies.4 Despite reports of
large reductions in human resource investments by households, enrolment seems to have
been aﬀected mildly. The positive trend in enrolment was halted during the crisis, but
enrolment rates did manage to exceed per-crisis levels by 1999. Utilisation of outpatient
care decreased during the crisis, both in terms of the number of people that visited health
care providers and the frequency of visits by these people. Utilisation of public care shows
the strongest decrease, which is explained by a decline in quality and supply of public
care.
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Figure 2.2: Trend in health outcomes 1960 to 1996. Source: World Development
Indicators, World Bank, 1998.
3The JPS further included a food security program, labour creation and micro credit programme.
Ananta and Siregar (1999) and Daly and Fane (2002) provide a good overview of all the JPS programs.
4These two sections draw on results reported earlier in Pradhan and Sparrow (2000a and 2000b).
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2.2 The economic crisis
The Indonesian economic crisis was triggered by a Þnancial crisis that hit Southeast Asia
mid 1997. In addition, eastern Indonesia, Java and Sumatra were struck by El Niño related
droughts in the second half of 1997, while Sumatra, Kalimantan and eastern Indonesia
suﬀered large forest Þres.
By 1998 the eﬀects of the economic crisis were felt all over Indonesia. Real GDP
decreased by roughly 14 percent in 1998 and poverty rates had increased dramatically.5
The economic crisis was accompanied by social unrest and political instability, with vio-
lence marring several parts of the country. This culminated in the resignation of president
Suharto in May 1998 following deadly clashes between armed forces and student activists
demonstrating for reform, and riots in Jakarta that left more than a thousand people
dead.
The economic crisis showed considerable heterogeneity across regions, with Java (the
most populous island of the archipelago) experiencing the greatest diﬃculties (Sumarto,
Wetterberg and Pritchett, 1998). Also, urban areas seem to have been hit harder than
rural areas. Using data from the Indonesian Family Life Survey, Smith et al. (2002)
show that from 1997 to 1998 mean real incomes decreased by 43 percent for urban and
by 21 percent for rural families. Real income decreased for all income groups, but the
poor suﬀered the largest shock. For the poorest 25 percent of the population, real income
decreased by 64 and 33 percent in urban and rural areas, respectively.
Real incomes decreased as prices soared. Figure 2.3 graphs the change in the consumer
price index from 1997 to 1999. 1998 saw an annual increase in the consumer price index
of 78 percent, with the price of food doubling. Especially alarming for the poor was the
development of the price for rice and other staple food, which increased by more than 200
percent from July 1997 to September 1998. The price for education and health services
also increased, but not as strongly as the food price. Over the course of 1998 prices for
health services increased by about 40 percent, for education 10 percent. Note that for
some of the poor, such as net food producers, this implies that health and education had
become cheaper.
There is little evidence of rising overall unemployment during the crisis. Instead, real
wages dropped by about 40 percent in the formal wage sector during the Þrst year of the
crisis, and agriculture seems to have absorbed part of the displaced labour from other
sectors. The decline in real wages is about twice as high compared to real incomes of
households active in the formal sector, indicting alternative income smoothing strate-
5See, for example, Cameron (1999) for an account of the events and economics developments during
the crisis.
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Figure 2.3: Consumer Price Index, January 1997 to December 1999. Source: Central
Bureau of Statistics, Indonesia.
gies. The crisis saw large scale migration to rural areas (especially children and elderly),
increased household labour activities, and households reverting to agriculture. Other re-
ported coping strategies included spending down on wealth and changing spending on
semidurables.6
According to oﬃcial estimates the poverty headcount increased from 17.7 in 1996 to
23.5 in 1999. Alternative estimates of poverty during the crisis abound, unambiguously
showing a daunting increase in poverty. Suryahadi, Sumarto and Pritchett (2003) trace
the path of poverty from 1996 to 1999 and Þnd that, after a period of steady decline, the
poverty headcount has more than doubled during the crisis (Þgure 2.4).7 They estimate
that from February 1997 to the height of the crisis, late 1998, the poverty headcount
increased from 15.3 to 33.2 percent. Of course, the poverty head count is sensitive to
the choice of poverty line as it lies close to the mode of the distribution of per capita
expenditure (e.g. Dhanani and Islam, 2002; Suryahadi, Sumarto and Pritchett, 2003). But
the crisis impact is also reßected in other dimensions of poverty. SkouÞas, Suryahadi and
Sumarto (2000) Þnd that both the poverty gap and poverty inequality increased stronger
than the headcount. This increase in inequality is partly explained by the diﬀerential
impact of the crisis at the lower end of the income distribution. Real wages declined
6See, amongst others, Cameron (1999), Dhanani and Islam (2002), Smith et al. (2002), Frankenberg,
Smith and Thomas (2003).
7Suryahadi, Sumarto and Pritchett (2003) use a variety of data sources on poverty to estimate a
consistent set of poverty estimates over time. The main diﬀerence with other studies is that they account
for the strong relative price changes that occurred during the crisis.
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strongest for unskilled labour, while net food producers beneÞted from the relative price
increase in food.8 This again emphasises the heterogeneity of the crisis, not just across
regions, but also across households.
Knowles and Marzolf (2003) report sharp cutbacks in public health spending due to
reduced government revenues during the crisis. Real public spending on primary care
decreased by 5 percent (107 billion Indonesian Rupiah) in the 1997/1998 Þscal year, and
a further 11 percent (205 billion Rupiah) in 1998/1999. The lack of operational funds
and shortage of drugs disrupted services in public health care facilities in 1998. Health
spending by the Government of Indonesia declined even faster during this period, but
this was partly oﬀset by increased donor funding. In 1998/1999 total donor assistance
for primary health care spending increased by 163 percent (186 billion Rupiah.). Public
spending on education did manage to increase (in real terms) during the Þrst crisis year
but then plummeted in the following year. In the 1997/1998 Þscal year total real public
spending increased by 1 percent (146 billion Rupiah), after which it fell by 28 percent
(3,912 billion Rupiah) in 1998/1999 (World Bank, forthcoming).
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Figure 2.4: The evolution of the poverty headcount from 1996 to 2002. Source:
Suryahadi, Sumarto and Pritchett (2003).
8Smith et al. (2002) note, however, that the positive eﬀects for net food producers may be diminished
by the severe droughts and forest Þres prior to Þnancial crisis.
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2.3 Education
2.3.1 Institutional setting
Basic education in Indonesia consists of 6 years of primary school, followed by 3 years
of junior secondary school. Indonesian children are supposed to enrol in primary school
at age 7. After graduating from junior secondary school, children can progress to senior
secondary school, which takes another 3 years to complete. Oﬃcially, basic education is
compulsory for children aged 7 to 15, although this is not strictly enforced.
Primary and secondary education is oﬀered by both public and private schools. In
principle, each village and urban precinct (desa and kelurahan) in Indonesia should have
at least one public primary school. Junior and senior secondary schools generally serve
larger areas, such as sub-districts (kecamatan) and districts (kabupaten and kota). Hence
average travel distance increases with enrolment level. In addition to public schools there
is a large private sector. The 1998 Susenas reports about 23 percent of all primary and
secondary school students to be enrolled in a private school. The share of the private sector
increases with enrolment level, with 12, 33 and 47 percent at primary, junior and senior
secondary level, respectively. The private sector shows a great degree of heterogeneity,
with only a small segment of expensive and high quality schools. The large majority of
private schools are considered to be of lower quality and less expensive than public schools.
Private schools generally have fewer resources and school inputs, and more part-time and
less qualiÞed teachers.9
In the 1997/1998 budget year, public expenditure on education amounted to approx-
imately 2.1 percent of GDP. 52 percent of this was allocated to primary education, while
junior and senior secondary education received 18 and 13 percent, respectively (World
Bank, 1998). Private spending on education is almost as high as public spending (based
on the education module of the 1998 Susenas, which collects detailed household expendi-
ture on education).
2.3.2 Education and the crisis
There is some evidence that private spending on education was reduced to smooth con-
sumption during the crisis. Frankenberg et al. (2003) Þnd that real household consump-
tion declined by 23 percent in 1998, with investment in human capital (i.e., health and
education) decreasing by 37 percent. Thomas et al. (2004) Þnd that household spend-
ing on education declined, in particular for the rural poor. On average (real) education
9Detailed information on Indonesias education system is given in World Bank (1998).
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expenditure per enrolled household member decreased by 19 percent from 1997 to 1999,
amongst rural households. They estimate that as a result of the crisis non-enrolment rates
for primary school aged children increased by almost 20 percent. Interestingly, households
seem to have protected education of the older children at the expense of their younger
siblings. An explanation is that expected returns to higher education are larger than for
basic education in Indonesia10, and that households have already invested in secondary
education of older children.
A Þrst glance at the Susenas data suggests that enrolment has suﬀered from the
crisis, but only for a short period. Table 2.1 shows that primary and junior secondary
school enrolment rates increased from 1995 to 1997, stagnated in the crisis year 1998,
but increased again in 1999. Despite the severity of the crisis, a large scale drop out
was not observed in 1998. Jones and Hagul (2001) and Jones et al. (2003) discuss Þeld
evidence of strong community support and commitment of schools to maintain enrolment
levels during the Þrst year of the crisis. The following year, when the JPS programme
had been initiated, enrolment picked up, exceeding pre-crisis levels. Senior secondary
enrolment increased throughout this period, even in 1998. A similar pattern is seen for
total enrolment per age group of school aged children.
Table 2.1: Enrolment rates, by education level and age group in 1995, 1997, 1998 and
1999
1995 1997 1998 1999
Net enrolment Primary 91.5 92.3 92.1 92.6
[0.13] [0.12] [0.12] [0.13]
Junior secondary 51.0 57.8 57.1 59.2
[0.36] [0.35] [0.34] [0.39]
Senior secondary 32.6 36.6 37.5 38.5
[0.38] [0.39] [0.37] [0.42]
Age group 7 to 12 93.9 95.4 95.1 95.2
[0.12] [0.10] [0.11] [0.12]
13 to 15 73.2 77.5 77.3 79.0
[0.32] [0.30] [0.30] [0.32]
16 to 18 43.9 47.9 48.7 50.4
[0.41] [0.40] [0.38] [0.41]
7 to 18 77.5 79.4 79.2 79.8
[0.18] [0.17] [0.17] [0.18]
Number of observations 250,053 247,908 243,349 235,334
Standard errors in square brackets are adjusted for clustering in survey design.
Source: Susenas 1995, 1997, 1998 and 1999.
10See, for example, Behrman and Deolalikar (1995).
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Figure 2.5: Enrolment by age and level, from 1995 to 1999 (percentages, left column is
1995, right 1999). Source: Susenas 1995, 1997, 1998 and 1999.
While the 1999 enrolment rates are higher than ever before, there is some indication of
delayed transition from one level of school to the next. Figure 2.5 shows enrolment by age
and school level. Delayed enrolment, often due to grade repetition, is not uncommon in
Indonesia (Behrman and Deolalikar, 1991; Pradhan, 1998). Delayed enrolment in primary
school increased during the crisis, especially for 6 year olds, for which enrolment declined
by 5.7 percent point from 1997 to 1999. Also at ages 11 to 13, when children should
move from primary to junior secondary, we see an overall increase in enrolment with an
increasing share of junior secondary school students. During the crisis this trend reverses
as the share of primary schooling increases. A similar trend can be observed for the
transition from junior to senior secondary school. At ages 15 and 16, a larger proportion
of children was still in junior secondary school then ever before. For 17 and 18 year olds,
on the other hand, there is a steady increase in senior secondary from 1995 to 1999. Delays
in basic education enrolment are also found in a study by Filmer et al. (1999), based on
a school survey.
The changes in enrolment by (per capita) consumption quintile are shown in tables
2.2, 2.3 and 2.4. The top panel in the tables show net enrolment, while the bottom gives
overall enrolment for speciÞc age groups. The pattern of an overall increase in primary
enrolment, from 1995 to 1999, with a small drop in 1998, is also observed for the Þrst,
second and fourth quintile (table 2.2). The poor suﬀered the largest decrease and are the
only group that did not recover to the 1997 level. By contrast, the richest quintile enjoyed
continued improvements in primary enrolment. The increase in net primary enrolment
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from 1998 to 1999 is partly due to delayed transition to junior secondary school, as
increases in enrolment amongst 7 to 12 year olds is less profound (bottom panel in table
2.2).
At the junior secondary level there are strong improvements in enrolment from 1995
to 1997 for all but the richest quintile (table 2.3). In absolute terms, the poor beneÞted
most from the expansion in the junior secondary school system. Net enrolment for the
poorest quintile increased by 12.5 percent points from 1995 to 1999. However, enrolment
is still highly correlated with wealth. Except for the rich, all quintiles suﬀered a dip in
junior secondary enrolment during the crisis. Enrolment picked up in 1999 and exceeded
pre-crisis enrolment for all income groups. However, for the Þrst to fourth quintiles the
increase over the 1997-1999 period is minor compared to the improvements observed from
1995 to 1997. For example, net junior secondary enrolment increased by 28 percent (8.7
percent point) amongst the poor in the two years prior to the crisis, while in the two years
following it increased by 6 percent (2.4 percent point).
Table 2.2: Enrolment rates primary school age (7 to 12), from 1995 to 1999, by per
capita consumption quintile, gender and area
Net primary enrolment 1995 1997 1998 1999
Consumption quintile 1 (poor) 88.8 90.4 89.6 90.2
2 92.1 92.7 92.6 93.1
3 92.5 93.2 93.3 93.8
4 92.9 93.9 93.1 94.2
5 (rich) 92.0 92.1 92.6 93.4
Gender Male 91.4 92.5 92.0 92.6
Female 91.5 92.2 92.1 92.6
Area Urban 92.6 93.0 92.8 93.3
Rural 90.9 92.0 91.7 92.2
Overall enrolment at age 7 to 12 1995 1997 1998 1999
Consumption quintile 1 (poor) 89.8 91.8 90.9 91.3
2 93.7 95.0 94.7 95.0
3 94.5 96.3 96.2 96.4
4 96.2 97.5 97.3 97.5
5 (rich) 98.1 98.6 98.8 98.8
Gender Male 93.6 95.1 94.9 94.9
Female 94.3 95.6 95.3 95.6
Area Urban 96.7 97.8 97.6 97.5
Rural 92.7 94.2 93.8 94.0
Source: Susenas 1995, 1997, 1998 and 1999.
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Table 2.3: Enrolment rates junior secondary school age (13 to 15), from 1995 to 1999, by
per capita consumption quintile, gender and area
Net junior secondary enrolment 1995 1997 1998 1999
Consumption quintile 1 (poor) 30.8 39.5 38.7 41.9
2 42.5 52.3 51.5 53.6
3 52.9 60.5 60.2 61.8
4 62.2 68.8 66.8 68.9
5 (rich) 72.7 74.2 74.5 76.3
Gender Male 50.7 57.4 56.2 58.5
Female 51.2 58.3 58.0 59.9
Area Urban 66.5 70.6 69.7 71.4
Rural 42.7 50.6 49.6 51.8
Overall enrolment at age 13 to 15 1995 1997 1998 1999
Consumption quintile 1 (poor) 56.8 62.1 62.4 65.2
2 66.5 73.0 72.2 74.8
3 75.1 79.9 78.7 81.6
4 82.7 86.5 85.8 87.0
5 (rich) 89.8 91.1 92.7 91.9
Gender Male 74.0 78.3 77.4 79.4
Female 72.4 76.7 77.2 78.7
Area Urban 85.9 88.0 88.6 88.0
Rural 66.4 71.6 70.6 73.7
Source: Susenas 1995, 1997, 1998 and 1999.
Enrolment for the 13 to 15 year age group shows similar patterns. The exception is
the poorest quintile. While net enrolment decreased during the crisis, enrolment for this
group is much higher than net enrolment since many are still at primary school. Delayed
junior secondary enrolment is higher amongst the poor: in the poorest quintile 64 percent
of enrolled junior secondary age children actually is in junior secondary school, against
83 percent in the richest quintile.
The second and third quintile achieved the highest increase in senior secondary en-
rolment, with a 9.1 and 8.6 percent point increase from 1995 to 1999, respectively. The
correlation between wealth and enrolment remains nevertheless highest at senior sec-
ondary level. The enrolment rate for the richest quintile is 2.5 times as high as for the
poorest quintile, and increases almost monotonically with per capita consumption. We
see confounding patterns for the diﬀerent quintiles, which yield an overall increase in en-
rolment (table 2.4). The poorest three quintiles show strong pre-crisis improvements, a
decrease in 1998 (especially for the poor), and a strong recovery in 1999. The two richest
quintiles experience continuous improvement in enrolment, which is halted in 1999 as the
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enrolment rate decreases by less than a percentage point. Note that this dip is actually
due to delayed transition from junior to senior secondary school, as overall enrolment
amongst 16 to 18 year olds does not decrease for these quintiles.
From 1995 to 1999, the boys-girls gap in enrolment has almost entirely disappeared.
Net enrolment rates by gender are given in the second panel of tables 2.2 to 2.4. At
primary school there is no diﬀerence in boy and girls school enrolment (table 2.2). For
both groups enrolment follows the general trend over the period from 1995 to 1999. At the
junior secondary level net enrolment is higher for girls. Boys seem to have been aﬀected
more by the crisis as net junior secondary enrolment drops by more than a percentage
point from 1997 to 1998 (table 2.3). Senior secondary enrolment increase continuously
for both groups, albeit faster for girls (table 2.4). In 1995 there is a 1.8 percentage point
gap between boys and girls, with 33.5 and 31.7 percent, respectively. By 1999 this has
turned around as senior secondary enrolment amongst girls increased to 39.1 percent and
for boys to 37.9. Overall, enrolment at secondary school age (i.e., 13 to 18 years) is higher
Table 2.4: Enrolment rates senior secondary school age (16 to 18), from 1995 to 1999, by
per capita consumption quintile, gender and area
Net senior secondary enrolment 1995 1997 1998 1999
Consumption quintile 1 (poor) 12.0 15.9 13.2 16.3
2 19.6 25.5 24.1 28.7
3 29.1 34.9 34.8 37.7
4 41.1 45.8 48.6 48.0
5 (rich) 57.1 59.6 63.5 62.9
Gender Male 33.5 36.7 37.5 37.9
Female 31.7 36.5 37.4 39.1
Area Urban 50.0 54.0 55.5 56.5
Rural 20.9 24.3 24.2 25.1
Overall enrolment at age 16 to 18 1995 1997 1998 1999
Consumption quintile 1 (poor) 21.6 26.7 24.5 28.1
2 31.8 37.6 36.2 41.2
3 41.3 47.2 47.4 51.1
4 54.2 57.9 60.5 60.5
5 (rich) 66.7 68.9 72.0 72.2
Gender Male 46.5 49.3 50.0 50.9
Female 41.3 46.5 47.4 49.9
Area Urban 61.3 65.4 66.0 67.3
Rural 32.2 35.6 36.0 37.9
Source: Susenas 1995, 1997, 1998 and 1999.
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for boys, but from 1995 to 1999 this gap narrowed and has practically disappeared in
1999. The eﬀect is most visible for the 16 to 18 age group, for which the boys-girls gap
in enrolment narrowed from 5.2 percent point in 1995 to 1 percent point in 1999. There
is, however, a diﬀerence between those boys and girls that are enrolled. Girls tend to go
to a higher education level at a younger age, while delayed enrolment is higher for boys.
Girls move faster through the school system and repeat less often.
The third panel in tables 2.2 to 2.4 presents net enrolment rates for urban and rural
areas. Net primary school enrolment rates are near universal, and a little higher in urban
than in rural areas (table 2.2). In 1998 enrolment amongst primary and junior secondary
aged children decreased more in rural than in urban areas. But despite the drop in 1998,
primary and junior secondary school enrolment improved from 1995 to 1999 in both urban
and rural areas (table 2.3). Senior secondary enrolment increased continuously, with a
slight tapering oﬀ is found in 1998, especially in rural areas (table 2.4).
2.4 Health
2.4.1 Institutional setting
The public health care system in Indonesia involves a wide network of public health
care providers. These public facilities include hospitals (mainly at district level), sub-
district health centres (Puskesmas), auxiliary health centres (Puskesmas Pembantu), mo-
bile health clinics and village maternity homes (Polindes). The public health centers oﬀer
primary health care services, implement a number of health programmes, and can refer
patients to public hospitals. In each village family planning services and maternity care
is available through a village midwife programme (Bidan di Desa).
There is a considerable private health sector in Indonesia. As we will see below,
the private sector covers more than half of all outpatient care utilisation. Private sector
consists of private doctors, clinics, hospitals and paramedical services. It is not uncommon
that doctors working in public centers also maintain a private practice.
Public health expenditures in the 1997/1998 budget cover about 0.5 percent of GDP
(Lanjouw et al., 2002). Just over half of this is attributed to primary health care spend-
ing. Per capita private spending on health is considerably higher than public spending.
According to expenditure data from the 1998 Susenas health module, aggregate annual
household expenditure on health care is more than twice as high as annual public spend-
ing.
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2.4.2 Health care utilisation and the crisis
The severity of the crisis has undoubtedly aﬀected households health care expenditures
and utilisation. Table 2.5 depicts observed trends in the utilisation of medical services
before and during the crisis. The data are based on a series of Susenas household surveys
and present utilisation and contact rates of modern health care for a one-month recall
period.11 The contact rate reßects the percentage of people that visited a health care
provider at least once, while the utilisation rate reßects the frequency of use (i.e., the
contact rate weighted by the number of visits). The table indicates a sharp decrease in
the utilisation of modern health care from 1997 to 1998 as the utilisation rate decreased
by 26 percent, from 0.19 to 0.14 visits per person. The percentage of people that visited
a modern health care provider at least once in the last month decreased from 12.8 to
10.5 percent. The decline in utilisation was largely due to a 33 percent decrease in
utilisation of public sector providers. Utilisation of private care also saw a considerable
decline, but to a lesser extent with 20 percent. By 1998 the utilisation and contact rate of
private facilities (7.8 and 6.1, respectively) exceeded that of public facilities (6.4 and 5.0,
respectively). This trend in utilisation is also found in the Indonesian Family Life Survey
(e.g. Frankenberg, Thomas and Beegle, 1999).
A breakdown by type of provider is presented in table 2.6 and shows that the decline
in public care occurs for the most part at public health clinics. The contact rate at public
health clinics decreased by a quarter, from 4.3 percent in 1997 to 3.3 percent in 1998,
while 1999 shows a small increase to 3.5 percent. Auxiliary health clinics experienced a
similar decline, as the contact rate decreased from 1.7 to 1.0 percent and remained at that
level in 1999. Waters, Saadah and Pradhan (2003) attribute this trend to a decline in
the supply and quality of health care services at public sector providers. The main cause
for this quality deterioration was the growing shortage of medicines, medical equipment
and materials with public facilities during the Þrst year of the crisis, especially in rural
areas.12
Saadah, Pradhan and Surbakti (2000) also argue that the relative strong decrease in
public care, compared to private, is not due to price increases. They show that public
health clinics were the only providers where user fees (reported by households) did not
increase in nominal terms. The cost of care did increase strongly at other facilities,
11Modern health care is here deÞned as public health care providers  hospitals, health clinics
(Puskesmas), subsidiary health clinics (Puskesmas pembantu) village maternity posts (Polindes) and
integrated health posts (Posyandu)  and private providers  hospitals, doctors, clinics and paramedical
services. Traditional health care is not included.
12See, for example, Ananta and Siregar (1999), Frankenberg, Thomas and Beegle (1999), Frankenberg,
Beegle, Thomas and Suriastini (1999), and Knowles, Pernia and Racelis (1999).
2.4. HEALTH 23
especially at hospitals, while use of outpatient care at hospitals remained fairly constant.
From 1998 to 1999 total utilisation of modern health care providers remained the same,
but the share of the public sector increased. The contact rate increased to 5.3 percent,
and the private contact rate decreased to 5.8 percent. One possible explanation is the
JPS health programme, which started during this period.13
Both Saadah et al. (2000) and Waters et al. (2003) note that the pattern of public
and private care is very diﬀerent to other South East Asian countries. For example,
in Thailand the use of public care increased during the crisis. Social protection and
health insurance schemes were limited in Indonesia, in contrast to Thailand, where such
programmes had been expanding in the years prior to the crisis.
Table 2.5: Outpatient utilisation and contact rate, 1995, 1997, 1998 and 1999
Type of provider 1995 1997 1998 1999
Utilisation rate Public∗ 10.9 9.5 6.4 6.9
[0.14] [0.13] [0.09] [0.10]
Private 10.1 9.8 7.8 7.5
[0.13] [0.13] [0.10] [0.10]
Modern 21.1 19.3 14.2 14.4
[0.20] [0.20] [0.15] [0.16]
Traditional 1.6 1.2 0.7 0.6
[0.05] [0.04] [0.02] [0.03]
Contact rate Public∗ 7.0 6.7 5.0 5.3
[0.08] [0.08] [0.06] [0.07]
Private 6.5 6.7 6.1 5.8
[0.07] [0.08] [0.07] [0.08]
Modern 12.8 12.8 10.5 10.5
[0.11] [0.12] [0.10] [0.11]
Traditional 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.4
[0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.01]
Number of observations 873,643 887,266 880,040 864,580
Standard errors in square brackets are adjusted for clustering in survey design.
Source: Susenas 1995, 1997, 1998 and 1999.
∗ Public hospitals, health clinics, subsidiary health clinics, village maternity posts
and integrated health posts.
 Private hospitals, doctors, clinics and paramedical services.
 Public and private care. The contact rate for modern care is lower than the sum of
the contact rates for public and private care because people that sought both public
and private care are counted only once in the aggregate.
13Another explanation for the dip in 1998 would be that households postponed preventive care, in
anticipation of the health card. But this is unlikely because the JPS interventions had not been announced
when the 1998 Susenas survey was conducted.
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There is no evidence that nutritional indicators have worsened during the crisis, for
example weight for age scores, in 1998 and 1999. This measure is sensitive to short term
changes in nutritional status (Saadah et al., 2000; Waters et al., 2003). Self reported
illness did increase slightly. However, one needs to be careful interpreting these data, due
to measurement error and reporting bias (Strauss and Thomas, 1998).
Utilisation of modern care is strongly correlated with income. Tables 2.7 to 2.9 show
utilisation and contact rates at public, private and modern health care providers. During
the crisis utilisation has decreased for all quintiles, both in terms of contact rates and
utilisation rates. Less people have visited a modern health care provider, and for those
that do go the number of visits has decreased over time (table 2.7). The diﬀerences
between poor and rich have become smaller over time, even during the crisis. In 1999
the utilisation rate for the richest quintile (16.8) is 50 percent higher than for the poorest
quintile (11.2). In 1995 modern outpatient care utilisation was 78 percent higher amongst
the rich (27.1) compared to the poor (15.2).
Table 2.6: Outpatient contact rate by type of provider, 1995 to 1999
Type of provider 1995 1997 1998 1999
Public hospital 0.64 0.60 0.64 0.59
[0.015] [0.017] [0.017] [0.019]
Private hospital 0.40 0.41 0.40 0.39
[0.016] [0.015] [0.013] [0.018]
Private doctor 3.01 3.14 2.84 2.63
[0.050] [0.053] [0.044] [0.052]
Primary health clinic (Puskesmas) 4.66 4.31 3.25 3.46
[0.065] [0.069] [0.049] [0.057]
Auxiliary health clinic (Puskesmas Pembantu) 1.69 1.66 1.01 1.01
[0.046] [0.044] [0.031] [0.032]
Private clinic 0.42 0.39 0.34 0.31
[0.020] [0.020] [0.015] [0.016]
Integrated health centre (Posyandu) 0.19 0.20 0.12 0.10
[0.009] [0.011] [0.008] [0.007]
Village maternity home (Polindes) 0.38 0.24 0.26 0.40
[0.017] [0.013] [0.015] [0.015]
Paramedical practitioner (Petugas) 2.82 2.93 2.80 2.70
[0.048] [0.052] [0.048] [0.049]
Traditional care 0.73 0.63 0.43 0.40
[0.020] [0.018] [0.014] [0.015]
Number of observations 873,647 887,266 880,040 864,580
Standard errors in square brackets are adjusted for clustering in survey design.
Source: Susenas 1995, 1997, 1998 and 1999.
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Table 2.7: Utilisation and contact rate modern outpatient care, 1995 to 1999, by per
capita consumption quintile, gender and area
Utilisation rate 1995 1997 1998 1999
Consumption quintile 1 (poor) 15.2 14.0 11.3 11.2
2 18.0 17.3 12.7 12.6
3 20.7 19.5 14.4 14.7
4 24.3 21.8 15.9 15.6
5 (rich) 27.1 24.1 16.8 16.8
Gender Male 21.3 19.5 14.1 14.2
Female 20.8 19.2 14.3 14.5
Area Urban 20.8 19.4 14.5 14.8
Rural 21.2 19.3 14.0 14.1
Contact rate 1995 1997 1998 1999
Consumption quintile 1 (poor) 9.5 9.6 8.5 8.3
2 11.3 11.8 9.6 9.5
3 12.7 13.1 10.7 10.8
4 14.5 14.3 11.6 11.3
5 (rich) 16.2 15.5 12.1 12.1
Gender Male 12.8 12.7 10.3 10.4
Female 12.9 12.9 10.6 10.7
Area Urban 13.3 13.2 11.1 11.2
Rural 12.5 12.6 10.1 10.1
Source: Susenas 1995, 1997, 1998 and 1999.
From 1995 to 1999 the diﬀerences in contact rates show a similar pattern. Contact
rates amongst the rich remain higher than for the poor, but they have decreased faster
during the crisis. Amongst the rich 15.5 percent of the people had visited a modern
provider in 1995. By 1998 this had reduced to 12.1 percent. Over this period, the contact
rate for the poorest quintile decreased from 9.6 to 8.5 percent.
Use of public care increases with income up to the fourth quintile, and decreases again
for the Þfth quintile (table 2.8), although from 1995 to 1999 public outpatient utilisation
has become more equally distributed. Public utilisation decreased for all quintiles from
1995 to 1998, with the largest dip in 1998, while in 1999 all quintiles increased their use
of public care. A notable development in 1998 is the large shift away from public care by
the rich, as the contact rate decreased from 6.2 to 4.3 percent. The percentage of people
from the poorest quintile that visited a public provider decreased less strongly, from 5.9
to 5.2. In 1998 and 1999 public utilisation and contact rates are lowest for the richest
quintile.
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Utilisation of private care is distributed very much pro-rich (table 2.9). This pattern
has persisted from 1995 to 1999 as utilisation has decreased for all income groups, espe-
cially during the Þrst year of the crisis. Unlike public care, no revival is observed in 1999.
For the richest quintile the contact rate decreased from 16.1 to 10.7 percent, and for the
poor from 3.7 to 3.2 percent.
There is little diﬀerence between men and women in terms of utilisation rates. The
decreasing pattern in utilisation from 1995 to 1999 is similar for men and women, al-
though utilisation amongst men decreases slightly faster. Before the crisis men had a
higher utilisation rate than women (21.3 against 20.8 in 1995), but slightly lower contact
rate (12.8 against 12.9). That is, fewer men seek outpatient care, but those that do go
more often. This pattern disappears during the crisis in 1998, when men have slightly
lower utilisation and contact rates than women (14.1/10.3 against 14.3/10.6, respectively).
Another diﬀerence is that utilisation of public care is higher amongst women than with
men, while private care is used more by men than women. This may reßect outpatient
services oﬀered by village midwives and maternity posts.
Table 2.8: Utilisation and contact rate public outpatient care, 1995 to 1999, by per
capita consumption quintile, gender and area
Utilisation rate 1995 1997 1998 1999
Consumption quintile 1 (poor) 9.5 8.3 6.6 7.1
2 10.4 9.5 6.4 6.8
3 11.4 10.0 6.7 7.4
4 12.3 10.7 6.7 7.5
5 (rich) 10.9 9.3 5.8 6.1
Gender Male 10.9 9.4 6.2 6.6
Female 11.0 9.6 6.7 7.2
Area Urban 9.0 8.3 5.8 6.3
Rural 12.0 10.2 6.8 7.3
Contact rate 1995 1997 1998 1999
Consumption quintile 1 (poor) 6.3 5.9 5.2 5.5
2 6.9 6.8 5.1 5.4
3 7.4 7.0 5.3 5.8
4 7.7 7.4 5.2 5.8
5 (rich) 6.7 6.2 4.3 4.6
Gender Male 6.8 6.5 4.8 5.1
Female 7.2 6.8 5.2 5.6
Area Urban 6.0 5.9 4.6 4.9
Rural 7.6 7.1 5.3 5.6
Source: Susenas 1995, 1997, 1998 and 1999.
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Table 2.9: Utilisation and contact rate private outpatient care, 1995 to 1999, by per
capita consumption quintile, gender and area
Utilisation rate 1995 1997 1998 1999
Consumption quintile 1 (poor) 5.7 5.7 4.7 4.1
2 7.6 7.9 6.4 5.8
3 9.3 9.4 7.7 7.3
4 12.0 11.1 9.2 8.1
5 (rich) 16.1 14.8 11.0 10.7
Gender Male 10.4 10.1 8.0 7.6
Female 9.9 9.5 7.7 7.3
Area Urban 11.8 11.1 8.8 8.5
Rural 9.2 9.0 7.2 6.8
Contact rate 1995 1997 1998 1999
Consumption quintile 1 (poor) 3.7 4.0 3.7 3.2
2 5.0 5.5 5.1 4.6
3 6.0 6.6 6.0 5.6
4 7.5 7.5 7.2 6.3
5 (rich) 10.3 9.8 8.6 8.2
Gender Male 6.6 6.8 6.2 5.9
Female 6.4 6.6 6.0 5.7
Area Urban 7.9 7.7 7.1 6.8
Rural 5.7 6.1 5.5 5.2
Source: Susenas 1995, 1997, 1998 and 1999.
Utilisation of modern outpatient care is higher in urban areas, while the impact of the
crisis was larger in rural areas. Contact rates in urban and rural areas decreased from 13.2
and 12.6 in 1997 to 11.1 and 10.1, respectively. Public utilisation is higher in rural areas,
but so is the decrease during the crisis. This follows other reports that the disruption of
public care was most severe in rural areas. The private sector is more prominent in urban
areas. Public utilisation picked up in 1999, in both rural and urban areas, while private
utilisation decreased throughout the period 1995 to 1999.
2.5 Conclusion
The chapter described changes in health care utilisation and school enrolment during the
crisis, on the basis of the Susenas household survey. The economic crisis that hit Indonesia
in 1997 saw GPD drop by 14 percent in 1998, a strong increase in poverty, rising food
prices and sharp budget cuts in social sectors.
Generally, the crisis does not seem to have halted the positive trend in enrolment
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observed over the period 1995 to 1997, but it did manage to frustrate it for a year.
Reduced household spending on education, such as reported by Frankenberg et al. (2003),
are reßected in aggregate enrolment Þgures. There is some evidence that children were
temporarily taken out of school, with the rural poor aﬀected disproportionately as a result
of the crisis. But 1999 saw a full recovery from 1998, bringing enrolment levels higher than
they were in 1997. Chapter 5 will argue that the recovery of primary enrolment is due
to the JPS scholarship programme. Without the programme, primary enrolment would
have decreased further. However, for junior secondary school enrolment the programme
can only explain part of the increase.
Increased costs of health care, decreased household income and deteriorating health
services were followed by a strong decline in health care utilisation. Utilisation of both
public and private care decreased during the crisis for all income groups. Utilisation has
decreased stronger for the rich, especially public care.
The main explanation is that quality and supply of public care suﬀered considerably
from the crisis, turning people away from the public sector. This eﬀect has been especially
strong amongst the rich. However, there seems no evidence of substitution eﬀects towards
the private sector. This suggests other factors are at work. One would be an income eﬀect.
Second, quality of private care may also be aﬀected by the crisis and the increased prices
of medical supplies.
1999 saw a comeback of the public sector, while utilisation of private care remained
constant. Chapter 6 will investigate to what extent this revival is due to the JPS health
programme. It appears that the price subsidy that was oﬀered through the health card
did indeed increase utilisation of public care. Amongst the poor the health card lead to an
increase in the use of health care, while for the non-poor the health cards have only lead
to a substitution from private to public care. But the largest eﬀect is due to the budgetary
support. The extra resources available to public health facilities under the programme
has helped improve quality of care, and increase supply of drugs and materials. However,
this supply impulse has only moved the non-poor, as the poor seem only sensitive to the
price subsidy.
Chapter 3
The Indonesian Social Safety Net:
Programme Design and BeneÞt
Incidence
3.1 Introduction
In an attempt to protect access to health and education for the poor during the crisis,
nationwide health and education programmes were introduced in August 1998, as part of
the Indonesian Social Safety Net - Jaring Pengaman Sosial (JPS). Under the education
programme almost 4 million scholarships were made available to primary and secondary
school students. The programme followed a partly decentralised allocation process, in-
volving both geographic and community based individual targeting. The size of the schol-
arship increased with the school level and amounted to about 7 to 18 percent of average
per capita household consumption. The scholarships were monthly cash transfers, and
students had full discretion on how to use the funds.
The health care intervention followed a few months later, and included both a tar-
geted price subsidy and a public spending component. The price subsidy concerned the
revitalisation of the so called health card - Kartu Sehat. This card existed before the
onset of the crisis, but its use had been negligible. Households that were thought to be
most vulnerable to economic shocks were allocated health cards, which entitled all house-
hold members to the price subsidy at public health care providers. Health care facilities
that provided the subsidised care received extra budgetary support to compensate for the
increased demand. However, there was a loose relationship between the utilisation of the
health card and the compensation that the health care providers received in return. Com-
pensation was allocated to districts based on the estimated number of households eligible
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for the health card programme rather than actual utilisation of the health cards. Similar
to the education programme, targeting and allocation was decentralised to districts and
village communities.
The success of such crisis interventions critically depends on the ability to identify
and reach the poor, in particular those that are most vulnerable to the eﬀects of a cri-
sis. Successful targeting requires information on welfare and crisis impact for individual
households. Typically, collecting such disaggregated information centrally is costly. The
administrative capacity for providing welfare details for each household (for example, a
centralised tax administration) is often not available in developing countries like Indone-
sia. Moreover, short term information regarding the crisis eﬀects for individual households
would be hard to retrieve even under a highly developed administrative system. For exam-
ple, in case of the Indonesian crisis, SkouÞas, Suryahadi and Sumarto (2000) Þnd evidence
of considerable movement in and out of poverty from 1997 to 1998, hindering accurate
targeting of the poor.
The decentralised design of the JPS programmes is meant to deal with this targeting
problem. The combination of multi-level geographic and community based targeting
provides an alternative infrastructure for gathering and processing information locally,
and disseminating this to higher administrative levels. Several authors have argued that
a decentralised design can beneÞt from local knowledge and community participation, on
the premise that local communities are more capable of identifying the poor.1 Not only
do local communities have better access to information on targeting criteria, they are also
more able to prioritise amongst the set criteria or even formulate new local criteria that
better reßect the need for assistance.
However, decentralisation has its weaknesses. Recently, a number of theoretical and
empirical studies have investigated the implications and pitfalls of diﬀerent aspects of
decentralisation (e.g. regional political or Þscal autonomy). A main concern is that the
beneÞts of using local knowledge are oﬀset against the loss of control over the allocation
process. Decentralised programmes are prone to local elite capture and suﬀer from classic
principal-agent dilemmas (e.g. Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000 and 2005; Galasso and
Ravallion, 2005). In a comprehensive review of the empirical literature on targeting
Coady, Grosh and Hoddinott (2004) Þnd that geographic and community based targeting
perform above average, but with a large variation between the individual projects.
This chapter deals with the targeting of the two JPS programmes, in light of the de-
centralised design. The objective is to investigate how the programmes were implemented
1See, for example, Alderman (2001 and 2002). Conning and Kevane (2002) provide an extensive review
of community based targeting.
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in the Þeld and who were the beneÞciaries of scholarships and health cards. Were the
beneÞciaries those people that the programmes intended to reach? Is there evidence of
leakage or local capture of beneÞts by the non-poor? Particular focus will be on the
eﬀectiveness of regional targeting policy in contrast to within-district targeting by the
allocation committees. Has the central allocation unit been able to identify the regions
hit hardest by the crisis? What determines targeting at local level?
Due to a lack of data on the crisis impact, programme managers based geographic
targeting on pre-crisis poverty estimates. However, the extent of the crisis varied greatly
across regions and was not correlated with pre-crisis poverty. This is also reßected in the
geographic targeting criteria for both programmes.
On average, the scholarship are targeted pro-poor, but with high leakage rates to the
non-poor. There are also diﬀerences between schooling levels. Allocation of primary school
scholarships is more pro-poor than at secondary level. Especially at senior secondary level
the allocation committees found it diﬃcult to identify the poorest students.
Health card allocation is pro-poor, despite a large number of health cards going to the
non-poor. Moreover, health card allocation is more pro-poor than health card utilisation:
conditional on ownership, the non-poor use health cards more often. This suggests that
not all access barriers to health care are overcome by a user fee waiver. The main deterrent
seems to be the opportunity costs of seeking health care. While the more remote areas
were targeted because of the lack of access to health care facilities, it is for the same
reason that usage rates are low.
The key source of data for this chapter is Indonesias main socioeconomic survey (Suse-
nas). The Susenas is conducted annually on a national scale, collecting information on
health, education, socioeconomic background of individuals and households, and detailed
information on household expenditures. In 1999 a special JPS module was included. This
module provides information on household and individual participation in each of the
JPS programmes. The Susenas survey is Þelded in February, so the JPS module only
reßects programme coverage during the initial 6 months of implementation. The Þrst
scholarships and health cards were distributed in the fourth quarter of 1998. By February
1999, the health card programme covered about 11 percent of the population while 5
percent of enrolled children had received a scholarship. In 1999 the core survey included
205,747 households and 864,580 individuals. The number of households included in the
JPS module was slightly smaller, at 202,089.
A 1996 village census (Podes), provides pre-intervention data on the availability of
schools, health care facilities in each village (desa) and urban precinct (kelurahan) in
Indonesia. The Podes includes 66,486 of these communities and can be merged with
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the Susenas data. A health facility survey, conducted in June 1999 among 3,802 public
health clinics and 3,989 village midwives provides information on the amount of JPS funds
received and the way in which it has been spent. Finally, I use administrative data on
the geographic targeting criteria.
The next two sections in this chapter contain a detailed description of the JPS educa-
tion (section 3.2) and health (section 3.3) programmes. Each of these sections describes
the programme design and who were the main beneÞciaries of the programme.
The other sections in this chapter then look into the eﬀectiveness of targeting that
underlies the observed beneÞt incidence. Section 3.4 addresses geographic targeting of
both programmes, by comparing the allocation rules with actual poverty and the impact
of the crisis across districts. Section 3.5 then investigates the determinants of within-
district targeting. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 The scholarship programme
3.2.1 Programme design
The JPS scholarship programme was implemented at the start of the 1998/1999 academic
year. It was to run for 5 years, Þnanced by the World Bank, the Asian Development
Bank and the Government of Indonesia. For the Þrst year the costs amounted to US
$ 114 million. The main objective of the programme was to keep enrolment rates for
primary and secondary education at pre-crisis levels (Ministry of Education, 1998). The
programme aimed to reach 6 percent of enrolled students at primary schools, 17 percent
at junior secondary schools, and 10 percent at senior secondary schools. Schools received
block grants from an operational assistance fund - Dana Bantuan Operasional (DBO) -
to maintain quality of education during the crisis.2
The size of the scholarships increases with the enrolment level. The scholarships
amounted to Rp. 10,000 per month for students in primary school, Rp. 20,000 for junior
secondary school, and Rp. 25,000 in senior secondary school. To put these numbers into
perspective, average monthly per capita expenditure reported in the 1999 Susenas was
Rp. 131,465, while households representing the poorest 20 percent of the population spent
Rp. 62,417 per capita per month. For the 1997/1998 school year, monthly expenditures
on education per student from the poorest quintile were Rp. 4,881, Rp. 16,123 and
Rp. 30,401 (in February 1999 prices) for primary, junior secondary and senior secondary,
2The DBO block grants could be used to purchase materials, make repairs, and cover other operational
costs.
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respectively.3 Thus, for the poorest households the scholarships are quite signiÞcant
contributions to monthly income and cover a large part of the expenditures on education.
Through the decentralised design of the programme, scholarships were allocated in
three phases. First, the funds were allocated to districts (kabupaten and kota, based on
the level of poverty. At the time of implementation there was no accurate information
available on the crisis impact. Therefore a poverty index was constructed based on the
1996 Susenas consumption module (in the rest of the study I will refer to this index as
JPS96). Poor districts were allocated relatively more scholarships, proportional to the
number of enrolled students.
At the district level committees were formed to allocate scholarships to schools. This
allocation was based on a prosperity measure for the village or sub-district (kecamatan)
served by the school, the percentage of IDT eligible villages in the area, and the average
school fees paid by students.4 Both private and public schools were eligible. The district
committees were allowed to deÞne additional criteria if they felt this would better reßect
local conditions. The prosperity measure was provided by the National Family Planning
Coordinating Agency - Badan Koordinasi Keluarga Berencana Nasional (BKKBN), and
counts the number of poor households based on the so-called prosperity status. Under this
deÞnition a household classiÞes as poor if it fails at least one of the following 5 basic needs
criteria: (i) households can worship according to faith, (ii) eat basic food twice a day, (iii)
have diﬀerent clothing for school/work and home/leisure activities, (iv) have a ßoor that
is made out of something other than earth, and (v) have access to modern medical care
for children or access to modern contraceptive methods. The BKKBN regularly collects
this information on a census basis.
Finally, JPS allocation committees were formed at schools to select students for the
programme. The committees received guidelines on which allocation criteria to consider.
These included the BKKBN prosperity status, single parent and large households, and
travel distance from home to school. Another aim was to allocate at least half of the
scholarships to girls. Students in primary school grades 1 to 3 were not eligible. The
allocation committees could also select children that had already dropped out of school
due to the crisis. Continuation of scholarships was conditional on enrolment and passing
the grade at the end of the school year. However, no formal conditions were placed on
school attendance or how the funds had to be spent.
A distinctive element of the scholarship and block grants programme is the funding
3Based on data from an education expenditure module to the 1998 Susenas.
4IDT refers to the Inpres Desa Tertinggal program, an anti-poverty programme for economically less
developed villages. For this program, each village or urban precinct in Indonesia has been classiÞed as
either developed or less developed. This indicator was not used for the primary school poverty ranking.
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mechanism itself. The scholarships and grants were transferred directly to local post
oﬃces, where the intended beneÞciaries could collect the funds. In remote areas, where
transportation costs for students are high, post oﬃce oﬃcials would travel to the schools
to disburse the scholarships to the students.
3.2.2 BeneÞt incidence
Average incidence
By February 1999, at the time that the 1999 Susenas survey was administered, the JPS
scholarship programme had not yet reached its intended targets. Table 3.1 shows the
allocation of scholarships to enrolled students, by enrollment level. The JPS coverage of
enrolled students was 4.0 percent, 8.4 percent and 3.7 percent for the respective enrollment
levels. Overall, 5.0 percent of all students in primary and secondary school were covered.
Table 3.1 also shows how the JPS programme dwarfs all other scholarship programmes,
as it covers about 83 percent of all scholarships.
Table 3.1: Coverage of JPS and non-JPS scholarships (percent of enrolled students,
February 1999)
Type Primary Junior secondary Senior secondary All
Government JPS 4.01 8.42 3.71 4.96
Goverment Non-JPS 0.22 0.76 0.62 0.39
GN-OTA∗ 0.28 0.39 0.19 0.29
Private sector 0.08 0.25 0.27 0.15
Other 0.12 0.23 0.22 0.16
Total 4.71 10.05 5.02 5.95
N 122,143 41,367 25,522 189,032
Source: Susenas 1999.
∗ National Foster Parents Movements
Looking at the distribution of the scholarships by per capita expenditure (table 3.2),
the pro-poor distribution of JPS scholarships is clear, as is the considerable leakage to
students from wealthier households.5 Amongst students from the poorest 20 percent of
the population 7.2, 15.8 and 8.3 percent received a scholarship at primary, and junior
and secondary school, respectively. The percentage of scholarship recipients decreases
5Some caution is required, as there may be some direct short-term eﬀects on per capita consumption.
See van de Walle (2003) for a discussion on assumptions about behavioural responses regarding the eﬀect
of public policy on household consumption. Preferably, the analysis should have been based on the pre-
intervention per capita consumption level of households. However, this information is not available in
the survey. All that is collected is current consumption.
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Table 3.2: Distribution of JPS scholarships amongst enrolled children
Incidence Average odds ratio Share
(% of students) (%)
Primary
Quintile 1 7.15 1.78 43.84
Quintile 2 4.78 1.19 26.85
Quintile 3 3.35 0.84 17.27
Quintile 4 1.94 0.48 8.82
Quintile 5 0.92 0.23 3.21
Male 3.70 0.92 47.92
Female 4.36 1.09 52.08
Urban 2.28 0.57 19.96
Rural 4.95 1.23 80.04
All 4.01 1.00 100.00
Junior Secondary
Quintile 1 15.78 1.87 29.53
Quintile 2 11.55 1.37 27.23
Quintile 3 8.35 0.99 21.63
Quintile 4 5.60 0.67 14.70
Quintile 5 2.84 0.34 6.91
Male 7.89 0.94 47.75
Female 8.96 1.06 52.25
Urban 5.56 0.66 30.18
Rural 10.81 1.28 69.82
All 8.42 1.00 100.00
Senior Secondary
Quintile 1 8.16 2.20 18.48
Quintile 2 6.49 1.75 25.21
Quintile 3 4.39 1.18 23.18
Quintile 4 2.78 0.75 19.39
Quintile 5 1.63 0.44 13.74
Male 3.43 0.92 46.88
Female 4.00 1.08 53.12
Urban 2.95 0.80 49.83
Rural 4.99 1.35 50.17
All 3.71 1.00 100.00
Number of observations: 122,143 (primary), 41,367 (junior secondary) and
25,522 (senior secondary). Source: Susenas 1999.
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gradually for the richer quintiles, with 0.9, 2.8 and 1.6 percent of the richest students
being included in the programme, for the respective enrollment levels.
The average odds ratio of receiving a scholarship is given column 2 in table 3.2. This
ratio is simply the incidence of beneÞts for a particular sub-group of the population divided
by the average incidence. They reßect the odds of selection into the programme for a child
in particular group, relative to the whole population. We see that at all enrolment levels
the average odds of receiving a scholarship are the highest for students from the two
poorest quintiles. However, average odds ratios give an incomplete picture of targeting
because they do not account for the population structure at diﬀerent enrolment levels.
For example, the poor are typically under-represented at secondary school, so the odds
ratio for the Þrst quintile reßect average incidence amongst a smaller group of students
than that of the Þfth quintile.6
The third column in table 3.2 shows the share of scholarships concentrated with the
diﬀerent population groups. These shares oﬀer a diﬀerent perspective on the allocation,
with marked diﬀerences between enrolment levels. Whereas the odds ratio for the poor
increase with enrolment level, the share of scholarship that is allocated to the poor is
greater at primary school at secondary school level. Students from the two poorest quin-
tiles hold 70.7 percent of the primary school scholarships, while 3.2 percent went to the
richest quintile. Allocation of scholarships to junior secondary school is also pro-poor,
but slightly less than the overall allocation. In contrast, allocation at senior secondary
level does not seem to be pro-poor at all. 44.1 percent of the scholarships went to stu-
dents from the poorest 40 percent, and 13.6 of the scholarships went to students from the
richest quintile. In fact, the very poor seem to be underrepresented in the distribution
of scholarships at senior secondary level, while the middle quintiles capture most of the
beneÞt.
The concentration curves in the Þgure 3.1 correspond to the shares reported in table
3.2. The Þgure shows on the vertical axis the share of scholarships distributed and on the
horizontal axis the students ranking in the national distribution of per capita expenditure.
It clearly shows the diﬀerent targeting performance between levels, as the curves never
cross. The senior secondary concentration curve does cross with the 45 degree line.
The results in table 3.2 suggest that allocation committees in senior secondary schools
Þnd it hard to identify the poorest students in school. One reason could be the rela-
tively small number of children from poor households that enroll at secondary school.
For example, the number of senior secondary students from the richest quintile is four
6This is also why the average odds for the quintiles do not sum to 5, which they should if the quintiles
reßect groups of equal size.
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times as high as the number of students from the poorest quintile (32.2 and 7.9 percent,
respectively), while in primary school the rich are the smaller group (13.3 and 25.3 per-
cent, respectively). Nevertheless, the number of poor is still greater than the number of
scholarships.
The fact that the probability of receiving a scholarship is still higher for the poor in
senior secondary school could simply be due to the high number of scholarships allocated
to secondary schools, relative to the number of students from the poorest households, as
the percentage of students with a scholarship in primary and senior secondary level is
about equal (4.0 and 3.7 percent, respectively).
There is a remarkable diﬀerence between urban and rural areas. While the impact of
the crisis was highest in urban areas, scholarship coverage was much higher in rural areas
(6.2 percent against 3.2 percent). This may reßect targeting to the poorest schools, which
are located predominantly in rural areas. With regard to the gender of the students,
the scholarships have been allocated according to the allocation rules. Table 3.2 shows a
slightly higher percentage of girls were reached than boys, in all school levels. This is also
reßected in the shares. At all levels girls received just over 50 percent of the scholarships.
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Figure 3.1: Concentration curves for scholarship allocation, by enrolment level.
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Marginal incidence
The average incidence analysis above shows how the scholarships are distributed pro-poor.
However, this does not tell us who would beneÞt if the programmes would expand. That
is, it says nothing about the beneÞts of marginal changes to the programmes. But this is
something we want to know, since both the health and the education programme were still
expanding at the time of the survey. Lanjouw and Ravallion (1999) propose a method of
marginal beneÞt incidence analysis, exploiting regional variation in programme intensity.
Their method investigates how marginal changes in the programme will be distributed
across diﬀerent population groups. Denote programme participation by an individual i
residing in district k by yiqk = 1. Subscript q indicates the per capita consumption quintile.
The marginal odds are estimated by regressing the individual programme participation
on a constant, c, and the programme coverage in the districts, yk, interacted with quintile
dummy variables, dq.7
yiqk = c+
5X
q=1
θqdqyk + ηq + αJPS96k + εiqk (3.1)
The coeﬃcients θq then reßect the marginal odds ratio, which indicate which quintiles
will beneÞt from a general increase in programme coverage. The quintile speciÞc Þxed
eﬀects are captured by ηq. District level programme coverage is assumed to be exoge-
nous, as it is determined by the programme design and not targeting of individuals. The
regional allocation rule, JPS96k, is included to capture between-district allocation. The
marginal eﬀects are estimated using a linear probability model and constraining the θq co-
eﬃcients to sum to 5. Alternatively, yk can be interacted with male/female or urban/rural
dummy variables to show marginal beneÞt incidence by gender or area. In this case the
θq coeﬃcients will be constrained to sum to 2.
The estimated marginal odds ratios for scholarship allocation show a pro-poor pattern
(table 3.3). If the programme were to increase, then the very poor will beneÞt more than
proportionately. For both primary and junior secondary scholarships there is no evidence
of early capture by the non-poor. The initial allocation of scholarships is pro-poor, and so
will an expansion of the programme be. For senior secondary school this is not the case,
although there is also no capture by the rich. Households of the second and third quintiles
hold the bulk of the senior secondary scholarships, while the marginal beneÞts lie with the
7While Lanjouw and Ravallion (1999) and Lanjouw et al. (2002) estimate the marginal odds using
regional aggregated data for diﬀerent administrative levels, this method can just as well be applied to
individual level data (Younger, 2003). Interpretation of the marginal odds parameters remains the same,
but the statistical power of the model increases with the number of observations.
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second and Þrst quintiles. Note that in early 1999 roughly 30 percent of the population
lives below the poverty line.8 So the observed patterns can hardly be called non-poor.
Rather, the results suggest that allocation committees Þnd it hard to distinguish the very
poor from the poor in secondary schools.
Table 3.3: Marginal odds ratio of JPS scholarships allocation, 1999
Primary Junior Secondary Senior Secondary
θ [s.e.] θ [s.e.] θ [s.e.]
Quintile 1 1.20 [0.02]∗∗ 1.13 [0.02]∗∗ 1.12 [0.03]∗∗
Quintile 2 1.07 [0.02]∗∗ 1.21 [0.03]∗∗ 1.18 [0.03]∗∗
Quintile 3 1.06 [0.03]∗∗ 1.06 [0.03]∗∗ 1.04 [0.04]∗∗
Quintile 4 0.90 [0.03]∗∗ 0.97 [0.03]∗∗ 1.02 [0.04]∗∗
Quintile 5 0.77 [0.04]∗∗ 0.63 [0.04]∗∗ 0.64 [0.04]∗∗
Male 1.00 [0.01]∗∗ 0.96 [0.01]∗∗ 0.99 [0.02]∗∗
Female 1.00 [0.01]∗∗ 1.04 [0.01]∗∗ 1.01 [0.02]∗∗
Urban 0.85 [0.01]∗∗ 0.90 [0.02]∗∗ 0.95 [0.02]∗∗
Rural 1.15 [0.01]∗∗ 1.10 [0.02]∗∗ 1.05 [0.02]∗∗
SigniÞcance levels:  : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Note: see tables 3.12 to 3.14 in appendix 3.A for detailed estimation results.
3.3 The health card programme
3.3.1 Programme design
The JPS health card programme started in the fall of 1998. The health card entitled
the owner and family members to free services at public health care providers consisting
of (1) outpatient and inpatient care, (2) contraceptives for women of child bearing age,
(3) pre-natal care and (4) assistance at birth. This study is limited to the impact of
the health card programme on outpatient health care utilisation. The public health care
providers where the health cards could be used received budgetary support. These grants
were meant to compensate for the expected demand due to the health card and maintain
quality of health care. The 1998/1999 budget for JPS health grants to primary health
centres (Puskesmas) and village midwives (Bidan di Desa) amounted to US $ 29 million,
Þnanced by the Government of Indonesia and the Asian Development Bank.
The JPS health programme also followed a decentralised design, where the allocation of
health cards and funds is delegated to lower administrative levels. The amount of subsidy
8For example, Suryahadi et al. (2003) calculate a poverty headcount of 27.1 percent in February 1999,
based on the Susenas consumption module. See also Þgure 2.4.
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for public health care providers to be distributed across districts, along with the number
of health cards to be issued, was determined by the BKKBN headcount per district. The
BKKBN prosperity measure has been criticised to be an unsuitable allocation criterion
for the JPS, since its components are fairly inßexible and inappropriate for measuring
economic shocks or the impact of a crisis. However, at the time of implementation it was
the only up to date welfare measure at hand.9 Furthermore, since national survey data
do not allow for estimates below the district level, the BKKBN prosperity measure was
also used as allocation rule for both the budgetary support to facilities and health cards
to households.
At the district level committees were formed to deal with the allocation of funds to the
health clinics and village midwives. This allocation was based on the BKKBN estimate of
poor households eligible for a health card in the village or sub-district that is served by each
public provider. The transfer was not inßuenced by the actual services provided to health
card owners. The district committee allocated health cards to villages, again based on the
BKKBN measure, where the village leaders headed village allocation committees. Along
with the health cards they received guidelines on which criteria to use when distributing
the health card to households. Besides households that were classiÞed as poor by the
BKKBN, the village committees were to consider households that were severely aﬀected
by the crisis. The local leaders however maintained a lot of room to distribute health
cards according to their own insights. Health cards were usually distributed through local
health centres and village midwives.
3.3.2 BeneÞt Incidence
Average incidence: the missing link between health card allocation and utili-
sation
The health card programme was already of a substantial magnitude in February 1999
with 10.6 percent of Indonesians reporting that their household was allocated a health
card.
Utilisation of outpatient care is higher amongst households that own a health card,
especially in case of public services. The utilisation rates provided in table 3.4 indicate
that 15.1 percent of the health card owners visited an outpatient provider during a period
of 3 months, compared to 12.9 percent for the non-health card owners. Although health
card owners tend to choose public providers more often, they do not always use their health
9In the second year of the programme (Þscal year 1999/2000) the BKKBN measure for allocation to
districts was replaced by a poverty estimate based on household consumption data from the 1999 Susenas,
which, by then, provided information on the impact of the crisis.
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card. 3.7 out of 10.4 percent of the health card owners report not to use the health card
when seeking care at a public provides. Also there are a few instances where a health card
is used while the household head reports not to own a health card. Technically, these type
of occurrences are possible because ownership information is collected from the household
head while utilisation is collected by individual respondents.
Table 3.4: Utilisation of health card 1999 (percent that sought care in past three
months)
Head of household Head of household
reports to have reports not to have
received a health card received a health card
Received outpatient care 15.10 12.91
Went to public provider 10.36 6.55
Used health card 6.63 0.14
Did not use health card 3.73 6.41
Went to private provider 4.74 6.36
Number of observations 81,126 741,481
Source: Susenas 1999.
What could explain the weak link between ownership and utilisation? Providers were
not reimbursed based on actual services provided, but on the predicted demand. Possibly,
the providers themselves selected who they deemed in need for subsidised services and
did not always honour the rule that those who could present a health card should be
provided free services. Alternatively, rich household may decide to forgo the option of
free health care, preferring the higher quality private facilities instead of the public health
care center.
Strauss et al. (2004) show that at some public health clinics not all services were
covered by the health card, but that this can not fully explain the under usage of health
cards. Qualitative research by Soelaksono et al. (1999) Þnd that at some public facilities,
the time allocated to patients with a health card was limited, and that in remote areas the
lack of access to the nearest public facility was a possible deterrent to use the health card.
They also found indications that patients perceived the care received using a health card
to be of lower quality than services and medicines obtained when not using the health
card. In addition, the public perception was that treatment at the public clinic was less
eﬀective than at private sector.
Health cards are distributed pro-poor. Table 3.5 shows that 18.5 percent of individuals
from the poorest quintile had a health card. For people in the second poorest quintile
(about half of which are estimated to live below the poverty line at that time) this is 13.7
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percent. The allocation shares for ownership and utilisation are presented in column 3
of table 3.5. The poorest 20 percent of the population own 33.7 percent of the health
cards. Still there is considerably leakage to the more wealthy households. Considering
that about 10 percent of the households received a health card, perfect targeting would
imply that all health cards were obtained by the poorest 10 percent of the population.
However, the data show that households from the wealthiest 60 percent of the population
own about 40 percent of the health cards.
Table 3.5: Distribution of health card allocation and utilisation, 1999
Incidence Average odds ratio Share
(% of Indonesians) (%)
Allocation
Quintile 1 18.45 1.74 33.74
Quintile 2 13.71 1.29 25.68
Quintile 3 10.61 1.00 20.06
Quintile 4 7.09 0.67 13.41
Quintile 5 3.71 0.35 7.10
Male 10.48 0.99 49.28
Female 10.76 1.01 50.72
Urban 7.23 0.68 26.79
Rural 12.82 1.21 73.21
All 10.62 1.00 100.00
Utilisation for outpatient care
Quintile 1 1.33 1.60 31.30
Quintile 2 1.01 1.22 24.44
Quintile 3 0.84 1.01 20.42
Quintile 4 0.61 0.73 14.89
Quintile 5 0.36 0.43 8.96
Male 0.73 0.88 43.78
Female 0.93 1.12 56.22
Urban 0.62 0.75 29.54
Rural 0.96 1.16 70.46
All 0.83 1.00 100.00
Number of observations: 822,607. Source: Susenas.
Utilisation of health cards for outpatient care is also pro-poor but slightly less so.
Those who received beneÞts were on average wealthier than those who received the card.
That means that, conditional on having a health card, the wealthier are more likely to
obtain the beneÞts. Barriers of access to health care, such as lack of information or
opportunity costs unabridged by the health card, seem higher for the poor. Even though
the rich are more likely to use their health card when they have one, most of the beneÞts
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still accrue to the poor. This is because the initial distribution of the health card is
distributed pro-poor.
Access to a health card is evenly distributed between men and women, but women
tend to use the cards more for outpatient care. These outpatient Þgures do not reßect the
use of health cards for contraception and family planning services. Nevertheless, it could
be that the availability of these service under the health card has raised awareness of its
usefulness amongst women. Almost three quarters of the health cards is distributed in
rural areas. But relative to this distribution, the use of the cards is higher in urban areas.
This reßect the diﬀerences in access to health care facilities. In urban areas the supply of
health services is higher and travel distance to care providers is smaller.
Marginal incidence
The marginal odds ratios for the health card programme is given in table 3.6. Between
district allocation is now captured by the district BKKBN headcount. Increasing the
overall supply of health cards will increase the share of health cards owned by the poor.
But similar to the average incidence results, the marginal change in the utilisation of
the health cards is less pro-poor than for allocation. Health card utilisation amongst the
poorest changes proportionally with the overall change. The marginal odds are highest
for the second and third quintiles. This implies that access barriers to health care for the
very poor are not overcome as the programme expands.
Table 3.6: Marginal odds ratio of JPS health card allocation and utilisation, 1999
Allocation of health cards Utilisation for outpatient care
θ [s.e.] θ [s.e.]
Quintile 1 1.32 [0.01]∗∗ 1.01 [0.01]∗∗
Quintile 2 1.15 [0.01]∗∗ 1.33 [0.02]∗∗
Quintile 3 1.05 [0.01]∗∗ 1.21 [0.02]∗∗
Quintile 4 0.87 [0.01]∗∗ 0.89 [0.02]∗∗
Quintile 5 0.60 [0.01]∗∗ 0.56 [0.02]∗∗
Male 0.99 [0.00]∗∗ 0.95 [0.01]∗∗
Female 1.01 [0.00]∗∗ 1.05 [0.01]∗∗
Urban 0.91 [0.00]∗∗ 0.98 [0.01]∗∗
Rural 1.09 [0.00]∗∗ 1.02 [0.01]∗∗
SigniÞcance levels:  : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Note: see table 3.12 to 3.14 appendix (3.A) for detailed estimation results.
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The beneÞts of budgetary support
The public health care providers were left fairly free in how to utilise the JPS subsidy.
The 1999 health facility survey provides some insight in how the JPS health funds have
been used. Disbursements to public providers started at the end of 1998. Table 3.7 shows
the type of expenses for which the health clinics chose to use the JPS health grants.
The spending pattern by public health clinics and village midwives suggests that the
JPS budget has been used to support the supply and quality of public care. The largest
fraction (41 percent) of JPS health spending concerned medicines and 12 percent was
spent on additional materials. In rural areas the share used for medicine is far larger than
in urban areas (43 and 38 percent respectively). This reßects the shortage of medicine
during the crisis, suggesting that this problem was especially relevant in rural areas (see
chapter 2). The village midwives used 38 percent of the funds for medicine and 16 percent
for supplies, both urban and rural.
Lanjouw, Pradhan, Saadah, Sayed, and Sparrow (2002) show that up to the crisis the
use of public primary health care was higher for the non-poor than for the poor. House-
holds in the third and fourth quintile seem to have been the main beneÞciaries of public
health spending, as they are the ones that most often visit public health care providers.
However, they also show that a general increase in public sector spending will more than
proportionately beneÞt households from the second and third quintiles. Overall, this does
suggest that, unlike the health cards, the targeting of the health subsidies will not be
geared to the poorest 20 percent of the population.
Table 3.7: Type of expenses for which JPS transfers to health clinics have been used (as
percentage of total JPS health program transfers)
Public health clinic Village midwife
Urban Rural All Urban Rural All
Medicine procurement 37.64 43.21 41.40 39.09 38.36 38.44
Medical disposables 14.29 11.56 12.45 16.31 16.49 16.47
Food for in-patients 2.57 1.87 2.10
Transport costs for referral 5.75 6.75 6.43 3.73 4.09 4.05
Other transport expenses 22.38 20.51 20.72
Birth aids by village midwife 17.05 17.95 17.65
Contraceptive tools 2.01 3.13 3.01
Tax to Pemda 1.42 1.49 1.47
Honorarium 2.23 2.04 2.10
Other 19.05 15.13 16.40 16.48 17.40 17.30
Number of observations 1,319 2,411 3,730 404 3,242 3,646
Source: JPS health facility survey 1999.
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3.4 Geographical targeting and crisis impact
How well did the district targeting criteria reßect regional diﬀerences in poverty and
impact of the crisis?
Several studies have raised concern about the lack of reliable data available for geo-
graphic targeting.10 Given the heterogeneous nature of the crisis, it is likely that criteria
for regional targeting misjudged the degree of poverty in the districts, since only pre-crisis
information on regional poverty was available. There are two reasons for this. First, the
crisis has given rise to large relative price changes, between products (especially food)
and across regions.11 This variation is completely ignored in the targeting process when
pre-crisis poverty estimates are applied as allocation rule in 1999. Second, the eﬀects of
the crisis varied strongly between regions and were only weakly correlated with the initial
level of poverty (Sumarto, Wetterberg and Pritchett, 1998). This heterogeneity of the cri-
sis impact is shown in Þgure 3.2, which plots 1996 poverty against the change from 1996
to 1999, according to poverty headcount estimates released by the Indonesian Bureau of
Statistics (BPS) in 2000. The diﬀerence between 1996 and 1999 estimates reßects the
impact of the crisis. It indicates the absolute change in the fraction of people that moved
into or out of poverty during the crisis. In line with Sumarto et al. (1998), there appears
to be no correlation between the initial level of poverty and the impact of the crisis.
The BKKBN data are collected at more frequent intervals than the consumption
surveys. They can provide fairly up to date information, as far down as the household
level. The problem, however, is that the components of the BKKBN classiÞcation are
inßexible measures and inappropriate for capturing the degree of poverty when faced
with severe economic shocks of a crisis.12
Table 3.8 is illustrative for the diﬃculty of capturing the eﬀect of the crisis using pre-
crisis data. It shows the ranking of provinces (from low to high) according to the JPS96
and BKKBN measures, and the 1999 (BPS99) and 1996 (BPS96) poverty headcount of
10E.g. Ananta and Siregar (1999), Daly and Fane (2002), Dhanani and Islam (2002), and Pritchett,
Sumarto and Suryahadi (2002).
11E.g. Cameron (1999), Frankenberg, Smith and Thomas (2003), Friedman and Levinsohn (2002).
12The main criticism in this respect is that the BKKBN measure is based on Þxed assets (type of ßoor
and owning clothes) and non-economic questions regarding religious practices. Sumarto, Suryahadi and
Pritchett (2003) place further questions with interregional consistency of the BKKBN measure as the
village staﬀ who collect the BKKBN data receive relatively little training, and the Þgures are vulnerable
to manipulation by locale government oﬃcials. Using data from a longitudinal survey in 100 villages,
Suryahadi, Suharso and Sumarto (1999) show that there is a high degree of mismatch between the
BKKBN classiÞcation and expenditure based poverty measures. For example, the BKKBN data classify
49 percent of the households in the sample as poor. But according to per capita consumption, only 57
percent of these households rank with the poorest 49 percent of the population.
46 CHAPTER 3. THE INDONESIAN SOCIAL SAFETY NET
BPS.13 The underlying Þgures are given in table 3.9. The diﬀerent welfare measures show
diﬀerent levels of poverty. As expected, both the consumption based poverty headcount
estimates for 1996 are lower than the one for 1999. If we evaluate welfare by the basic needs
criteria of the BKKBN this yields a higher count of deprived households. In itself this is
not surprising. What is important is that the rankings are very diﬀerent. The ranking
following the BKKBN and JPS96 measures diﬀer from both the levels and changes of
poverty, as measured by BPS.
The diﬀerences between the welfare measures is further illustrated by a graphical ex-
position. Figures 3.3 to 3.6 (appendix 3.B) graph the targeting rules against the poverty
BPS estimates. Both BKKBN prosperity score and JPS96 are strongly positively corre-
lated with the 1999 poverty headcount, but with a lot of variation around the trend. For
the BKKBN the correlation seems to be stronger but the variation is also larger. This is
not surprising since the BKKBN criteria are not solely based on household consumption.
There is no correlation between the change in poverty and JPS96. For BKKBN the graph
shows a weakly positive trend for the main body of districts. The line is pulled up by a
small number of districts that experienced a large increase in poverty. These trends are
reßected in the allocation of scholarships (Þgure 3.7 and 3.8) and health cards (Þgure 3.9
and 3.10), as reported in the Susenas data.
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Figure 3.2: Correlation between initial poverty in 1996 and crisis impact on BPS poverty
headcount. Locally weighted regression with 0.8 bandwidth. Source: BPS (2000).
13Both JPS96 and BPS96 are based on the 1996 Susenas data, but they diﬀer in methodology for
setting poverty lines. The BPS96 and BPS99 have been constructed in similar fashion, using the Susenas
household expenditure surveys. See BPS (2000) for details.
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Overall, there is clear evidence of pro-poor targeting. However, the data available
to programme managers was not suited to give any information on the crisis impact.
There remains a lot of variation around the pro-poor trend, suggesting a high degree of
geographic mis-targeting.
Table 3.8: Provinces ranked by geographic allocation rules and BPS poverty estimates
(1996 and 1999)
Province BKKBN 1997 JPS 1996 BPS 1996 BPS 1999 ∆BPS99-96
Aceh 18 16 8 6 11
North-Sumatra 3 17 9 8 14
West-Sumatra 7 7 5 3 13
Riau 10 3 7 4 5
Jambi 4 8 11 17 25
South-Sumatra 12 15 12 14 20
Bengkulu 16 10 14 12 12
Lampung 22 14 21 20 15
Jakarta 2 1 1 1 9
West-Java 6 11 6 11 23
Central-Java 19 20 17 18 18
Yogyakarta 9 12 16 15 21
East-Java 14 19 18 21 19
Bali 1 2 2 2 3
NTB 23 22 23 23 4
NTT 26 24 24 25 22
West-Kalimantan 17 25 20 16 10
Central-Kalimantan 15 18 10 7 6
South-Kalimantan 8 21 3 5 16
East-Kalimantan 5 9 4 13 24
North-Sulawesi 11 13 15 9 1
Central-Sulawesi 20 5 19 19 17
South-Sulawesi 13 4 13 10 8
South-East-Sulawesi 24 6 22 22 2
Maluku 21 23 26 24 7
Irian-Jaya 25 26 25 26 26
See table 3.9 for underlying estimates
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Table 3.9: Poverty estimates used for initial JPS allocation in 1996 and BPS poverty
estimates (1996 and 1999), by province
Province BKKBN 1997∗ JPS 1996 BPS 1996 BPS 1999 ∆BPS99-96
Aceh 51.65 10.99 12.72 14.75 2.03
North-Sumatra 27.56 11.05 13.23 16.74 3.51
West-Sumatra 33.89 8.86 9.84 13.24 3.40
Riau 35.97 8.11 12.62 14.00 1.38
Jambi 29.67 9.30 14.84 26.64 11.80
South-Sumatra 41.27 10.95 15.89 23.53 7.64
Bengkulu 43.22 9.63 16.71 19.79 3.08
Lampung 60.72 10.79 25.59 29.11 3.52
Jakarta 17.32 2.52 2.35 3.99 1.64
West-Java 33.25 10.05 11.06 19.78 8.72
Central-Java 54.30 13.99 21.61 28.46 6.85
Yogyakarta 34.57 10.38 18.43 26.11 7.68
East-Java 42.24 11.91 22.13 29.48 7.35
Bali 0.00 4.30 7.81 8.53 0.72
NTB 62.49 17.80 31.97 32.95 0.98
NTT 82.68 20.82 38.89 46.73 7.84
West-Kalimantan 46.82 22.42 24.21 26.18 1.97
Central-Kalimantan 42.71 11.42 13.50 15.05 1.55
South-Kalimantan 34.03 14.62 8.53 14.37 5.84
East-Kalimantan 32.14 9.45 9.73 20.16 10.43
North-Sulawesi 39.90 10.69 17.94 18.19 0.25
Central-Sulawesi 56.84 8.33 22.30 28.68 6.38
South-Sulawesi 41.53 8.12 16.71 18.32 1.61
South-East-Sulawesi 64.09 8.65 29.23 29.51 0.28
Maluku 60.21 19.77 44.56 46.14 1.58
Irian-Jaya 70.40 31.73 42.28 54.75 12.47
Indonesia 41.98 11.46 17.70 23.43 5.73
Source: ∗ www.bkkbn.go.id,  Ministry of Education (1998),  BPS (2000)
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3.5 Community based targeting
3.5.1 Education
What are the key factors that determine targeting at the community level? Table 3.10
reports probit estimates of the factors aﬀecting the probability of an enrolled student
being selected for a scholarships. The eﬀects of geographic targeting are captured by
district Þxed eﬀects, so the estimates can be interpreted as the results from within-district
targeting. The table reports marginal eﬀects. The standard errors have been adjusted for
the stratiÞed sampling design of the Susenas survey.
The model further includes variables that constitute the main selection criteria for
the sub-district and school poverty measures. These are the percentage of BKKBN poor
households in the sub-district, and the IDT village classiÞcation. The BKKBN variable
is based on the oﬃcial count of households with a pre-prosperous or prosperous I classi-
Þcation in January 1999. The distance to school for a students is relevant for selection
(especially for secondary schools), but is not recorded in the Susenas. However, the 1996
Podes does record the number and type of schools in the village. I will use this infor-
mation as a proxy for distance to school. Remember that each village should have a
primary school, while junior and senior secondary schools typically serve sub-districts
and districts.14
Individual and household characteristics include age, gender, type of school attend-
ing (public or private), per capita expenditure quintile, the Þve factors that determine
BKKBN prosperity status15, household composition, gender and education of the head of
household, the main source of income for the household, living conditions, and a variable
that indicates whether or not the student lives in a rural area.
Starting with the personal characteristics, girls are more likely to receive a scholarship,
irrespective of the enrollment level. Somewhat surprisingly, attending a public schools in-
creases the probability of selection at all enrolment levels. According to the programme
implementation plan no distinction is made between public and private schools. Consid-
ering that the model controls for the socioeconomic background of the student, this would
suggest that on average public schools have been rated higher (i.e., poorer) on the school
poverty ranking, and have relatively more scholarships to distribute.
Turning to household level variables, there is a clear negative relation between per
capita expenditure and programme participation. Primary school students from the rich-
14Some observations have been lost in merging the Susenas with the Podes and because some districts
had not yet implemented the programme.
15The real status applied by the BKKBN oﬃcials is not recorded in the Susenas survey.
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est quintile are 3.2 percentage point less likely to attain a scholarship, relative to students
from the poorest quintile. For junior and senior secondary school this is 3.7 and 1.8
percentage point, respectively. Note that these estimates are conditional the geographic
allocation criteria. Allocation committees in secondary schools Þnd it hard to distinguish
between the poor and the very poor. Nevertheless, the weak pro-poor pattern at senior
secondary level does not fully explain the distribution of scholarships, most of which were
allocated to the second and third quintile.
The performance of the BKKBN criteria, on the other hand, is a very diﬀerent story.
There is no evidence that the BKKBN criteria have been followed, as most of the criteria
do not have a statistically signiÞcant eﬀect. Living in a house with a dirt ßoor or not
having diﬀerent clothes for school/work and home increases the probability of receiving a
primary or junior secondary school scholarship. For senior secondary school none of the
BKKBN variables are signiÞcant.
Other living conditions have been important for eligibility. Access to electricity, clean
drinking water and a closed sewer system decrease the eligibility of students, while eligi-
bility is higher for students that live in a bamboo house. This is consistent with Þndings
by Jones et al. (2003) that house visits by school teachers were an important part of the
local selection process.
Household size and composition have diverse eﬀects for the diﬀerent enrollment levels.
For primary education, an increase in household size decreases the probability of selection,
while the household composition variables are not signiÞcant. Secondary school students
from households with a relatively large share of younger siblings were more likely to be
selected for a scholarship.
The characteristics of the head of household have a signiÞcant inßuence on students
prospects of getting a scholarship. Having a female as head of the household increases the
probability by 4.6 to 5.7 percentage points. The probability decreases as the educational
attainment of the head of household increases, for all enrollment levels.
There is strong evidence that school and community targeting criteria have been used
by district selection committees. The variables that are included in the school and sub-
district poverty rankings are statistically signiÞcant and have the expected sign. Living
in an IDT eligible village or a sub-district with a high BKKBN deprivation tally increases
the probability of selection.
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Table 3.10: Within-district targeting JPS scholarships, probit marginal eﬀects
Variable Primary Junior Senior
secondary secondary
Age 0.0083 -0.0016 0.0029
[0.0006]∗∗ [0.0010] [0.0014]∗
Female 0.0133 0.0131 0.0144
[0.0022]∗∗ [0.0039]∗∗ [0.0031]∗∗
Public school 0.0124 0.0128 0.0083
[0.0031]∗∗ [0.0033]∗∗ [0.0027]∗∗
Female head of household 0.0459 0.0565 0.0519
[0.0057]∗∗ [0.0077]∗∗ [0.0084]∗∗
Education head of household
None (= reference)
Primary -0.0074 -0.0097 -0.0006
[0.0020]∗∗ [0.0031]∗∗ [0.0032]
Junior secondary -0.0105 -0.0161 -0.0108
[0.0028]∗∗ [0.0038]∗∗ [0.0033]∗∗
Senior secondary -0.0241 -0.0280 -0.0173
[0.0027]∗∗ [0.0039]∗∗ [0.0032]∗∗
Higher -0.0269 -0.0366 -0.0152
[0.0047]∗∗ [0.0050]∗∗ [0.0038]∗∗
Head of household unemployed 0.0199 0.0246 0.0441
[0.0143] [0.0178] [0.0200]∗
Ln(household size) -0.0073 0.0071 -0.0011
[0.0034]∗ [0.0052] [0.0044]
Household composition
Share of males age < 6 0.0001 0.0361 0.0172
[0.0130] [0.0216] [0.0202]
Share of females age < 6 0.0271 0.0701 0.0476
[0.0131]∗ [0.0206]∗∗ [0.0210]∗
Share of males age 6-12 0.0129 0.0229 0.0160
[0.0109] [0.0150] [0.0141]
Share of females age 6-12 0.0075 0.0149 0.0134
[0.0109] [0.0149] [0.0142]
Share of males age 13-17 0.0105 0.0410 -0.0018
[0.0115] [0.0174]∗ [0.0111]
Share of females age 13-17 -0.0181 0.0168 -0.0278
[0.0120] [0.0170] [0.0128]∗
Share of males age 18-60 (= reference)
Continued on next page...
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... table 3.10 continued
Variable Primary Junior Senior
secondary secondary
Share of females age 18-60 -0.0179 -0.0116 -0.0503
[0.0135] [0.0163] [0.0119]∗∗
Share of males age > 60 0.0162 0.0353 0.0575
[0.0162] [0.0238] [0.0192]∗∗
Share of females age > 60 0.0011 -0.0159 -0.0951
[0.0169] [0.0234] [0.0210]∗∗
Agriculture main source of income 0.0040 0.0031 0.0010
[0.0023] [0.0033] [0.0034]
Per capita expenditure quintile
Quintile 1, poorest (= reference)
Quintile 2 -0.0055 -0.0010 -0.0033
[0.0024]∗ [0.0040] [0.0041]
Quintile 3 -0.0128 -0.0126 -0.0066
[0.0025]∗∗ [0.0040]∗∗ [0.0040]
Quintile 4 -0.0198 -0.0197 -0.0088
[0.0026]∗∗ [0.0043]∗∗ [0.0041]∗
Quintile 5, richest -0.0320 -0.0368 -0.0176
[0.0026]∗∗ [0.0044]∗∗ [0.0043]∗∗
BKKBN criteria
Worship -0.0014 -0.0081 0.0047
[0.0036] [0.0065] [0.0062]
Food 0.0037 0.0061 -0.0155
[0.0068] [0.0102] [0.0162]
Clothing -0.0057 -0.0281 -0.0261
[0.0057] [0.0123]∗ [0.0181]
Floor -0.0096 -0.0087 -0.0023
[0.0029]∗∗ [0.0046] [0.0049]
Health 0.0005 0.0036 0.0052
[0.0036] [0.0055] [0.0050]
House made out of bamboo 0.0225 0.0258 0.0042
[0.0036]∗∗ [0.0059]∗∗ [0.0060]
Access to clean drinking water -0.0052 -0.0083 -0.0095
[0.0028] [0.0037]∗ [0.0031]∗∗
Closed sewer -0.0115 -0.0234 -0.0114
[0.0027]∗∗ [0.0034]∗∗ [0.0030]∗∗
Access to electricity -0.0111 -0.0156 -0.0027
[0.0030]∗∗ [0.0050]∗∗ [0.0056]
Continued on next page...
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... table 3.10 continued
Variable Primary Junior Senior
secondary secondary
Village characteristics
IDT village 0.0088 0.0084 0.0114
[0.0030]∗∗ [0.0046] [0.0049]∗
Rural area -0.0036 -0.0018 -0.0029
[0.0041] [0.0051] [0.0040]
Primary public school 0.0024 0.0069 0.0023
[0.0051] [0.0078] [0.0060]
Primary private school 0.0044 0.0043 -0.0075
[0.0027] [0.0036] [0.0031]∗
Junior Secondary public school 0.0007 0.0061 0.0010
[0.0027] [0.0037] [0.0030]
Junior Secondary private school -0.0031 0.0122 0.0057
[0.0030] [0.0043]∗∗ [0.0035]
Senior Secondary public school 0.0073 -0.0050 0.0001
[0.0044] [0.0048] [0.0035]
Senior secondary private school -0.0031 -0.0075 0.0005
[0.0036] [0.0045] [0.0036]
Most of inter village traﬃc by land -0.0103 -0.0303 0.0099
[0.0071] [0.0145]∗ [0.0102]
BKKBN poverty rate in subdistrict 0.0410 0.0749 0.0342
[0.0081]∗∗ [0.0127]∗∗ [0.0115]∗∗
District Þxed eﬀects yes yes yes
Observations 55,769 35,909 15,991
Pseudo R-squared 0.19 0.18 0.19
Robust standard errors in brackets.
SigniÞcance levels:  : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
3.5.2 Health
The probit analysis for the health card is conducted at the household level. Table 3.11
shows the determinants for health card allocation (column 1) as well as utilisation con-
ditional on ownership. For the latter, the model is estimated with and without district
Þxed eﬀects (columns 2 and 3, respectively), since part of the discrepancy between al-
location and utilisation of health cards may well be district speciÞc. For example, the
supply and quality of public and private health services varies greatly across regions in
Indonesia (Lanjouw et al., 2002). This is likely to aﬀect the utilisation of public care
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and consequently the use health cards. The model speciÞcation is similar to the scholar-
ship analysis, except for the individual characteristics and the school proximity variables.
Instead, some village level health supply variables are included: the number of public
health facilities located in the village, the number of doctors and midwives that live in
the village (per 1,000 inhabitants), and a variable indicating the village leaders opinion
on accessibility of health facilities in the village.16
There are signiÞcant negative eﬀects of per capita consumption on the probability of
receiving a health card, conÞrming the pro-poor targeting found in the beneÞt incidence
analysis. Although less prominent, the same holds for the use of the health card condi-
tional upon owning one. The poor tend to use the health cards more often. This indicates
that the pro-rich bias found in utilisation is not a direct wealth eﬀect but follows from
other background characteristics, which are correlated with wealth.
One such a characteristic is the sector of employment. Being involved in agriculture
does not inßuence within-district targeting. However, households for which agriculture
is the main source of income are less likely to use the health card, when district speciÞc
eﬀects are ignored. This may indicate that the opportunity costs of time spent at the
health clinic or traveling are relatively higher for farm households. Since these households
are on average less wealthy than urban households it may be one factor driving the pro-rich
bias in utilisation.
Another explanation is the supply and access of health care at village level. The
number of auxiliary public clinics negatively aﬀects the probability of receiving a health
card. But conditional on ownership the presence of primary and auxiliary public clinics
in the village strongly increases the use of health cards for outpatient care. Further,
utilisation of health cards is higher in villages where the village leader views health care
facilities to be easy or very easy to reach. While remote and less wealthy areas with little
access to health care receive priority in the targeting process, the direct and indirect costs
of using the cards are relatively high.
On the other hand, the probability of selection increases as the number of doctors and
midwives living in the village increases. Since it is the medical staﬀ of local clinics that
actually distribute the health cards to households, this might reßect the importance of
informal contacts within the village for participation in social programmes.
The probit results conÞrm that health cards have been awarded to households based
on health status. The oﬃcial allocation rules require health cards to be distributed to
the poor, irrespective of their health status. But the clearly positive eﬀect on the vari-
16The Podes survey asks village leaders whether the closest public health clinics are (i) very easy, (ii)
easy, (iii) diﬃcult or (iv) very diﬃcult to reach by the majority of the village population.
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able measuring whether any household member experienced an illness in the past month
indicates that often health cards were given based on acute need. For those who get sick
and do not own a health card, it is still possible to get a health card after seeking medical
care (Soelaksono et al., 1999). Not surprisingly, the propensity of using a health card also
increases strongly when a household member falls ill.
Turning to household composition eﬀects, the results show that (conditional on per
capita consumption) households with a relatively large share of children and elderly have
a higher probability of receiving and using a health card. Conditional on household
composition, household size is of little importance for targeting.
Household headed by females have a signiÞcantly higher chance of receiving a health
card. Education of the head also plays an important role. Higher education has a negative
eﬀect on the probability of receiving a health card. But controlling for other household
variables, the characteristics of the head of household seem not to be correlated with
utilisation of health cards.
The results conÞrm that the BKKBN prosperity status variables have been used to
decide the allocation of health cards. Floor material is a strong predictor for health card
ownership. Those with an earth ßoor have a higher chance of receiving a health card, but a
lower probability of actually using it for outpatient care. Access to modern care increases
the chance of receiving a health card and, conditional on ownership, also increases the
chance of using it. Owning diﬀerent sets of clothing for work and leisure decreases the
probability of owning and using a health card. Being able to worship according to faith
increases the probability of using a health card.
There is clear evidence that living conditions was one of the factors that took priority
in the local targeting process. Having access to electricity and clean drinking water, a
closed sewer and living in a house not made out of bamboo all decrease the probability
of receiving a health card.
Oﬃcial targeting criteria like the IDT village indicator and the sub-district BKKBN
basic needs measure all perform as expected, increasing the probability of receiving a
health card. Interestingly, the BKKBNmeasure has a strong negative eﬀect on utilisation.
This may indicate a quality deterioration eﬀect. The quality of care provided by health
facilities may decrease as the pressure of the programme increases. This can negatively
aﬀect the households willingness to use the cards.
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Table 3.11: Within-district targeting JPS health card to households, and determinants
of utilisation for outpatient treatment, probit marginal eﬀects
Variable Health card Health card use
allocation for outpatient care
(1) (2) (3)
( District Þxed eﬀects )
Female head of household 0.0215 0.0136 0.0165
[0.0025]∗∗ [0.0111] [0.0116]
Education head of household
None (= reference)
Primary -0.0063 0.0016 -0.0014
[0.0015]∗∗ [0.0072] [0.0080]
Junior secondary -0.0166 0.0017 -0.0009
[0.0019]∗∗ [0.0120] [0.0128]
Senior secondary -0.0272 -0.0036 0.0010
[0.0020]∗∗ [0.0132] [0.0142]
Higher -0.0339 -0.0173 -0.0153
[0.0030]∗∗ [0.0280] [0.0296]
Head of household unemployed 0.0080 -0.0359 -0.0214
[0.0069] [0.0279] [0.0322]
Member of household ill last month 0.0123 0.2091 0.2197
[0.0015]∗∗ [0.0080]∗∗ [0.0086]∗∗
Ln(household size) -0.0003 0.0058 0.0121
[0.0018] [0.0095] [0.0101]
Household composition
Share of males age < 6 0.0440 0.0833 0.0778
[0.0062]∗∗ [0.0326]∗ [0.0344]∗
Share of females age < 6 0.0388 0.1234 0.1046
[0.0065]∗∗ [0.0333]∗∗ [0.0356]∗∗
Share of males age 6-12 0.0114 0.0425 0.0306
[0.0053]∗ [0.0284] [0.0301]
Share of females age 6-12 0.0159 0.0566 0.0365
[0.0055]∗∗ [0.0286]∗ [0.0293]
Share of males age 13-17 0.0144 -0.0384 -0.0443
[0.0058]∗ [0.0343] [0.0359]
Share of females age 13-17 -0.0001 -0.0443 -0.0354
[0.0061] [0.0343] [0.0368]
Share of males age 18-60 (= reference)
Share of females age 18-60 0.0053 0.0369 0.0570
Continued on next page...
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... table 3.11 continued
Variable Health card Health card use
allocation for outpatient care
(1) (2) (3)
[0.0048] [0.0279] [0.0300]
Share of males age > 60 0.0136 0.1096 0.1061
[0.0051]∗∗ [0.0262]∗∗ [0.0281]∗∗
Share of females age > 60 0.0099 0.0609 0.0681
[0.0050] [0.0272]∗ [0.0289]∗
Agriculture main source of income -0.0019 -0.0103 -0.0138
[0.0017] [0.0077] [0.0083]
Per capita expenditure quintile
Quintile 1, poorest (= reference)
Quintile 2 -0.0117 -0.0083 -0.0132
[0.0019]∗∗ [0.0086] [0.0092]
Quintile 3 -0.0193 -0.0160 -0.0194
[0.0021]∗∗ [0.0098] [0.0103]
Quintile 4 -0.0311 -0.0279 -0.0345
[0.0021]∗∗ [0.0110]∗ [0.0113]∗∗
Quintile 5, richest -0.0492 -0.0361 -0.0475
[0.0024]∗∗ [0.0139]∗∗ [0.0138]∗∗
BKKBN criteria
Worship -0.0011 0.0217 0.0286
[0.0029] [0.0111] [0.0118]∗
Food -0.0081 0.0194 -0.0106
[0.0065] [0.0203] [0.0256]
Clothing -0.0086 -0.0440 -0.0489
[0.0046] [0.0160]∗∗ [0.0183]∗∗
Floor -0.0292 0.0279 0.0258
[0.0025]∗∗ [0.0079]∗∗ [0.0085]∗∗
Health 0.0169 0.0786 0.0856
[0.0022]∗∗ [0.0089]∗∗ [0.0095]∗∗
House made out of bamboo 0.0359 0.0139 0.0090
[0.0028]∗∗ [0.0092] [0.0096]
Access to clean drinking water -0.0057 0.0086 0.0152
[0.0025]∗ [0.0114] [0.0119]
Closed sewer -0.0218 -0.0152 -0.0021
[0.0020]∗∗ [0.0096] [0.0103]
Access to electricity -0.0063 -0.0050 -0.0214
[0.0027]∗ [0.0099] [0.0108]∗
Continued on next page...
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... table 3.11 continued
Variable Health card Health card use
allocation for outpatient care
(1) (2) (3)
Village characteristics
IDT village 0.0102 -0.0042 0.0235
[0.0032]∗∗ [0.0112] [0.0115]∗
Rural area 0.0025 0.0129 0.0018
[0.0035] [0.0143] [0.0133]
Nr. of primary health clinics -0.0001 0.0233 0.0262
[0.0028] [0.0116]∗ [0.0120]∗
Nr. of auxiliary health clinics -0.0095 0.0308 0.0392
[0.0023]∗∗ [0.0090]∗∗ [0.0092]∗∗
Nr. of integrated health centres -0.0033 0.0005 -0.0191
[0.0027] [0.0107] [0.0109]
Nr. of doctors per 1,000 inhabitants 0.0087 0.0049 -0.0002
[0.0031]∗∗ [0.0111] [0.0108]
Nr. of midwifes per 1,000 inhabitants 0.0127 0.0148 0.0342
[0.0031]∗∗ [0.0115] [0.0139]∗
Health facilities easy to reach 0.0035 0.0273 0.0545
[0.0052] [0.0177] [0.0178]∗∗
Most of inter village traﬃc by land 0.0098 -0.0819 -0.0151
[0.0070] [0.0450] [0.0345]
BKKBN poverty rate in subdistrict 0.0448 -0.0794 0.0148
[0.0087]∗∗ [0.0323]∗ [0.0223]
District Þxed eﬀects yes yes no
Observations 188,451 18,771 18,771
Pseudo R-squared 0.19 0.15 0.09
Robust standard errors in brackets.
SigniÞcance levels:  : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter discussed the design and implementation of the health and education safety
net programmes that were introduced in Indonesia in August 1998, as response to the
economic crisis. Under the education programme almost 4 million scholarships were made
available to primary and secondary school students. The scholarships were cash transfers
and the amount increased with enrolment level. The health programme consisted of a
health cost waiver scheme for households, in the form of a health card, and budgetary
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support to public health care facilities. The health card programme has a weak link
between the delivery of services to health card owners and the Þnancial compensation.
Service providers were reimbursed using a lump sum transfer based on the estimated
number of poor households in their area of inßuence. As a result, serving a health card
owner did not result in a direct Þnancial reward to the service provider. Both programmes
were targeted to the poor following a partly decentralised allocation process, involving
both geographic and community based individual targeting.
The programmes have been implemented at the remarkable speed. By February 1999
approximately 22 million people (about 11 percent of Indonesians) lived in households
that received a health card, and 2.1 million children aged 10 to 18 (about 5 percent) had
received a scholarship. The decentralised programme design may well have facilitated this
swift reaction, by relying on existing administrative and operational infrastructure within
the districts. However, at such short notice there was no reliable data on the impact of
the crisis across districts. Geographic targeting criteria were therefore based on pre-crisis
poverty estimates, which reßect the actual level of poverty to some extent but do not
capture the impact of the crisis. There appears to be no correlation between the initial
level of poverty and the impact of the crisis. Moreover, applying the pre-crisis poverty
estimates as allocation rule in 1999 is implicitly assuming that relative prices have not
changed.
Targeting of scholarships diﬀered strongly between enrolment levels. Targeting was
pro-poor at primary and junior secondary level, but there was also a lot of leakage to
wealthier groups. For senior secondary school the scholarships were not allocated pro-
poor at all, but instead distributed quite evenly. It appears that allocation committees
found it very diﬃcult to identify the poorest students in senior secondary schools.
There is clear evidence that the health card programme was pro-poor in the sense that
the poor had a higher probability of receiving a health card and using it to obtain free
health services, presumably making them healthier. However, despite pro-poor targeting,
a considerable number of health cards went to households in the richer quintiles. Service
providers also seem to have distributed health cards based on health status and to patients
that show up to ask for services.
A notable Þnding is that some health card owners did not use their health card when
obtaining care from public service providers. It seems like several factors are in play. The
particular design resulted in a discrepancy between health card ownership and utilisation.
High rejection rates could follow from the delays in the lump sum transfers made to the
providers. Patients could also perceive health care obtained using a health card to be
inferior to the service and medicines given to patients who pay the normal user fees.
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Utilisation of services is less pro-poor than ownership. Conditional on ownership, the
rich have a higher propensity to use their health card, suggesting that access barriers to
health care are not fully overcome by a price subsidy. The direct and indirect costs of
using the health card are relatively higher in the more remote, and rural villages with
little access to public health care providers.
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3.A Supplementary tables
Table 3.12: Marginal beneÞt incidence analysis, by per capita expenditure quintile (linear probability estimates)
Scholarships Health cards
Primary Junior secondary Senior secondary Allocation Utilisation
Coef. [s.e.] Coef. [s.e.] Coef. [s.e.] Coef. [s.e.] Coef. [s.e.]
Marginal odds ratio (θ) 1
Quintile 1 1.204 [0.016]∗∗ 1.128 [0.022]∗∗ 1.120 [0.028]∗∗ 1.323 [0.006]∗∗ 1.011 [0.009]∗∗
Quintile 2 1.066 [0.021]∗∗ 1.205 [0.026]∗∗ 1.182 [0.033]∗∗ 1.149 [0.006]∗∗ 1.326 [0.016]∗∗
Quintile 3 1.060 [0.026]∗∗ 1.058 [0.031]∗∗ 1.039 [0.039]∗∗ 1.053 [0.007]∗∗ 1.208 [0.019]∗∗
Quintile 4 0.900 [0.029]∗∗ 0.975 [0.033]∗∗ 1.015 [0.040]∗∗ 0.872 [0.007]∗∗ 0.891 [0.021]∗∗
Quintile 5 0.769 [0.038]∗∗ 0.634 [0.037]∗∗ 0.644 [0.040]∗∗ 0.603 [0.008]∗∗ 0.564 [0.023]∗∗
Quintile dummy variables
Quintile 1 (= reference)
Quintile 2 -0.003 [0.002]∗∗ -0.024 [0.006]∗∗ -0.009 [0.006] -0.007 [0.001]∗∗ -0.004 [0.0004]∗∗
Quintile 3 -0.012 [0.002]∗∗ -0.030 [0.006]∗∗ -0.013 [0.006]∗ -0.017 [0.001]∗∗ -0.004 [0.0004]∗∗
Quintile 4 -0.014 [0.002]∗∗ -0.037 [0.006]∗∗ -0.020 [0.005]∗∗ -0.022 [0.001]∗∗ -0.003 [0.0004]∗∗
Quintile 5 -0.018 [0.002]∗∗ -0.036 [0.006]∗∗ -0.020 [0.005]∗∗ -0.027 [0.001]∗∗ -0.003 [0.0004]∗∗
JPS96 -0.091 [0.008]∗∗ -0.144 [0.017]∗∗ -0.060 [0.016]∗∗
BKKBN 1997 -0.051 [0.001]∗∗ -0.004 [0.0005]∗∗
Constant 0.016 [0.002]∗∗ 0.040 [0.0048]∗∗ 0.022 [0.005]∗∗ 0.033 [0.001]∗∗ 0.004 [0.0004]∗∗
Observations 126,080 42,271 25,856 842,365 842,365
Root mean square error 0.189 0.272 0.188 0.279 0.095
SigniÞcance levels:  : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
1 The θ coeﬃcients are constrained to sum to 5.
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Table 3.13: Marginal beneÞt incidence analysis, by gender (linear probability estimates)
Scholarships Health cards
Primary Junior secondary Senior secondary Allocation Utilisation
Coef. [s.e.] Coef. [s.e.] Coef. [s.e.] Coef. [s.e.] Coef. [s.e.]
Marginal odds ratio (θ) 1
Male 1.002 [0.010]∗∗ 0.961 [0.013]∗∗ 0.988 [0.017]∗∗ 0.994 [0.003]∗∗ 0.947 [0.007]∗∗
Female 0.998 [0.010]∗∗ 1.039 [0.013]∗∗ 1.012 [0.017]∗∗ 1.006 [0.003]∗∗ 1.053 [0.007]∗∗
Gender dummy variables
Male (= reference)
Female 0.006 [0.001]∗∗ 0.002 [0.004] 0.007 [0.003]∗ 0.0002 [0.001] 0.001 [0.0002]∗∗
JPS96 0.000 [0.006] 0.003 [0.015] 0.001 [0.015]
BKKBN 1997 0.00004 [0.001] 0.00001 [0.0005]
Constant -0.003 [0.001]∗∗ -0.001 [0.003] -0.004 [0.002]∗ -0.0001 [0.001] -0.0004 [0.0003]
Observations 126,157 42,321 25,940 844,147 844,147
Root mean square error 0.200 0.274 0.189 0.282 0.095
SigniÞcance levels:  : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
1 The θ coeﬃcients are constrained to sum to 2.
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Table 3.14: Marginal beneÞt incidence analysis, by urban-rural area (linear probability estimates)
Scholarships Health cards
Primary Junior secondary Senior secondary Allocation Utilisation
Coef. [s.e.] Coef. [s.e.] Coef. [s.e.] Coef. [s.e.] Coef. [s.e.]
Marginal odds ratio (θ) 1
Urban 0.853 [0.013]∗∗ 0.902 [0.015]∗∗ 0.953 [0.018]∗∗ 0.907 [0.003]∗∗ 0.981 [0.007]∗∗
Rural 1.147 [0.013]∗∗ 1.100 [0.015]∗∗ 1.047 [0.018]∗∗ 1.093 [0.003]∗∗ 1.019 [0.007]∗∗
Area dummy variables
Urban (= reference)
Rural -0.001 [0.002] 0.0002 [0.004] 0.001 [0.003] 0.003 [0.001]∗∗ 0.001 [0.0003]∗∗
JPS96 -0.063 [0.008]∗∗ -1.072 [0.018]∗∗ -0.019 [0.017]
BKKBN 1997 -0.021 [0.001]∗∗ -0.001 [0.0005]∗
Constant 0.005 [0.001]∗∗ 0.004 [0.003] 0.001 [0.002] 0.002 [0.001]∗ -0.0001 [0.0003]
Observations 126,157 42,321 25,940 844,147 844,147
Root mean square error 0.200 0.273 0.189 0.281 0.095
SigniÞcance levels:  : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
1 The θ coeﬃcients are constrained to sum to 2.
64 CHAPTER 3. THE INDONESIAN SOCIAL SAFETY NET
3.B Supplementary Þgures
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Figure 3.3: Correlation between JPS96 and BPS 1999 poverty rate.
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Figure 3.4: Correlation between JPS96 and crisis impact on BPS poverty rate.
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Figure 3.5: Correlation between BKKBN headcount December 1997 and BPS 1999
poverty rate.
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Figure 3.6: Correlation between BKKBN headcount December 1997 and crisis impact
on BPS poverty rate.
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Figure 3.7: Correlation between scholarship coverage and BPS 1999 poverty rate.
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Figure 3.8: Correlation between scholarship coverage and crisis impact on BPS poverty
rate.
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Figure 3.9: Correlation between health card coverage and BPS 1999 poverty rate.
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Figure 3.10: Correlation between health card coverage and crisis impact on BPS poverty
rate.
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Chapter 4
Simulation Based BeneÞt Incidence
Analysis
4.1 Introduction
Decentralising public service delivery to local communities has become a growing trend
in the past decade (World Bank, 2004). A prominent argument is that, given the right
institutional incentives, delegating part of the responsibility to lower political and admin-
istrative levels will improve eﬀectiveness of service delivery to the poor. Evidence of the
eﬀectiveness of decentralisation is ambiguous, however. On the one hand it is recognised
that local authorities may have superior information on local needs and preferences (e.g.
Alderman, 2002). On the other, decentralisation may increase inequality due to local
elite capture or lack of accountability (e.g. Lanjouw and Ravallion, 1999; Galasso and
Ravallion, 2005). Even if communities use their informational advantage to the beneÞt of
the poor, local pro-poor targeting may be frustrated by ineﬀective regional targeting by
the central government (e.g. Alderman, 2001). In such a decentralised setting a question
that remains is how changes in public policy at a central level aﬀect the targeting of
services to the poor. How do we measure the marginal eﬀects of regional targeting on
the distribution of beneÞts from public policy, and how can we disentangle this from the
eﬀects of local targeting?
The recent literature on beneÞt incidence proposes a number of methods for marginal
beneÞt incidence analysis.1 These methods supplement traditional average beneÞt inci-
dence in that they investigate distributional eﬀects of marginal changes in social service
delivery. However, these methods do not shed light on the underlying factors that drive
1For a discussion on average and marginal beneÞt incidence see, for example, Younger (2003) and van
de Walle (2004).
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the observed marginal incidence. As has been pointed out by others, these methods can
not discern whether observed diﬀerences are due to geographic targeting, local policy
decisions or behaviour and characteristics of households.
Decomposing targeting performance into geographic and local speciÞc targeting is not
straightforward. Decomposable indices such as a concentration index or targeting diﬀer-
ential are informative measures on socioeconomic inequality in the use of services.2 But
these indices do not show how the full distribution of public service utilisation over the
population changes. In this chapter I apply a micro-simulation based approach for dy-
namic beneÞt incidence analysis to the JPS scholarship and health card programmes. This
method builds on an extension to the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method, proposed
by Bourguignon, Fournier and Gurgand (2001).
From 1999 to 2002 both the JPS scholarship and health card programmes have ex-
panded. Both programmes were targeted pro-poor, following a decentralised design that
involved geographic and community based targeting. However, the changes in the distri-
bution of beneÞts from both programmes show quite diﬀerent patterns. The poor have
been the main beneÞciaries of an increase in scholarships, whereas the expansion of the
health card does not show a pro-poor pattern. An important aspect of these programmes
is that the geographic targeting rules were altered after 1999, when more accurate infor-
mation on regional poverty became available. The main question I address here is to what
extent the distributional outcome of the programmes expansion is a result of geographical
targeting by the central allocation unit in Jakarta, or whether this was mainly determined
at the community level.
The results show how the simulations facilitate understanding and interpretation of
conventional marginal beneÞt incidence results. For the scholarship programme the mar-
ginal incidence in itself provides misleading policy advice, as it suggests that programme
expansion would beneÞt the poor. The decompositions, however, show that pro-poor
marginal incidence is driven by improved local and geographical targeting over time. Ex-
panding the programme without simultaneously improving the targeting process would in
fact increase leakage to the non-poor. For the health card programme, the decomposition
results are not conßicting with marginal incidence results. Instead, they highlights which
targeting instruments would be most eﬀective in reallocating health cards to the poor.
The next section provides a theoretical framework for the analysis. It provides a simple
model describing the decentralised targeting process. Section 3 provides a dynamic beneÞt
incidence analysis applying some commonly used methods. Section 4 then continues by
2See, for example, Bidani and Ravallion (1997), Ravallion (2000), andWagstaﬀ, van Doorslaer, Watan-
abe (2003).
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exploring how the eﬀects of central and local policy instruments can be disentangled,
using a simulation based decomposition approach. The results a given in section 5 and
section 6 concludes.
4.2 A simple model of decentralised targeting
This section illustrates the targeting problem and the determinants driving the observed
distributional outcomes with a simple model.
Consider a social programme where targeting is fully decentralised: funds are centrally
allocated to district communities, which, in turn, are responsible for targeting households.
The transfer, yik, that household i, residing in district k, receives from the programme
is thus determined by a two-stage targeting process. First, it depends on the outcome
of the geographical targeting process, in which district k receives amount sk of funds.
3
Second, it depends on how the local oﬃcials distribute this sk amongst the households in
the districts.
Let us start the exposition with the district based targeting phase, taking sk as given.
This assumes that the communities have no inßuence on the allocation decision by the
centre. This is a plausible setting for the JPS programmes, where Þrst stage targeting was
a purely administrative exercise using data exogenous to the programme.4 It is further
assumed that the centre has no direct inßuence on within-district targeting.
The community members in charge of local targeting do not have full information
about the households circumstances. Households are described by a set of characteristics
x∗ik, but some of these characteristics, ηik, remain unobserved (although the distribution of
ηik is assumed to be known). Thus x
∗
ik = (xik, ηik), where xik is observed information. This
introduces some local uncertainty. The decentralised targeting design is justiÞed as long
as communities are more able to reduce this uncertainty and the local costs of gathering
the (observed) information xik is smaller, compared to a fully centralised programme.
The targeting problem of local programme managers is to maximise the utility of
the Nk households within the district, subject to the local programme budget constraint.
Denote the utility gain from the beneÞts for a household by Uik (yik, x
∗
ik), which is assumed
3Note that the JPS introduced multilpe layers of geographic targeting, with targeting to districts,
sub-districts, and schools.
4For many programs exogeneity of geographic targeting is not a credible assumption. This can be
the case when, for example, geographic targeting is based on data that is collected by communities
themselves. It is also not uncommon that political decision making regarding social policy is inßuenced
by local pressure groups and lobbying of community oﬃcials. See for example Galasso and Ravallion
(2005), who question the exogeneity of geographic targeting and discuss the implications for empirical
analysis.
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to be concave and strictly increasing in yik. However, targeting implies that from the
perspective of programme managers, the welfare of some households receives priority over
others. These priorities are expressed by welfare, or Pareto, weights λ. These weights can
reßect a complex variety of factors, such as the targeting criteria communicated through
the programme guidelines or locally formulated criteria. Political economy factors also
inßuence the welfare weights if the targeting process is sensitive to political empowerment
or capture by some population groups. This eﬀect manifests itself through the political,
economic or demographic environment in the districts.5 The welfare weights will then be
a function of household and district characteristics (x∗ik and wk, respectively), and the
local budget (sk).
The local maximisation problem then becomes
max
yik
NkX
i=1
Eηik [Uik (yik, x
∗
ik)λ (x
∗
ik, sk, wk) | xik] (4.1)
s.t.
NkX
i=1
yik = sk, yik ≥ 0 ∀i, k (4.2)
with the solution
y∗ik = H [sk, x
∗
ik, ηik, λ (x
∗
ik, sk, wk)] (4.3)
Note that this exposition is simply a more general formulation of the model described
in Galasso and Ravallion (2005), in that their model maximizes aggregate (per capita)
welfare functions explicitly deÞned for the poor and the non-poor.
In similar vein, a targeting problem can be described for the centre. First of all,
this depends on the centres view of regional priorities (or fairness, if you will). Should
two equally poor people have the same probability of receiving a beneÞt independent of
where they live? Or do some regions require priority over others? A second issue regards
the centres information constraints. Geographic targeting crucially depends on available
data for regional welfare. The center also does not have full knowledge of local targeting
criteria (the districts set of Pareto weights). That is, it does not exactly know how lower
operational and administrative units will implement the programme. Taking into account
the expected allocation behaviour of communities, the available data on regional welfare,
and some degree of uncertainty associated with lack of information, solving the centres
maximisation problem will yield some pattern of regional programme intensity s∗k = αkS,
where S =
PK
k=1 sk is the national programme budget, and the district allocation shares
5For example the degree of poverty (Ravallion, 1999; Galasso and Ravallion, 2005) or inequality
(Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000).
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PK
k=1 αk = 1.
The outcome of the two stage process can then be written as a function of the size
of the programme, regional targeting, local targeting rules and the characteristics of the
household
y∗ik = G (S, αk, β, xik, εik) (4.4)
If there is regional variation in programme intensity, αk, then it matters where people
live for the amount of beneÞts they will receive. The selection process of individual
households by communities is represented by a vector of targeting rules, β. Targeting
is also aﬀected by the unobserved εik = (ηik, vk, ωik), which will be treated as random
shocks to the selection process. These shocks stem from uncertainty at local level (ηik),
information constraints of the centre (vk), and private information on the targeting process
of programme managers (ωik). An example of the latter are preferences or priorities of
local programme managers, introduced through the welfare weights, and are not observed
by others.
Alternatively, equation (4.4) can be interpreted as the households eligibility. This is
a useful interpretation if the beneÞts that we want to investigate concern participation
in a social programme. In this case the outcome of the latent targeting process (4.4) is a
binary one
yik = 1 [y
∗
ik > 0] = 1 [G (S,αk, β, xik, εik) > 0] (4.5)
where 1 [·] is a binary indicator function. A household is selected into the programme
(yik = 1) only if its eligibility, y
∗
ik, exceeds a certain threshold (here normalised to zero).
Finally, the observed distribution D (y) of transfers to households is a result of this
targeting process, and is consequently determined by the same factors
D (y) = F (S, αk, β, xik, εik) (4.6)
4.3 Dynamic analysis
With the availability of more than one cross section household survey dynamic methods
can be used for marginal beneÞt incidence analysis, by investigating how the distribution
of transfers, D (y), changes over time. This analysis draws on two rounds of the Susenas
survey data, for 1999 and 2002. In both these years the questionnaire asks households
whether they participated in the JPS scholarship and health card programme. Some
restrictions arise due to the data. First, not all districts are found in both surveys because
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some conßict areas were left out of the 2002 survey.6 Therefore, the analysis in this section
is restricted to the districts that are represented in both years. The other problem is that
information on scholarships in 2002 is only available at the household level. For each
household it is known whether at least one of the children has received a JPS scholarship.
To compare the two years the 1999 data is collapsed to the household level.
The size of both programmes has increased over time. The Þrst two columns in
table 4.1 show the average incidence of scholarships and health cards across per capita
consumption quintiles for 1999 and 2002, at a household level. In 1999 5.2 percent of
households received at least one scholarship, while in 2002 this had grown to almost 6
percent.7 The number of households that own a health card increased from 10.9 to 14.1
percent. Average incidence is pro-poor in 1999 and 2002 for both programmes, and all
quintiles beneÞted from the programmes expansion. The last four columns of table 4.1
show the average odds ratios and the shares of the beneÞts with the diﬀerent quintiles.
Although the poor hold the largest share in both programmes, there is considerable leakage
to the non-poor. The poorest 40 percent of the population have more than 60 percent of
scholarships, and almost 60 percent of health cards.
However, the change in the distribution over time diﬀers between the two programmes.
Table 4.2 shows the changes in the distributions in more detail. The table presents four
commonly used measures of dynamic beneÞt incidence.8
The Þrst column shows changes in average programme incidence over time
∆yqt =
PNqt+1
i=1 yiqt+1
Nqt+1
−
PNqt
i=1 yiqt
Nqt
(4.7)
where yiqt reßects programme participation for individual i from quintile q. Subscript t
indicates time. Equation (4.7) gives the change in the probability that a household from
quintile q is included in the programme: Pr(yt+1 = 1 | q) − Pr(yt = 1 | q). All quintiles
beneÞted from the increase in number of scholarships, but the incidence amongst the
poorest quintile was by far the highest. The programme expansion included 2.4 percent
of the poorest households. For the second quintile this is 0.9 percent, and for the three
richest quintiles less than 0.3 percent. The change in health card coverage is more equally
distributed over the quintiles. Coverage amongst all quintiles increased considerably, but
the pattern is far from pro-poor, ranging from 4.2 percent for the rich to 2.2 percent for
6The rural districts of Aceh, Maluku and Irian Jaya were not included in the 2002 survey due to local
violent conßicts. These areas constituted 21 districts in the 1999 survey. East Timor (13 districts in
1999) has not been included in the Susenas after the 1999 referendum on independence.
7Comparing table 4.1 with the results in chapter 3 show that the observed patterns in the distribution
of scholarships in 1999 are not changed by the data restrictions.
8See Younger (2003) for an extensive discussion of these methods.
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Table 4.1: Distribution of JPS scholarships and health cards by quintile, in 1999 and
2002
Incidence Average odds ratio Share
(% of population) (% of total)
1999 2002 1999 2002 1999 2002
Scholarships
Quintile 1 9.68 12.08 1.87 2.03 37.42 40.67
Quintile 2 6.99 7.87 1.35 1.32 27.00 26.50
Quintile 3 4.90 5.01 0.95 0.84 18.94 16.88
Quintile 4 3.05 3.32 0.59 0.56 11.79 11.18
Quintile 5 1.25 1.42 0.24 0.24 4.85 4.77
All 5.18 5.94 1.00 1.00 100.00 100.00
Health cards
Quintile 1 19.28 22.47 1.77 1.59 35.35 31.87
Quintile 2 13.73 17.05 1.26 1.21 25.17 24.18
Quintile 3 10.87 13.08 1.00 0.93 19.94 18.55
Quintile 4 7.09 10.14 0.65 0.72 13.00 14.39
Quintile 5 3.56 7.76 0.33 0.55 6.53 11.00
All 10.91 14.10 1.00 1.00 100.00 100.00
The number of observations is 186,272 for 1999 and 212,642 for 2002.
Source: Susenas 1999 and 2002.
the third quintile. In the other quintiles about 3 percent of the household beneÞted from
the programme increase.
The changes in average incidence have implications for the shares held by the diﬀerent
quintiles. The changes in the overall share of the beneÞts are given in the second column,
that is
∆αqt =
PNqt+1
i=1 yiqt+1PNt+1
i=1 yit+1
−
PNqt
i=1 yiqtPNt
i=1 yit
(4.8)
This gives change in the probability that the selected households are from a speciÞc
quintile: Pr(Q = q | yt+1 = 1)−Pr(Q = q | yt = 1). Here we see stark diﬀerences between
the two programmes. The poorest quintile has increased its share of the scholarships by
3.3 percentage point, from 37.4 to 40.7 percent. The share of the other quintiles has
decreased. In case of the health card programme, the two wealthiest quintiles that have
increased their share, at the expense of the 3 poorest quintiles. The leakage of health
cards to the non-poor has increased over time.
The change in share and average incidence do not give a complete picture on marginal
incidence. They do not show how the change in beneÞts are distributed (Younger, 2002;
van de Walle, 2004). This is given in the third column, where we observe to what extent
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the changes in the programmes have beneÞted the diﬀerent quintiles. Each quintiles share
in the overall changes is calculated as
∆sqt
∆St
=
PNqt+1
i=1 yiqt+1 −
PNqt
i=1 yiqtPNt+1
i=1 yit+1 −
PNt
i=1 yit
(4.9)
The poorest quintile enjoyed 55 percent of the overall increase of scholarships. The mar-
ginal shares decrease strongly for the wealthier quintiles. The rich received only 4.4
percent of the extra scholarships. The beneÞt of the extra health cards shows a U-shape
pattern, somewhat similar to the change in average incidence. The poorest and the richest
quintile received the largest share of the change, the middle quintile the least. However,
only for the two richest quintiles is the share in the programme expansion larger than the
initial share of the allocation. This explains the observed changes in the overall shares of
beneÞts.
Finally, table 4.2 reports marginal odds ratios of programme expansion (following
Lanjouw and Ravallion, 1999), while controlling for district speciÞc factors
yiqkt = c+
5X
q=1
θqdqykt + γq + δt + φk + εiqkt (4.10)
Conditional on regional allocation, the marginal odds ratios, θq, indicate how the mar-
ginal beneÞts are distributed across quintiles. Equation (4.10) is estimated by regressing
household programme participation on the programme coverage in districts, ykt, inter-
acted with quintile dummy variables, dq. This approach is similar to the marginal beneÞt
incidence analysis in chapter 3 (page 38), except for the time dimension. Here the data
for the two years have been pooled, and a year dummy variable is added to capture time
eﬀect δt. An advantage of using pooled household data is that both district Þxed eﬀects,
φk, and quintile Þxed eﬀects, γq, can now be accounted for directly.
9 It is assumed that
ykt is not correlated with εiqkt, as regional targeting is determined solely by the centre.
The marginal eﬀects are estimated using a linear probability model and constraining the
θq coeﬃcients to sum to 5.
The marginal odds ratios conÞrm the results for the scholarship programme. Starting
9This application diﬀers from previous studies, which either use regional aggregated data at diﬀer-
ent administrative levels (Lanjouw and Ravallion, 1999; Ravallion, 1999; Galasso and Ravallion 2001;
Lanjouw, Pradhan, Saadah, Sayed, and Sparrow, 2002; Younger, 2003), or cross section data for indi-
viduals (Younger, 2003). The advantage of using individual over regionally aggregated data is that the
statistical power of the model increases with the number of observations. Interpretation of estimates
remains unchanged since the survey is representative at the district level, within the stratiÞed survey
design households are sampled from these districts, and all districts appear in both surveys.
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from a pro-poor allocation in 1999, the increase of the programme over the next three
years has disproportionately beneÞted the poor. There is no evidence of early programme
capture by the non-poor, despite some non-trivial leakage. However, in case of the health
card programme the marginal odds show a clear pro-poor pattern, unlike the other three
measures of change.
Based on the above results, the policy implications would seem to be clear. The
marginal incidence suggests that an expansion of the scholarship programme will, for the
most part, beneÞt the poor. For the health cards this is not the case. Although the poor
are the main beneÞciaries, an increase in the number of health cards will beneÞt both the
poor and the non-poor. Improving pro-poor allocation seems only possible if targeting is
improved.
Table 4.2: Dynamic beneÞt incidence of JPS scholarships and health cards, by quintile,
1999 to 2002
Change in Change in Share in Marginal odds ratio 1
incidence share change θq [s.e.]
Scholarships
Quintile 1 2.40 3.25 54.93 1.61 [0.017]∗∗
Quintile 2 0.88 −0.50 24.33 1.25 [0.017]∗∗
Quintile 3 0.11 −2.06 7.85 0.97 [0.017]∗∗
Quintile 4 0.27 −0.61 8.47 0.73 [0.018]∗∗
Quintile 5 0.17 −0.08 4.42 0.44 [0.019]∗∗
All 0.76 0.00 100.00
Health cards
Quintile 1 3.19 −3.48 22.79 1.34 [0.011]∗∗
Quintile 2 3.32 −0.99 21.61 1.15 [0.011]∗∗
Quintile 3 2.21 −1.39 14.92 1.04 [0.011]∗∗
Quintile 4 3.05 1.39 18.01 0.87 [0.012]∗∗
Quintile 5 4.20 4.47 22.67 0.60 [0.013]∗∗
All 3.19 0.00 100.00
SigniÞcance levels:  : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
The number of observations is 186,272 for 1999 and 212,642 for 2002.
Source: Susenas 1999 and 2002.
1 See table 4.7 (appendix) for detailed estimation results.
4.4 Decomposition and simulation.
To what extent can the distributional outcome of the programmes expansion, as observed
in the previous section, be attributed to geographical targeting by the central allocation
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unit in Jakarta, or to local decision making? To relate this question to the outcome of the
behavioural model in equation (4.6), we can view the observed change in the distribution
of beneÞts over time, from Dt (y) to Dt+1 (y), to be a result of changes in the factors
that determine this distribution. Bourguignon et al. (2001) propose a simulation method
to decompose changes in the income distribution. Their approach extends the Oaxaca-
Blinder method by applying the decomposition to the full income distribution, instead of
just the means of diﬀerent population groups.10 In this section I will illustrate how this
methodology can be used to investigate the eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent policy instruments
for targeting of public programmes.
The distribution Dt (y) is determined by each households eligibility, which in turn is
determined by geographical targeting, local targeting, the households personal charac-
teristics and some unobserved element. Suppressing the i and k subscripts for ease of
notation, indicate a households eligibility level at time t as
Gt = G (St, αt, βt; xt, εt) (4.11)
The households eligibility level may change, which aﬀects the probability of future par-
ticipation,
Gt+1 −Gt = G
¡
St+1, αt+1, βt+1; xt+1, εt+1
¢−G (St, αt, βt;xt, εt)
Now imagine a counterfactual eligibility, where the size of the programme (S) is increased
to the level of year t + 1, while keeping the local targeting rules (β), the relative shares
assigned to districts (α) and the population characteristics (x, ε) constant at the level of
year t,
G
∆{S}
t = G
¡
St+1, αt, βt; xt, εt
¢
With the allocation threshold Þxed at zero, the eligibility of all households will increase,
G
∆{S}
t > Gt, since more funds are available. Alternatively, we could change regional
targeting, keeping all else constant,
G
∆{α}
t = G
¡
St, αt+1, βt;xt, εt
¢
This will increase average eligibility only in areas where αt+1 > αt, since the funds al-
located to those districts, Stαt+1, increases. Average eligibility will decrease in districts
where αt+1 < αt.
10Bourguignon and Ferreira (2005) provide a detailed discussion on the generalisation of the Oaxaca-
Blinder decomposition.
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The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition builds on generating an array of such counterfac-
tual eligibility. In this way the overall change in eligibility is readily decomposed into
changes in each of the determinants. These separate eﬀects are simply introduced by
adding and subtracting terms
Gt+1 −Gt = [G∆{S}t −Gt]
(size)
+ [G
∆{S,α}
t −G∆{S}t ]
(regional targeting)
(4.12)
+[G
∆{S,α,β}
t −G∆{S,α}t ]
(local targeting)
+ [Gt+1 −G∆{S,α,β}t ]
(population change)
Oﬀ course, there are other paths by which the change in eligibility can be decomposed,
depending on which eligibility levels are used as baseline. For example, the Þrst eﬀect on
the right reßects the size eﬀect. But the size eﬀect can also be expressed asG∆{S,α}t −G∆{α}t .
In the case above there are in fact 8 diﬀerent representations of the size eﬀect, using
diﬀerent counterfactual eligibility levels.
This highlights an important implication of the decomposition method: path depen-
dence. It is not necessarily the case that G∆{S}t − Gt = G∆{S,α}t − G∆{α}t . There is an
intuitive reason behind this. The distributional eﬀects of expanding the programme de-
pend on the targeting process (αt, βt) in the reference state. Although the availability
of extra funds increases eligibility for the whole population, only those at the margin of
the threshold will cross it. In other words, ranking of the population by eligibility level
matters. In this particular example, the two reference states (Gt and G
∆{α}
t ) are subject
to diﬀerent geographic targeting regimes (αt and αt+1, respectively). If these regimes each
yield a diﬀerent ranking of the population by eligibility, then the eﬀect of ∆S will also be
diﬀerent.
Note also that the population eﬀect can be further decomposed into changes in the
population characteristics, xt, and the unobserved elements, εt.
11 But given the context
of the paper I will restrict the analysis to separating the eﬀect of the targeting policy
11One problem with decomposing the population eﬀect is that the number of observations in the two
periods is not necessarily the same. Generating the counterfactual eligibity G∆{ε}t then requires to assume
that the changes in unobservables εik follow a rank preserving transformation process
εikt+1 = F
−1
t+1 · Ft (εikt)
where F (.) is the cumulative distribution function. If this is assumed to be a normal distribution then
the transformation process is approximated by
εikt+1 =
σt+1
σt
εikt
with σt is the standard deviation of εt. See, for example, Bourguignon et al. (2001) for an application of
this procedure.
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instruments (S,αk, β) from the population eﬀects.
The decomposed changes in eligibility have corresponding eﬀects on the distribution
of beneÞts. For example, using Dt (y) as reference, four diﬀerent eﬀects can be described:
1. Size eﬀect Dt (y)→ D∆{S}t (y)
2. Regional targeting eﬀect: Dt (y)→ D∆{α}t (y)
3. Within-district targeting eﬀect: Dt (y)→ D∆{β}t (y)
4. Population eﬀect: Dt (y)→ D∆{x,ε}t (y)
With repeated cross-section data these eﬀects can be calculated by means of simula-
tion. Under normality assumptions, the parameters of the targeting process (αk, β) are
obtained for each year by probit estimation of (4.5). The unobserved component in the
latent function is not readily retrieved from (4.5). However, we do need εik since we are
especially interested in those households at the margin of the eligibility threshold. As-
suming that the unobserved components are void of any systematic variation, εik is drawn
randomly from a standard normal distribution.
Eligibility and programme participation are then predicted for each household based
on the estimated parameters and simulated unobservables
yik = 1 [y
∗
ik > 0] = 1[G(S, αk,
β; xik, εik) > 0] (4.13)
This produces hypothetical distributions Dt(y) and Dt+1(y), which are similar to the
observed distributions in that they are generated by the same targeting process, and diﬀer
only in the random shocks they endure. These distributions serve as base state for the
decompositions. Counterfactual distributions are generated by changing the parameters
in the eligibility function, and registering which households cross the threshold.
4.5 Simulation results
The probit estimates of equation (4.5) are given in table 4.3. The models include variables
that are found in both the 1999 and the 2002 Susenas. These variables include local
selection criteria such as characteristics of the head of household (gender, educational
attainment, employment status), household welfare (per capita consumption quintiles),
and household size and composition. Other variables are household living conditions
(housing, water and sanitation) and a dummy variable indicating whether the household
lives in a rural area. Finally, the model controls for district Þxed eﬀects, to capture the
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geographic targeting process.12
Table 4.3: JPS scholarship and health card selection, 1999 and 2002 (probit)
Variable Scholarships Health card
1999 2002 1999 2002
Female head of household 0.2626 0.1692 0.1654 0.1382
[0.0229]∗∗ [0.0218]∗∗ [0.0179]∗∗ [0.0151]∗∗
Education head of household
None (= reference)
Primary -0.0284 -0.0449 -0.0682 -0.0799
[0.0154] [0.0147]∗∗ [0.0131]∗∗ [0.0114]∗∗
Junior secondary -0.1293 -0.1060 -0.1770 -0.1119
[0.0235]∗∗ [0.0207]∗∗ [0.0191]∗∗ [0.0154]∗∗
Senior secondary -0.1771 -0.2289 -0.2930 -0.1325
[0.0253]∗∗ [0.0231]∗∗ [0.0215]∗∗ [0.0167]∗∗
Higher -0.3274 -0.4181 -0.3870 -0.0849
[0.0481]∗∗ [0.0404]∗∗ [0.0452]∗∗ [0.0267]∗∗
Head of household unemployed 0.2505 0.1723 0.0800 0.0171
[0.0698]∗∗ [0.0714]∗ [0.0519] [0.0475]
Per capita expenditure quintile
Quintile 1, poorest (= reference)
Quintile 2 -0.0013 -0.0181 -0.0959 -0.0817
[0.0188] [0.0176] [0.0173]∗∗ [0.0144]∗∗
Quintile 3 -0.0480 -0.0728 -0.1699 -0.1535
[0.0212]∗ [0.0203]∗∗ [0.0202]∗∗ [0.0167]∗∗
Quintile 4 -0.1182 -0.1453 -0.2859 -0.2436
[0.0239]∗∗ [0.0235]∗∗ [0.0228]∗∗ [0.0187]∗∗
Quintile 5, richest -0.2143 -0.2052 -0.4938 -0.3649
[0.0292]∗∗ [0.0293]∗∗ [0.0284]∗∗ [0.0233]∗∗
Ln(household size) 0.6984 0.5974 0.0359 0.1029
[0.0212]∗∗ [0.0202]∗∗ [0.0149]∗ [0.0127]∗∗
Household composition
Share of males age < 6 -0.5101 -0.2696 0.3923 0.2713
[0.0839]∗∗ [0.0719]∗∗ [0.0522]∗∗ [0.0422]∗∗
Share of females age < 6 -0.3155 -0.1993 0.3726 0.3329
Continued on next page...
12In a few districts the scholarships or health cards are not (yet) active. Given the district Þxed-eﬀects
approach, these districts are dropped from the probit analysis since there is no variation in the outcome
variable within the districts. However, they are used in the simulations, as the allocated shares to districts
are changed.
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... table 4.3 continued
Variable Scholarships Health card
1999 2002 1999 2002
[0.0823]∗∗ [0.0719]∗∗ [0.0549]∗∗ [0.0422]∗∗
Share of males age 6-12 1.3461 1.8144 0.0910 0.2851
[0.0650]∗∗ [0.0577]∗∗ [0.0454]∗ [0.0369]∗∗
Share of females age 6-12 1.6011 1.8476 0.1369 0.2383
[0.0659]∗∗ [0.0588]∗∗ [0.0466]∗∗ [0.0383]∗∗
Share of males age 13-17 2.0845 1.9005 0.0656 0.0847
[0.0662]∗∗ [0.0607]∗∗ [0.0486] [0.0422]∗
Share of females age 13-17 2.2600 2.0106 -0.0249 0.1682
[0.0685]∗∗ [0.0615]∗∗ [0.0508] [0.0427]∗∗
Share of males age 18-60 (= reference)
Share of females age 18-60 0.0562 0.0880 0.0609 0.1700
[0.0816] [0.0719] [0.0398] [0.0306]∗∗
Share of males age > 60 -0.0929 -0.3376 0.1065 0.2078
[0.0878] [0.0776]∗∗ [0.0425]∗ [0.0349]∗∗
Share of females age > 60 -0.2904 -0.2916 0.0821 0.2735
[0.0941]∗∗ [0.0799]∗∗ [0.0416]∗ [0.0344]∗∗
House made out of bamboo 0.1183 0.1469 0.2573 0.2596
[0.0207]∗∗ [0.0208]∗∗ [0.0180]∗∗ [0.0171]∗∗
Floor made out of earth 0.0621 0.0760 0.3022 0.1695
[0.0207]∗∗ [0.0187]∗∗ [0.0180]∗∗ [0.0158]∗∗
Access to clean drinking water -0.0745 -0.0516 -0.0380 -0.0413
[0.0202]∗∗ [0.0193]∗∗ [0.0209] [0.0159]∗∗
Closed sewer -0.1186 -0.1047 -0.1958 -0.1601
[0.0196]∗∗ [0.0176]∗∗ [0.0179]∗∗ [0.0151]∗∗
Access to electricity -0.0597 -0.0136 -0.0476 -0.0712
[0.0206]∗∗ [0.0217] [0.0225]∗ [0.0192]∗∗
Rural area -0.0337 -0.0228 0.0011 -0.1014
[0.0252] [0.0213] [0.0273] [0.0188]∗∗
Constant -3.7953 -3.3437 -1.1983 -1.1950
[0.2047]∗∗ [0.1964]∗∗ [0.1049]∗∗ [0.1003]∗∗
District Þxed eﬀects yes yes yes yes
Observations 183,657 212,226 184,458 212,642
Pseudo R-squared 0.23 0.22 0.19 0.09
Robust standard errors in brackets.
SigniÞcance levels:  : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
For both programmes, households headed by females are more eligible than male
4.5. SIMULATION RESULTS 83
headed households, although this diﬀerences decreases over time. An increase in educa-
tion attainment of the head of household decreases the probability of participation. Un-
employment of the household head is a relevant criterion for the scholarship programme,
but not for the health card programme. Both programmes are allocated pro-poor in
terms of per capita consumption. Large households are more likely to be selected into the
programmes. As expected, the probability of scholarship receipt is higher for households
where the share of children at scholarships eligible age (i.e., older than 10) is relatively
high. For the health card programme, households with a large share of children, women,
and elderly (relative to adult men) are more likely to be selected. Household living con-
ditions are important selection criteria for both programmes. The probability of selection
in either programme increases when households live in a bamboo house, have a ßoor made
out of earth, do not have a closed sewer, or have no access to clean drinking water or
electricity.
The probit estimates are used to rank households within districts on their eligibility
level, y∗ik, which is the linear prediction plus the random shock εik. The eligibility threshold
is set by the number of scholarships or health cards available to a district in a speciÞc
year. For those households above the threshold y∗ik = 1, for those below y
∗
ik = 0.
The simulated baselines for the scholarship and health card programmes are shown
in the Þrst column of tables 4.4 and 4.5. The simulated shares show a similar pattern to
the observed distribution. The tables further report the decomposition of the simulated
changes. The top panels show the simulated change, each with 1999 as base year (i.e.,
D1999 (y)→ D2002 (y)). For example, the third column (headed by ∆αk) in the top panel
shows the simulated change to the 1999 distribution if it were to be subject to the 2002
geographical targeting regime (D∆α1999 (y)). The bottom panel shows results with 2002 as
base (i.e., D2002 (y)→ D1999 (y)). The sign of the 2002 results have therefore been reversed
to facilitate comparability. The results are not identical between years, emphasising the
path dependency that plagues the decomposition method.13 Nevertheless, comparing the
results for both years provides some notion of precision of the estimates.
The results in table 4.4 suggest that local targeting (∆β) has been a driving force
behind the pro-poor increase of the scholarship programme. Keeping all other factors
constant, the share of scholarships with the poorest 20 percent of the population increased
by 0.7 to 1.4 percentage point because of local targeting, depending on the base year. This
13Note that tables 4.4 and 4.5 do not present a properly decomposed path, as described in equation
(4.12). That is, the decomposed elements do not add up to the full change. Although such a decomposition
can be constructed, the table only shows simulated changes relative to the baselines, (D2002 (y) ,D1999 (y)),
since these eﬀects or most relevant from a policy perspective. Tables 4.8 and 4.9 in the appendix provide
examples of a correct decomposition.
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Table 4.4: Simulated distribution of JPS scholarships and decomposition of changes in
the distribution
Baseline Decomposition of changes
local regional size population
targeting targeting eﬀect eﬀect
eﬀect eﬀect
∆β ∆αk ∆S ∆ {xik, εik}
1999 Quintile 1 35.85 1.41 −0.21 0.16 2.28
Quintile 2 26.27 −0.56 0.27 −0.27 0.01
Quintile 3 19.09 −0.63 0.06 0.28 −0.52
Quintile 4 12.93 −0.27 −0.27 −0.22 −1.59
Quintile 5 5.86 0.06 0.15 0.05 −0.19
2002 Quintile 1 39.06 0.69 0.94 −1.50 2.88
Quintile 2 25.91 −0.18 −0.20 0.53 0.17
Quintile 3 17.97 −0.45 −0.43 0.43 −0.82
Quintile 4 11.27 −0.17 −0.01 0.27 −1.19
Quintile 5 5.79 0.11 −0.30 0.27 −1.04
The number of observations is 186,272 for 1999 and 212,642 for 2002.
constitutes about a quarter of the overall increase. However, the largest eﬀect is due to
changed characteristics of the population (∆ {xik, εik}). The policy instruments available
to the centre, on the other hand, do not show an unambiguous pattern across years. Given
the 2002 local targeting policy and the relative shares allocated to districts, an increase in
programme size (∆S) has increased the share of the non-poor, at the expense of the poor.
But this eﬀect has been partly oﬀset by improved regional targeting (∆αk). However,
taking the 1999 local targeting regime as base, the eﬀects show a less convincing pattern.
The results for the health card programme show more robust results across years (table
4.5). The pro-rich distribution of the increase in beneÞts is driven by local and regional
targeting. Local targeting has decreased the share of the 3 poorest quintiles, and especially
the poor. Changes in the allocation of health cards by local committees has been mainly
to the beneÞt of the richest quintile, as their share increases by more than 2 percentage
points. The eﬀects of geographical targeting show a similar, albeit less profound, pattern.
As geographical targeting has changed after 1999, a relatively greater weight has been
assigned to districts with, on average, more wealthy households. There is also evidence of
late capture by the non-poor, in the sense that expansion of the programme has beneÞted
the Þfth and fourth quintile. That is, keeping all targeting rules constant, the households
at the margin of the allocation threshold are relatively wealthy.
Table 4.6 shows the concentration indices that reßect the simulated base distribution
and the decomposition of changes. The concentration index (CI) is an indicator of con-
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Table 4.5: Simulated distribution of JPS health cards and the decomposition of changes
in the distribution
Baseline Decomposition of changes
local regional size population
targeting targeting eﬀect eﬀect
eﬀect eﬀect
∆β ∆αk ∆S ∆ {xik, εik}
1999 Quintile 1 32.88 −1.21 −1.10 −2.29 1.21
Quintile 2 26.04 −0.86 −1.03 −0.09 0.17
Quintile 3 20.91 −0.68 −0.50 0.15 −0.84
Quintile 4 13.73 0.59 0.75 0.98 −0.46
Quintile 5 6.44 2.15 1.89 1.26 −0.08
2002 Quintile 1 31.01 −2.18 0.79 −1.36 1.55
Quintile 2 24.00 −0.49 −1.28 −0.20 −0.25
Quintile 3 19.25 −0.46 −0.94 0.33 −0.33
Quintile 4 15.14 0.66 0.41 0.29 −0.43
Quintile 5 10.59 2.47 1.01 0.92 −0.56
The number of observations is 186,272 for 1999 and 212,642 for 2002.
sumption related inequality in the distribution of beneÞts. The CI reßects the curvature
of the concentration curve, which graphs the cumulative proportion of the population
ranked by per capita consumption (from the poor to the rich) against the cumulative
proportion of the beneÞts.14 The CI is calculated as
CI =
2
µ
cov (y, rpc) (4.14)
where rpc is a households rank in the per capita consumption distribution, and µ = E (yi)
is mean beneÞts. The CI ranges from -1 (all the beneÞts are allocated to the poorest
household) to +1 (all the beneÞts accrue to the richest household). An equal distribution
yields a CI of zero.
The reported CI are negative for both programmes, corresponding to the pro-poor
allocation. Over time the CI for the scholarship programme has become larger (more
pro-poor), from -0.307 in 1999 to -0.339 in 2002. The CI for the distribution of health
cards has become smaller (less pro-poor), moving from -0.267 to -0.205.
The changes correspond to the results observed in tables 4.4 and 4.5. Pro-poor tar-
geting of marginal beneÞts is driven by local and regional targeting, and the population
eﬀect. The programmes expansion has had an equalising eﬀect on the distribution of
scholarships. The distribution of health cards has become more equal (i.e., less pro-poor)
14E.g., Wagstaﬀ, Paci and van Doorslaer (1991), and Kakwani, Wagstaﬀ and van Doorslaer (1997).
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Table 4.6: Simulated concentration indices and decompsition of changes
Baseline Decomposition of changes
local regional size population
targeting targeting eﬀect eﬀect
eﬀect eﬀect
∆β ∆αk ∆S ∆ {xik, εik}
Scholarships
1999 fCI -0.3073 -0.3168 -0.3078 -0.3087 -0.3312
∆ -0.0095 -0.0005 -0.0014 -0.0239
2002 fCI -0.3385 -0.3346 -0.3286 -0.3513 -0.3035
∆ -0.0039 -0.0099 0.0128 -0.0350
Health cards
1999 fCI -0.2668 -0.2335 -0.2377 -0.2399 -0.2770
∆ 0.0333 0.0291 0.0269 -0.0102
2002 fCI -0.2045 -0.2468 -0.2119 -0.2251 -0.1885
∆ 0.0423 0.0074 0.0206 -0.0160
The number of observations is 186,272 for 1999 and 212,642 for 2002.
because of local targeting, geographical targeting and late elite capture. This irrespective
of the reference period.
Finally, the decomposition results for the targeting variables (S, α, β) are graphically
illustrated in Þgure 4.1 for scholarships and Þgure 4.2 for health cards, using 2002 as base
year. The advantage of the simulation based approach is that the decomposed eﬀects can
be followed over the whole distribution of per capita consumption. The Þgures show the
change in the share of beneÞts (in terms of fractions) on the vertical axis. The horizontal
axis ranks households from poor (0) to rich (1). Figure 4.1 shows how the largest changes
have occurred at the lower end of the income distribution. It shows the oﬀsetting eﬀects
of the change in size and the reallocation of scholarships between districts.
Figure 4.2 emphasises that the distributional changes in the health card programme
due to geographical targeting are non-monotonic. Both the rich and the very poor have
beneÞted. Both the local targeting and size eﬀects show the gradual non-poor marginal
allocation of health cards.
This simulation exercise shows that the existing measures for dynamic marginal beneÞt
incidence can be misleading for policy advice. The traditional methods would suggest a
strong pro-poor marginal distribution of scholarships, supporting the view that expansion
of the scholarship programme would beneÞt the poor. However, the simulation results
show that expanding the programme without considering the eﬀects of local and regional
targeting will do little to improve distribution of scholarships to the poor. Changing
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Figure 4.1: Decomposition of changes in allocation of scholarships, 2002 base (locally
weighted regression, 0.3 bandwith)
the size of the programme (increase or decrease) will at most aﬀect (beneÞt or hurt) the
non-poor.
The results for the health card programme are consistent with the conclusions drawn
from traditional methods, as the pro-rich marginal distribution is conÞrmed. In addi-
tion, the simulation results would suggest that while geographical targeting has not been
pro-poor, improved targeting can function as instrument for reaching the poor. The re-
distributional eﬀects of geographic targeting of health cards could potentially oﬀset the
pro-rich changes in local targeting. Moreover, it can improve pro-poor targeting while
keeping the size of the programme constant.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter I applied a micro-simulation based approach for dynamic beneÞt inci-
dence analysis to the Indonesian JPS scholarship and health card programmes, for the
period 1999-2002. This method builds on the recent extensions of the Oaxaca-Blinder
decomposition. The contribution of this method is that it provides some insight on the
underlying factors driving marginal beneÞt incidence. Especially in a decentralised set-
ting, the existing methods for dynamic marginal beneÞt incidence leave some questions
unanswered.
Both the JPS health card and scholarship programmes were targeted pro-poor, while
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Figure 4.2: Decomposition of changes in allocation of health cards, 2002 base (locally
weighted regression, 0.3 bandwith)
following a decentralised design. This design involved geographic and community based
targeting. After 1999, when more accurate information on regional poverty became avail-
able, the geographic targeting rules were altered. The programmes and expanded from
1999 and 2002, but the marginal distribution of beneÞts show quite diﬀerent patterns.
The poor have been the main beneÞciaries of an increase in scholarships, whereas the
expansion of the health card does not show a pro-poor pattern.
The simulation based decomposition approach allows to investigate to what extent the
distributional outcome of the programmes expansion is a result of changes in geographical
targeting, changes in local targeting, or simply due to the expansion of the programmes.
The simulation method can provide more nuance to the observed patterns in target-
ing of social programmes, and facilitate interpretation of conventional marginal beneÞt
incidence results. The exercise with the scholarship programme has shown that existing
measures for dynamic marginal beneÞt incidence can be misleading for social policy ad-
vice. The pro-poor marginal incidence observed with the scholarship programme seem
to be driven by improved local and geographical over time. Expanding the programme
without simultaneously improving the targeting process will increase leakage to the non-
poor. For the health card programme, the decomposition results are not conßicting with
marginal incidence results. Instead, it highlights which targeting instruments would be
most eﬀective in reallocating health cards to the poor.
An important aspect of this method is path dependence, as the estimated eﬀects are
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not the same for across diﬀerent reference states. Often described as a potential drawback
to Oaxaca-Blinder type decompositions, this path dependence can also be informative.
The choice of the counterfactual baseline should be determined by the policy question
mind. Observing the behaviour of the same targeting instrument in diﬀerent settings can
provide diﬀerent, policy relevant, scenarios. Moreover, this approach allows us to compare
the performance of diﬀerent targeting instruments in a certain setting, or how eﬀective
these instruments are when the setting is uncertain.
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4.A Supplementary tables
Table 4.7: Dynamic marginal beneÞt incidence analysis (linear probability estimates
using pooled household data from the 1999 and 2002 Susenas)
Scholarships Health cards
Coeﬃcient [s.e.] Coeﬃcient [s.e.]
Marginal odds ratio 1
Quintile 1 (θ1) 1.614 [0.017]∗∗ 1.336 [0.011]∗∗
Quintile 2 (θ2) 1.249 [0.017]∗∗ 1.149 [0.011]∗∗
Quintile 3 (θ3) 0.966 [0.017]∗∗ 1.043 [0.011]∗∗
Quintile 4 (θ4) 0.732 [0.018]∗∗ 0.869 [0.012]∗∗
Quintile 5 (θ5) 0.439 [0.019]∗∗ 0.603 [0.013]∗∗
Quintile dummy variables
Quintile 1 (= reference)
Quintile 2 -0.001 [0.002] -0.011 [0.003]∗∗
Quintile 3 -0.005 [0.002]∗ -0.021 [0.003]∗∗
Quintile 4 -0.010 [0.002]∗∗ -0.026 [0.003]∗∗
Quintile 5 -0.013 [0.002]∗∗ -0.031 [0.003]∗∗
Year dummy variables
1999 0.000 [0.001] -0.002 [0.001]∗
2002 (= reference)
Constant 0.015 [0.006]∗ 0.045 [0.010]∗∗
District Þxed eﬀects yes yes
Observations 2 398,914 398,914
Root mean square error 0.202 0.307
1 The θq coeﬃcients are constrained to sum to 5.
2 The number of observations is 186,272 for 1999 and 212,642 for 2002.
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Table 4.8: Alternative decomposition paths for simulated changes in the distribution of JPS scholarships
Baseline Change Decomposition of changes
D1999 D2002 −D1999 D∆{S}1999 −D1999 D∆{S,α}1999 −D∆{S}1999 D∆{S,α,β}1999 −D∆{S,α}1999 D2002 −D∆{S,α,β}1999
Quintile 1 35.85 3.21 0.16 -0.40 0.57 2.88
Quintile 2 26.27 -0.36 -0.27 -0.04 -0.22 0.17
Quintile 3 19.09 -1.12 0.28 -0.19 -0.39 -0.82
Quintile 4 12.93 -1.66 -0.22 0.19 -0.44 -1.19
Quintile 5 5.86 -0.07 0.05 0.44 0.48 -1.04fCI -0.3073 -0.0312 -0.0014 0.0066 -0.0014 -0.0350
D2002 D2002 −D1999 D2002 −D∆{S}2002 D∆{S}2002 −D∆{S,α}2002 D∆{S,α}2002 −D∆{S,α,β}2002 D∆{S,α,β}2002 −D1999
Quintile 1 39.06 3.21 -1.50 1.63 0.80 2.28
Quintile 2 25.91 -0.36 0.53 -0.92 0.02 0.01
Quintile 3 17.97 -1.12 0.43 -0.44 -0.59 -0.52
Quintile 4 11.27 -1.66 0.27 0.08 -0.42 -1.59
Quintile 5 5.79 -0.07 0.27 -0.36 0.21 -0.19fCI -0.3385 -0.0312 0.0128 -0.0129 -0.0072 -0.0239
The number of observations is 186,272 for 1999 and 212,642 for 2002.
92 CHAPTER 4. SIMULATION BASED BENEFIT INCIDENCE
Table 4.9: Alternative decomposition paths for simulated changes in the distribution of JPS health cards
Baseline Change Decomposition of changes
D1999 D2002 −D1999 D∆{S}1999 −D1999 D∆{S,α}1999 −D∆{S}1999 D∆{S,α,β}1999 −D∆{S,α}1999 D2002 −D∆{S,α,β}1999
Quintile 1 32.88 -1.87 -2.29 0.32 -1.45 1.55
Quintile 2 26.04 -2.04 -0.09 -1.23 -0.47 -0.25
Quintile 3 20.91 -1.66 0.15 -0.92 -0.56 -0.33
Quintile 4 13.73 1.41 0.98 0.41 0.45 -0.43
Quintile 5 6.44 4.15 1.26 1.41 2.04 -0.56fCI -0.2668 0.0623 0.0269 0.0194 0.0320 -0.0160
D2002 D2002 −D1999 D2002 −D∆{S}2002 D∆{S}2002 −D∆{S,α}2002 D∆{S,α}2002 −D∆{S,α,β}2002 D∆{S,α,β}2002 −D1999
Quintile 1 31.01 -1.87 -1.36 0.38 -2.10 1.21
Quintile 2 24.00 -2.04 -0.20 -1.44 -0.57 0.17
Quintile 3 19.25 -1.66 0.33 -0.94 -0.21 -0.84
Quintile 4 15.14 1.41 0.29 0.71 0.87 -0.46
Quintile 5 10.59 4.15 0.92 1.30 2.01 -0.08fCI -0.2045 0.0623 0.0206 0.0146 0.0373 -0.0102
The number of observations is 186,272 for 1999 and 212,642 for 2002.
Chapter 5
Protecting Education for the Poor in
Times of Crisis: An Evaluation of a
Scholarship Programme in Indonesia
5.1 Introduction
Protecting access to education for the poor in times of economic crisis is a primary policy
concern in low-income countries, since investment in education is generally considered to
be a key factor in reducing poverty.1 These investments are compromised when house-
holds are faced with unexpected transitory income shocks, such as resulting from the
economic crisis. Under typically incomplete Þnancial markets, the investment decisions of
households are bound by credit and resource constraints (e.g. Jacoby and SkouÞas, 1997).
Households consumption smoothing strategies may then involve reducing investments in
education or relying on child labour to smooth consumption.2
1Many empirical studies have stressed the importance of investment in education, in particular basic
education, for future earnings. For an overview see, for example, Schultz (1988), Psacharopoulos (1994)
and Jimenez (1995). Although the reliability of methods for estimating returns on future earnings has
often been questioned, there are some studies for Indonesia where the typical endogeneity problems have
been addressed. Dußo (2001) identiÞes economic returns to education by exploiting exogenous regional
and inter-temporal variation in a school construction program in the 1970s. She Þnds rates of return
of basic education that range between 6.8 to 10.6 percent. Using 1986 survey data and controlling for
unobserved heterogeneity at household an community level, Behrman and Deolalikar (1995) estimate
returns to an additional year of primary education of around 5 percent on earnings. They Þnd returns
to secondary education of 5.3 to 5.9 for boys and 7.1 to 10.3 for girls. Similar results are reported in
Behrman and Dealolikar (1991) and (1993).
2There is some empirical work that explicitly studies the role of human capital investment in household
consumption smoothing strategies. In the case of Indonesia Cameron and Worswick (2001) Þnd evidence
of consumption smoothing through reduced education expenditures (especially for girls) amongst rural
households as a reaction to crop loss. Fitzsimons (2003) Þnds for small Indonesian villages that enrolment
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Targeted scholarship programmes can be cost-eﬀective instruments for protecting in-
vestments in education for the poor. There are several studies that provide evidence that
price subsidy programmes are indeed eﬀective in increasing school participation and re-
ducing child labour.3 This chapter evaluates the eﬀects of such a demand side intervention
within the context of an economic crisis. In particular, the chapter evaluates the extent to
which the Indonesian Social Safety Net intervention - Jaringan Pengaman Social (JPS)
- has been able to protect access to education for the poor during the Þrst year of the
programme. The chapter looks at the impact of the scholarships on both enrolment status
of children and the actual activities of students, i.e., school attendance and work.
The scholarships can aﬀect school attendance or work activities, even without having
an observable eﬀect on enrolment. School attendance and child work are not mutually
exclusive or perfect substitutes.4 Suryahadi, Priyambada and Sumarto (2005), Þnd that
in Indonesia schooling and part time work often go together. Although the declining trend
in child labour, observed during the past 3 decades, has come to a halt with the onset of
the crisis, they Þnd that working does not exclude children from attending school. They
even Þnd evidence that students from severely poor families seek employment to Þnance
their own education. There is a growing number of empirical studies that investigate
the simultaneous nature of labour and schooling decisions5. This chapter adds to this
work, by estimating the impact of the JPS scholarships on the joint decision of school
attendance and child labour.
To deal with the non-random allocation of scholarships, the identiÞcation strategy
exploits the decentralised targeting design of the programme. In principle, the scholarships
were targeted pro-poor, at both the individual and the district level. However, due to
the heterogeneous nature of the crisis across districts, only incomplete information on
regional poverty was available to policy makers. For the Þrst year of the programme,
geographic allocation was therefore based on outdated pre-crisis poverty estimates from
is mainly aﬀected by aggregate instead of idiosyncratic risk. For empirical studies on the eﬀects of
income volatility on schooling and child labour, in relation to credit markets, see Flug, Spilimbergo and
Wachtenheim (1998), Dehejia and Gatti (2002), and Beegle, Dehejia and Gatti (2003).
3The conditional cash transfer (CCT) component of the Mexican PROGRESA programme increased
school enrolment and attendance, and reduced child work activities (SkouÞas and Parker, 2001; Schultz,
2004; Behrman et al. ,2005; and Parker et al. 2005). Similar results have been found with other CCT
programmes in Latin America (Rawlings and Rubio, 2003; Maluccio and Flores, 2004). Ravallion and
Wodon (2000) Þnd increased schooling and decreased child work as a results from a food-for-education
programme in Bangladesh.
4With regard to school subsidy programmes, Ravallion and Wodon (2000), SkouÞas and Parker (2001)
and Schultz (2004) all Þnd that the positive eﬀects on schooling are only partly explained by reduced
labour activities.
5See, amongst others, Canagarajah and Coulombe (1997), Nielsen (1998), Ridao-Cano (2001), Maitra
and Ray (2002), and Rosati and Rossi (2003).
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1996. The lack of reliable data at the initial phase of allocation caused some degree of
unintended mis-targeting to districts. This exogenous variation in the targeting process
is used to identify the treatment eﬀects. Instrumental variables are constructed from the
initial selection rule and ex-post information on the poverty proÞle. The availability of
pre-intervention data makes it possible to assess the validity of regional mis-targeting as
instrument.
The programme appears to have been successful in returning enrolment to pre-crisis
levels, especially for children of primary school age from poor rural households. The schol-
arships also enticed households to reallocate a childs time from work to school. However,
in contrast to other studies, labour activities of enrolled students show to be more sensitive
to scholarships than school attendance. The results emphasise the relationship between
transitory income shocks and households investment in human capital. The scholarships
were most eﬀective for children whose education was especially vulnerable to consumption
smoothing during the crisis.
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section describes the data. Section 5.3
gives a short account of the education outcomes during the crisis.6 Section 5.4 deals with
identiÞcation and estimation of the programmes impact, and section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 The data
As in the previous chapters, the main source of data for this analysis is Indonesias annu-
ally conducted national socioeconomic survey (Susenas). The Susenas collects information
on education, socioeconomic background of individuals and households, and detailed in-
formation on household expenditures. Besides school enrolment the survey also collects
information on the activities of children in the previous week. Children aged 10 and older
are asked about school attendance, labour, house work, and other activities. The special
JPS module of 1999 provides the information on programme participation for each child.
Since the survey is Þelded in February the JPS module only covers the Þrst 6 months of
the programme. The 1999 survey includes 205,747 households and 864,580 individuals.
The Susenas is representative at the district level (kabupaten and kota). The 1998
and 1999 cross section data can be used to construct a pseudo-panel of two waves for 294
districts.7 The 1998 survey was Þelded in February 1998, about 6 months prior to the
JPS programme, and includes 207,645 households and 880,040 individuals. It collects the
same information as the 1999 survey, except for the JPS data.
6For a more detailed overview of education during the crisis (and references to other studies) see
chapter 2.
7The districts of East Timor are not included in the analysis due to incomplete data.
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Another source of data is the 1996 Podes village census, which will provide infor-
mation on the availability of schools in each village (desa) and township (kelurahan) in
Indonesia. The 1996 Podes includes 66,486 villages and is merged with the Susenas data
at village level. Finally, I will use administrative data for the district selection criteria
and budget allocation for the scholarship programme, documented in the 1998 Programme
Implementation Plan (Ministry of Education, 1998).
5.3 The economic crisis and investments in education
In chapter 2 it was shown that there is some evidence that expenses on education were
reduced to smooth consumption during the crisis. The main conclusions based on the
observed trends in the Susenas data and Þndings from other studies is that investments
in education did suﬀer from the crisis, especially for the rural poor, but that households
seem to have protected education of the older children at the expense of their younger
siblings. The positive trend in primary and junior secondary enrolment was halted in
1998, but recovered again in 1999.
Table 5.1: School attendance in previous week amongst enrolled children (percentage),
by enrolment level and age group in 1999
JPS Non-JPS Work No work All
Enrolment
Primary 97.6 98.2 91.5 98.4 98.1
[0.33] [0.11] [0.80] [0.11] [0.11]
Junior Secondary 97.6 98.2 92.2 98.6 98.1
[0.36] [0.11] [0.66] [0.10] [0.11]
Senior Secondary 97.8 98.5 94.7 98.8 98.5
[0.80] [0.13] [0.71] [0.12] [0.13]
Age group
10 to 12 97.8 98.4 94.1 98.5 98.4
[0.34] [0.11] [0.83] [0.10] [0.10]
13 to 15 97.5 98.2 92.2 98.6 98.2
[0.34] [0.11] [0.67] [0.10] [0.11]
16 to 18 97.4 97.9 92.0 98.5 97.9
[0.61] [0.13] [0.71] [0.11] [0.13]
10 to 18 97.6 98.2 92.6 98.6 98.2
[0.25] [0.09] [0.49] [0.08] [0.09]
N 8,503 111,519 8,505 111,517 120,022
Standard errors in square brackets are adjusted for clustering in survey design
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To a large extent the increase in enrolment in 1999 has been attributed to the JPS pro-
gramme, mainly on the grounds that the programme has been fairly successful in targeting
the poor (Jones and Hagul, 2001; Dhanani and Islam, 2002). However, a comprehensive
evaluation of the impact of the programme has not been carried out yet. Cameron (2002)
does Þnd a positive eﬀect of the programme, using a dataset concerning 100 predominantly
poor villages. She Þnds signiÞcant eﬀects only for junior secondary education.
Being enrolled does not automatically mean that students actually go to school. Enrol-
ment takes place in August and typically requires sunk costs such as a one time enrolment
fee and costs for school uniforms and books. Variable schooling costs include transporta-
tion costs and monthly tuition fees.8 For consumption smoothing reasons, it could be
that enrolled children may not attend school because of these variable costs of schooling.
Alternatively, they may decide to work, which could reduce time spent at school.9
Table 5.2: Labour activities in previous week (percentage), by enrolment level and age
group in 1999
Enrolled Not enrolled All
JPS Non-JPS All
Enrolment
Primary 7.9 3.6 3.9
[0.59] [0.13] [0.13]
Junior Secondary 12.1 7.3 7.7
[0.75] [0.22] [0.22]
Senior Secondary 13.6 7.2 7.5
[1.56] [0.26] [0.26]
Age group
10 to 12 6.5 2.8 3.0 20.4 3.7
[0.58] [0.11] [0.12] [1.08] [0.13]
13 to 15 11.8 6.6 7.1 38.5 13.7
[0.72] [0.19] [0.20] [0.68] [0.24]
16 to 18 14.8 8.8 9.0 52.2 30.2
[1.27] [0.27] [0.27] [0.49] [0.35]
10 to 18 10.2 5.5 5.8 46.6 15.9
[0.53] [0.13] [0.14] [0.43] [0.19]
N 8,503 111,519 120,022 40,018 160,040
Standard errors in square brackets are adjusted for clustering in survey design
8Annual sunk costs for enrolment fees, school uniforms and books constitute 25 percent of average
total education expenditures per child in the 1997/1998 school year (Pradhan and Sparrow, 2000). About
11 percent of total expenditures are due to daily transportation, while monthly tuition and BP3 (i.e.
parent-teacher association) fees take account of 29 percent.
9Qualitative research by Jones et al. (2003) Þnds anecdotal evidence to support this hypothesis.
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Table 5.1 looks at school attendance in the past week for enrolled students, in 1999.10
School attendance is fairly high for all enrolment levels and age groups, varying around
98 percent. However, programme participants have a slightly lower attendance rate than
non-participants, on average just over half a percentage point. Columns 5 and 6 show
that working doesnt prevent children from attending school. However, enrolled children
that work are more often absent from school. Working is here deÞned as activities that
contribute to household income, for at least one hour in the last week. This may include
wage labour, but also non wage labour such as own farm activities.
Table 5.2 depicts labour activities for scholarship recipients, enrolled children without
a scholarship and non-enrolled children. Enrolled children without a scholarship are less
likely to work than those with a scholarship. Scholarship recipients work, on average,
twice as much as non recipients (10.2 and 5.5 percent, respectively). Labour activity is
highest for non-enrolled children. 46.6 percent of non-enrolled children aged 10 to 18 work
at least one hour a week.
5.4 The impact of the scholarship programme
5.4.1 Regional mis-targeting
The foremost and obvious problem for measuring the eﬀect of the programme is that the
scholarships were not assigned randomly, but have been targeted to students from poor
households instead. Poor households are expected to be more likely to take their children
out of school or have them participate in labour activities, in response to the eﬀects of
the crisis. In the absence of the scholarship programme, enrolment and school attendance
would be expected to be lower for scholarship recipients, given that they come from, on
average, poorer households than non-recipients. For the same reason the probability of
working is expected to be higher. Consequently, children without a scholarship do not
form a suitable control group for children that are selected for the programme.
A variety of approaches can be used to deal with non-random allocation of scholarships
(e.g., Heckman, LaLonde and Smith, 1999). A frequently applied method is to use instru-
mental variables, which relies on Þnding some source of exogenous variation that aﬀects
the probability of receiving a scholarship, but is independent of the potential outcomes.
The former assumption can easily be veriÞed, but the latter is diﬃcult to test, and often
relies on economic reasoning.
10This refers to the full week prior to enumeration, which took place in February, one month into the
second semester of the 1999/2000 school year.
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With regard to the JPS programme, the endogeneity has its source with both geo-
graphic and individual targeting. Ravallion and Wodon (2000) exploit the decentralised
nature of the allocation process to Þnd a valid instrument. They argue that partial de-
centralisation creates geographic separability, where the probability of selection into the
programme is conditional on geographic allocation, and independent between areas.11
Under the assumption of geographic separability, exogenous variation in geographic tar-
geting can be used to identify the eﬀect of the programme. It may be easier to Þnd an
instrument at district level than at individual level since the dimensions of the targeting
process (and possible unobservables) are smaller.
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Figure 5.1: Correlation between JPS96j and scholarship coverage (T j).
Targeting of scholarships to districts was based on just two criteria: the 1996 poverty
estimate (JPS96) and the number of enrolled students in the district. A district level
regression shows that the JPS96measure and the 1998 enrolment rates explain 69 percent
of the variation in the fraction of scholarships recipients across districts.12 There is a
strong positive correlation between the JPS96 measure and scholarship coverage, but it
doesnt fully explain actual allocation (see Þgure 5.1). There can be several reasons for
actual allocation in districts to deviate from the targeting rule. First, the timing of the
programme and the Susenas may introduce unobserved variables that aﬀect allocation.
Remember that at the time of the survey, February 1999, not all the targets had been
met yet, and this delay in implementation varied across districts. Moreover, there may be
11This assumes no inter-district migration due to the programme.
12Results not shown here.
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diﬀerences in the eﬀectiveness and eﬃciency of the allocation systems between districts.
Chapter 3 has shown that given the heterogeneous nature of the crisis and the lack
of up to date information available to programme management, it is likely that the Þrst
stage targeting rule misjudged the degree of poverty in the districts. Mis-targeting of
districts can provide the exogenous variation needed to identify the eﬀect of the scholarship
programme. To put the argument more formally, decompose the JPS96 measure into two
components
JPS96j = ψ
0Vj + zj (5.1)
where Vj reßects the actual poverty proÞle in 1998 and the impact of the crisis for district j.
The mis-targeting term, zj, is a non-systematic judgement error in the targeting process.
It reßects the inability to capture the extent of poverty during the crisis due to the lack
of information on the actual situation in 1998.
With the belated availability of information on the regional poverty proÞle in 1998, zj
can be estimated by taking the residual of the regression E[JPS96j | Vj]. If conditioning
on Vj indeed purges JPS96j of all systematic variation then zj would be a suitable
instrument. For example, if JPS96j overestimates the actual degree of poverty in 1998
(Vj) for district j, then zj > 0. Given suﬃcient available information on poverty proÞle
Vj, the estimated overestimation zj should be independent from the enrolment rate, and
the extent of school attendance and child labour in that district.
With a strategy like this there remains the danger that Vj is not fully observable, in
which case the omitted variables will cause zj to contain some poverty related variation.
One way to evaluate the credibility of the identiÞcation strategy is to test whether zj
is correlated with the pre-intervention outcomes (Pradhan, Rawlings and Ridder, 1998),
using data from Susenas 1998. The identifying assumption for estimating the impact of
the programme is that if the exclusion restriction is valid for 1998, it also is for 1999. This
seems a reasonable assumption since JPS96 is based on historic poverty estimates, and
the impact of the crisis across districts seems not to be correlated with pre-crisis poverty
(e.g. chapter 3).
Table 5.3 shows the results from district level regressions of 1998 enrolment, school
attendance and child labour rates for children age 10 to 18, on zj and JPS96j, respec-
tively.13 The regional poverty proÞle Vj includes the 1998 headcount (P0) and the poverty
gap (P1) for each district.14 An alternative poverty headcount estimate for 1996 (BPS96),
13Figures 5.2 to 5.7 in the appendix 5.C show the results graphically with partial-regression leverage
plots.
14P0 and P1 are estimated based on per capita household expenditure. The expenditure data comes
from Susenas. The povertylines are set such that the average head count for Indonesia is 24.1% in
February 1998 and 27.1% in February 1999 (Suryahadi, Sumarto and Pritchett, 2003).
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released by the Indonesian Bureau of Statistics in 2000, is included to capture the impact
of the crisis.15 The results suggest that given the speciÞcation of Vj, the exclusion restric-
tion is justiÞed. Enrolment and labour are strongly correlated with JPS96j, while school
attendance is not (top panel). Districts that the JPS programme regarded as relatively
poor, experience lower enrolment and higher incidence of child labour. However, the mis-
targeting residual zj shows no correlation with the outcome variables, as the coeﬃcients
are small and statistically not signiÞcant (bottom panel). Note that for enrolment and
attendance it suﬃces to just condition on P0 and P1 to remove the systematic variation
in zj.
Table 5.3: Relation between 1998 pre-intervention outcomes and geographic (mis-)
targeting (OLS estimates)
Enrolment rate Attendance rate Child labour rate
JPS96j -0.342 -0.017 0.188
[0.065]∗∗ [0.015] [0.040]∗∗
Constant 0.786 0.988 0.039
[0.009]∗∗ [0.002]∗∗ [0.006]∗∗
R-squared 0.0870 0.0043 0.0707
zj -0.083 -0.004 0.046
[0.087] [0.019] [0.062]
Constant 0.746 0.986 0.061
[0.006]∗∗ [0.001]∗∗ [0.003]∗∗
R-squared 0.0031 0.0001 0.0019
Standard errors in square brackets.
SigniÞcance levels:  : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Note: Outcome variables are district means from Susenas 1998. N = 294.
5.4.2 The eﬀect on enrolment
Estimation
The overall eﬀect of the JPS scholarships on enrolment is estimated at the district level,
by explaining regional variation in the enrolment rate by the variation in the size of the
programme across districts.16 For each district j the enrolment rate in year t is modelled
15The estimates and methodology are reported in BPS (2000).
16Pitt, Rozensweig and Gibbons (1995) follow a similar approach, applying diﬀerence in diﬀerence
estimation to regionally aggregated data in Indonesia in order to investigate the determinants of school
attendance and child morbidity. Analysis at the individual level is problematic since we do not observe
children that receive a scholarship, but are no longer enrolled. Therefore, there is no variation in treatment
assignment Ti for non-enrolled students. Ideally, I would like to have information on students histories
of receiving scholarships, but, unfortunately, the Susenas does not contain these data. But even if these
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as a linear function of the intensity of the scholarship programme
sjt = αj +
¡
τ + ηj
¢
T jt + φ
0Wjt + θ0dt +
5X
r=2
θrdrdt + εjt (5.2)
where
T jt =
1
Njt
NjtX
i=1
Tijt
Tijt denotes selection into the programme, Nj is the total number of children (for the spe-
ciÞc group) in district j and sj is the enrolment rate for a speciÞc age group or enrolment
level in district j (as reported in table 2.1). T jt is the fraction of children that received a
scholarship in that group. Thus, both sjt and T jt refer to the same potential JPS target
group of school age children. The average eﬀect of the programme is deÞned as E[τ j] = τ ,
where τ j is the idiosyncratic eﬀect for each district. Eﬀect heterogeneity is then reßected
by ηj = τ j − τ . This is the average deviation from τ in a speciÞc district, with E[ηj ] = 0.
Time is indicated by subscript t, which is either 1998 (pre-intervention) or 1999 (post-
intervention). In 1998 no JPS scholarships have been allocated, thus T j1998 = 0 for all
j. Wj is a set of control variables that capture labour market, welfare and demographic
characteristics in the districts. The time dummy variable dt takes value 1 if t = 1999
and 0 if t = 1998. Some ßexibility is given to capturing the time trend by interacting
time variable dt with region speciÞc Þxed eﬀects, dr.17 αj is a time invariant Þxed eﬀect.
This accounts for all endogeneity that has its source with non-random placement based
on district speciÞc time invariant variables. The bias due to targeting of poorer districts
(using the historic JPS96 measure) is thereby removed, as well as any bias due to time
invariant unobservables.
Taking Þrst diﬀerences of (5.2) yields
∆sj =
¡
τ + ηj
¢
T j + φ
0∆Wj + θ0 +
5X
r=2
θrdr +∆εj (5.3)
OLS will give unbiased estimates for (5.3) under two assumptions. First, the time trend
is assumed to be constant within the Þve regions. This assumption is violated if there is
any geographical variation in the change of the average economic conditions that is not
captured by the time dummies or ∆Wj. For example, the crisis may have systematically
had been available, it would be likely to Þnd very few scholarship recipients to drop out of school so early
into the programme, providing very little variation in the outcome variable for recipients.
17The 5 regions are (i) Java and Bali, (ii) Sumatra, (iii) Sulawesi, (iv) Kalimantan and (v) Other
Islands. Java and Bali serve as the reference group.
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diﬀerent eﬀects for rich districts than for less wealthy districts, within the regions. The
second assumption is that there are no time varying unobservables that are in any way
correlated with the allocation process. If either of these two assumptions does not hold
then T j will be correlated with∆εj. In this case the bias can be removed by IV estimation
using zj as instrument.18
Interpretation of the estimates depends on assumptions regarding the expected eﬀect
heterogeneity. Unobserved eﬀect heterogeneity requires strong assumptions if IV estimates
are to be interpreted as average treatment eﬀects (Heckman, 1997). For example, it would
be suﬃcient to assume that regional allocation is independent of the unobserved eﬀect het-
erogeneity, E[ηj | T j ] = 0.19 In this case both IV and OLS identify the average treatment
eﬀect, E[τATE] = τ . This seems to be a reasonable assumption, since geographic targeting
was not based on the expected average gains within districts. However, actual allocation
T j depends on 1996 poverty estimates and the speed of programme implementation per
district. If these are correlated with the heterogeneous eﬀect of the programme then
E[ηj | T j] 6= 0, even if this was not known a priori to programme managers. In this case
OLS will retrieve the average treatment eﬀect on the treated, E[τATT ] = τ + E[ηj | T j ].
This captures the fraction of the actual programme participants that would have dropped
out of school if they had not received a scholarship. IV, on the other hand, will iden-
tify the local average treatment eﬀect (LATE), E[τLATE] = τ + E[ηj | T j(z0j) > T j(z00j )],
proposed by Imbens and Angrist (1994).20 This is the average treatment eﬀect for those
districts where allocation T j is aﬀected by zj. In this respect, the mis-targeting term is an
appealing instrumental variable. Under the assumption that the probability of receiving
a scholarship is conditional on geographic allocation, the LATE can be interpreted as the
eﬀect of marginal changes in geographic targeting policy.
18An additional source of bias is measurement error in the Susenas data, since the JPS module records
scholarship information only for enrolled students. The extent of this bias depends on the number of
scholarship recipients dropping out of school in the Þrst months of the programme. While this bias is not
likely to be large (footnote 16), it cannot be ignored when interpreting the OLS estimates.
19Note that E[∆sj ] = τT j +φ
0∆Wj + θ0+
P
θrdr + ej , where the unobserved ej = E[ηjTj ] +E[∆εj ].
Since zj is correlated with T j by assumption, zj is correlated with ej if E[ηj | T j ] 6= 0, even if the
instrument is not correlated with the outcome variable, E[∆εj | T j ,∆Wj , dr] = E[∆εj | ∆Wj , dr] = 0.
See Angrist (2004) for a discussion on assumptions (weaker than eﬀect homogeneity) that allow IV to
identify average treatment eﬀects.
20LATE imposes a monotonicity assumption. Let T j(z0j) be T j given zj = z
0
j . Monotonicity requires
that for z0j and z00j , in the support of zj , it must hold that either T (z0j) ≤ T (z00j ) or T (z0j) ≥ T (z00j ) for all j.
Intuitively, this would imply that when the degree of poverty-overestimation (zj) in a district increases
this will never decrease the probability of receiving a scholarship for any child in that district.
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The overall eﬀect of the programme on the enrolment rate is given by a population
weighted average of the eﬀects for the districts
E[s11999]− E[s01999] = τ
JX
j=1
Nj
N
1
Nj
NjX
i=1
Tij = τT (5.4)
where T is the fraction of the relevant (subset of the) population that has received a
scholarship, and J the number of districts. s11999 is the actual enrolment rate that we
observe in 1999 with the programme in place. The counterfactual s01999 is the enrolment
rate that would have been if the programme was not implemented.
Results
Table 5.4 shows the OLS and IV impact estimates for equation (5.3) and the eﬀect on the
enrolment rate, τT (equation (5.4)), for all children aged 10 to 18, and for the three age
groups.21 The estimated eﬀects for net enrolment are given in table 5.5. The tables also
report T . The welfare variables, Wj, include the share of rural population, average age,
average household size, and poverty indictors P0 and P1 in the district. The coeﬃcients for
the covariates are omitted from the table for convenience. The number of observations is
294. The Þrst stage coeﬃcient for the instrument (denoted by δz) is positive and strongly
signiÞcant in all regressions. Over-estimation of poverty increases the intensity of the
programme in a district.
There is a signiÞcant eﬀect of the programme on enrolment. The IV estimates of
the programme are larger and more precise than the OLS estimates. This suggest some
correlation between T j and ∆εj. The most likely explanation would seem to be a non-
constant time trend due to regional variation in the crisis eﬀect.22
According to the IV estimates, 13 percent of programme participants would have
dropped out of school if they had not received a scholarship. The eﬀect for children aged
10 to 12 is 10 percent. For children between ages 13 and 15 it is slightly higher, at 12
percent, but this estimate is not precise. For the age group 16-18 there is no signiÞcant
eﬀect on enrolment.
21Weights are applied to take account of the underlying number of observations used for calculating
district means.
22It could also be that IV retrieves a LATE that diﬀers strongly from ATT or ATE. For example, if some
districts experience delays in programme implementation. In 7 out of 294 districts used in estimation, no
children reported to have received a scholarship yet (T j = 0). Using the terminology of Angrist, Imbens
and Rubin (1996), these districts can be thought of as never takers. Neither the LATE nor ATT reßect
the eﬀects for these districts. However, the estimates are not sensitive to including a dummy variable
that indicates the 7 never takers (see table 5.13 in appendix 5.B). The dummy coeﬃcients (θno−treat)
are small and not signiÞcant in all regressions.
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Turning to net enrolment, there is only an eﬀect for primary school level (18 percent
increase). So the bulk of the eﬀect picked up for 13 to 15 year olds is due to students who
are still in primary school (either because of delayed enrolment or grade repetition). This
is an important result. These students are likely to be in the higher grades of primary
school. In absence of the programme they would have dropped out of school just prior to
Þnishing primary education.
Table 5.4: Eﬀect of the JPS scholarships on enrolment (equations (5.3) and (5.4))
Age group τ [s.e.] τT T δz [s.e.]
OLS
10 to 12 0.076 [0.026]∗∗ 0.0044 0.058
13 to 15 0.037 [0.051] 0.0025 0.068
16 to 18 0.046 [0.138] 0.0011 0.024
10 to 18 0.053 [0.048] 0.0027 0.050
IV
10 to 12 0.100 [0.035]∗∗ 0.0058 0.058 0.772 [0.043]∗∗
13 to 15 0.117 [0.074] 0.0079 0.068 0.801 [0.050]∗∗
16 to 18 −0.002 [0.236] -0.0000 0.024 0.305 [0.025]∗∗
10 to 18 0.126 [0.065] 0.0063 0.050 0.642 [0.035]∗∗
SigniÞcance levels:  : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Number of observations is 294.
Table 5.5: Eﬀect of the JPS scholarships on net enrolment (equations (5.3) and (5.4))
School level τ [s.e.] τT T δz [s.e.]
OLS
Primary 0.150 [0.049]∗∗ 0.0088 0.058
Junior Secondary -0.057 [0.045] -0.0039 0.068
Senior Secondary -0.043 [0.057] -0.0010 0.024
IV
Primary 0.178 [0.067]∗∗ 0.0104 0.058 0.819 [0.045]∗∗
Junior Secondary 0.022 [0.069] 0.0015 0.068 1.046 [0.072]∗∗
Senior Secondary 0.021 [0.111] 0.0005 0.024 0.605 [0.059]∗∗
SigniÞcance levels:  : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Number of observations is 294.
The eﬀects for diﬀerent groups in the population are given in table 5.6. The table shows
the estimates by per capita consumption group, gender and rural/urban area. Three per
capita consumption groups are deÞned: the 1st-25th percentile (i.e., the poorest quarter of
the population), 25th-50th percentile and the 50th-100th percentile. The poorest quartile
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Table 5.6: Eﬀect of the JPS scholarships on enrolment, by per capita consumption,
gender and urban/rural (IV estimates for equation (5.3))
Sub group OLS IV
τ [s.e.] τ [s.e.] N
10 to 12
1-25 percentile 0.063 [0.042] 0.122 [0.059]∗ 293
25-50 percentile 0.081 [0.042] 0.043 [0.066] 294
50-100 percentile −0.015 [0.039] −0.021 [0.064] 294
male 0.087 [0.031]∗∗ 0.098 [0.045]∗ 294
female 0.068 [0.033]∗ 0.109 [0.046]∗ 294
urban 0.064 [0.032]∗ 0.055 [0.060] 287
rural 0.046 [0.031] 0.105 [0.042]∗ 277
13 to 15
1-25 percentile 0.208 [0.073]∗∗ 0.201 [0.108] 293
25-50 percentile −0.077 [0.083] −0.023 [0.129] 294
50-100 percentile −0.009 [0.080] 0.074 [0.143] 294
male 0.111 [0.063] 0.163 [0.096] 294
female 0.042 [0.059] 0.067 [0.090] 294
urban 0.055 [0.064] 0.084 [0.111] 287
rural 0.035 [0.055] 0.134 [0.081] 277
16 to 18
1-25 percentile 0.158 [0.186] −0.076 [0.396] 291
25-50 percentile 0.007 [0.208] −0.291 [0.443] 294
50-100 percentile 0.023 [0.179] −0.141 [0.340] 294
male 0.119 [0.168] −0.098 [0.293] 294
female −0.040 [0.159] 0.088 [0.317] 294
urban 0.026 [0.146] −0.115 [0.319] 287
rural 0.127 [0.154] 0.108 [0.266] 277
10 to 18
1-25 percentile 0.109 [0.059] 0.161 [0.080]∗ 293
25-50 percentile −0.024 [0.080] 0.049 [0.113] 294
50-100 percentile −0.085 [0.086] 0.011 [0.132] 294
male 0.117 [0.057]∗ 0.151 [0.078] 294
female −0.010 [0.057] 0.100 [0.079] 294
urban −0.010 [0.069] 0.046 [0.113] 287
rural 0.051 [0.050] 0.146 [0.068]∗ 277
SigniÞcance levels:  : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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Table 5.7: Eﬀect of the JPS scholarships on net enrolment, by per capita consumption,
gender and urban/rural (IV estimates for equation (5.3))
Sub group OLS IV
τ [s.e.] τ [s.e.] N
Primary
1-25 percentile 0.014 [0.046] 0.102 [0.063] 293
25-50 percentile 0.109 [0.060] 0.108 [0.092] 294
50-100 percentile 0.064 [0.096] 0.104 [0.160] 294
male 0.169 [0.053]∗∗ 0.170 [0.076]∗ 294
female 0.130 [0.053]∗ 0.189 [0.074]∗ 294
urban 0.121 [0.077] 0.267 [0.152] 287
rural 0.034 [0.043] 0.126 [0.058]∗ 277
Junior Secondary
1-25 percentile 0.007 [0.047] 0.033 [0.081] 290
25-50 percentile −0.129 [0.061]∗ −0.025 [0.106] 293
50-100 percentile −0.148 [0.082] 0.012 [0.162] 294
male −0.047 [0.061] 0.048 [0.097] 294
female −0.027 [0.049] 0.003 [0.079] 294
urban −0.137 [0.068]∗ −0.079 [0.123] 287
rural −0.006 [0.044] 0.031 [0.067] 276
Senior Secondary
1-25 percentile −0.044 [0.045] 0.050 [0.112] 275
25-50 percentile −0.109 [0.062] −0.175 [0.149] 292
50-100 percentile −0.172 [0.111] −0.182 [0.263] 293
male −0.004 [0.070] 0.042 [0.143] 294
female −0.135 [0.065]∗ −0.031 [0.149] 294
urban −0.124 [0.108] −0.244 [0.316] 286
rural 0.020 [0.049] 0.040 [0.091] 273
SigniÞcance levels:  : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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roughly represents the population that lives of a consumption level below the poverty
line.23
The results show a very heterogeneous pattern, and suggest that the programme was
most eﬀective for those most vulnerable to the crisis. The largest eﬀects are found for
children aged 10 to 12 from rural areas who live below the poverty line. This is exactly the
group for which investment in education was most aﬀected by households consumption
smoothing during the crisis (Thomas et al., 2004). A similar pattern is found for the 13-15
age group, although the estimates are less precise. Overall, the eﬀect of the scholarships
seem to favour boys over girls. For 10-12 year olds the eﬀects are fairly similar for boys
and girls, but for children aged 13-15 the scholarships are more eﬀective for boys. For
the oldest age group there is no statistically signiÞcant eﬀect for any of the population
groups, indicating that the absence of an overall eﬀect for this groups is not only due to
bad targeting, but that enrolment is also less sensitive to income shocks. Table 5.7 gives
the results for net enrolment by age group, conÞrming that the scholarships are eﬀective
only at primary school. The signiÞcant and negative OLS estimates further conÞrm that
diﬀerence approach in equation (5.3) is not suﬃcient to deal with the selective targeting
of districts.
What would have been the trend in overall enrolment if the JPS scholarship pro-
gramme had not been implemented? The overall increase of the enrolment rate due to
the programme (τT ) for 10 to 18 year olds is 0.6 percentage point. The trend in the
enrolment rate from 1997 to 1999 (table 2.1) shows a slight decrease in 1998 and then
a 0.7 percentage point increase a year later. The estimated eﬀect suggests that in the
absence of the programme, enrolment would have remained unchanged from 1998 to 1999.
Moreover, the JPS has pushed overall enrolment above the pre-crisis level. For children
aged 10-12 enrolment decreased by 0.3 percentage point in 1998, and returned to its
pre-crisis level in 1999. The programme increased the enrolment rate by 0.6 percentage
point. This means that if the programme had not been implemented, enrolment for this
age group would have decreased further in 1999. For the age group 13-15 the increase in
enrolment from 1998 to 1999 is 1.7 percentage point, of which about half (0.8 percentage
point) is due to the JPS programme.24
23Due to the number of observations in the intervention group, the analysis had to be restricted to
these three per capita consumption groups. A breakdown by quintile was problematic, especially for the
non-poor, as the means were based on too few observations, leaving very little variation in the treatment
variable.
24The JPS programme also included budgetary support to schools. If these grants aﬀected enrolment
then the estimates above measure the confounding eﬀect of both components of the programme. This
is tested by adding a variable with per capita DBO transfers per district as a regressor. Table 5.14
in appendix 5.B shows that enrolment is not aﬀected by per capita DBO allocation to districts. The
estimated eﬀects of scholarships change little (slightly larger) with this speciÞcation, suggesting that the
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5.4.3 The eﬀect on school attendance and child labour
Estimation
The eﬀect of the JPS scholarship programme on the simultaneous decision regarding
school attendance and work activities of enrolled children is analysed at the individual
level. Endogenous programme participation is dealt with by using a control function
approach.25 Like standard IV this method requires an exclusion restriction, but it is better
suited to deal with unobserved eﬀect heterogeneity. The correlation between unobserved
heterogeneity and programme selection is explicitly estimated, instead of relying on strong
assumptions about this relationship.
Let A∗i and L
∗
i describe the latent processes that underlie the decision to have an
enrolled child attend school (Ai = 1) and undertake labour activities (Li = 1). These
decisions may be correlated with each other and both may be correlated with the latent
variable T ∗i , which describes the decision rule for allocating scholarships to students. Only
the outcome of this allocation process is observed, with value Ti = 1 if a child receives
a scholarship and Ti = 0 otherwise. The relationship between programme participation
and the outcomes is given by a latent variable model
A0i = 1
£
A
∗0
i ≥ 0
¤
= 1
£
β0aXi + u
0
ai ≥ 0
¤
(5.5a)
A1i = 1
£
A
∗1
i ≥ 0
¤
= 1
£
β0aXi + γaTi + u
1
ai ≥ 0
¤
(5.5b)
L0i = 1
£
L
∗0
i ≥ 0
¤
= 1
£
β0lXi + u
0
li ≥ 0
¤
(5.5c)
L1i = 1
£
L
∗1
i ≥ 0
¤
= 1
£
β0lXi + γlTi + u
1
li ≥ 0
¤
(5.5d)
Ti = 1 [T
∗
i ≥ 0] = 1[β0TXi + δzj + vi ≥ 0] (5.5e)
where 1[·] is a binary indicator function. ¡A∗0i , L∗0i ¢ are the latent states when a student
does not receive a scholarship, and
¡
A
∗1
i , L
∗1
i
¢
if the student does. Selection on unob-
servables (in the base state) implies that (u0ai, u
0
li) are correlated with vi. Selection on
potential gains means that cov (u0a, v) 6= cov (u1a, v) or cov (u0l , v) 6= cov (u1l , v). In this
speciÞcation the eﬀect of the programme enters additively. Observed eﬀect heterogeneity
can be introduced by interaction terms of Xi and Ti.
The unobservables (u0ai, u
1
ai, u
0
li, u
1
li, vi) are assumed to be independent of zj and Xi.
Note that this is a stronger assumption than that underlying the exclusion restriction
with IV. In contrast to standard IV, the instrument now is assumed to be exogenous to
the allocation of scholarships. For the targeting error zj this is a reasonable assumption.
block grants do not interfere with the estimates of the scholarships.
25See Heckman and Navarro-Lozano (2004) for a discussion on control function methods.
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Assume further that the unobservables have a joint standard normal distribution
u0a
u1a
u0l
u1l
v
 ∼ N


0
0
0
0
0
 ,

1 ρa ρal0 ρ01 ρa0
ρa 1 ρ10 ρal1 ρa1
ρal0 ρ10 1 ρl ρl0
ρ01 ρal1 ρl 1 ρl1
ρa0 ρa1 ρl0 ρl1 1


The outcomes that we actually observe are
Ai = 1
£
A
∗
i ≥ 0
¤
= 1
£
A
∗1
i Ti +A
∗0
i (1− Ti) ≥ 0
¤
(5.6a)
Li = 1
£
L
∗
i ≥ 0
¤
= 1
£
L
∗1
i Ti + L
∗0
i (1− Ti) ≥ 0
¤
(5.6b)
where the conditional expectations of the latent outcomes are
E
¡
A
∗
i | Xi, zj
¢
= β0aXi + γaTi + TiE
¡
u1ai | Ti = 1
¢
+(1− Ti)E
¡
u0ai | Ti = 0
¢
(5.7a)
E
¡
L
∗
i | Xi, zj
¢
= β0lXi + γlTi + TiE
¡
u1li | Ti = 1
¢
+(1− Ti)E
¡
u0li | Ti = 0
¢
(5.7b)
Given the normality assumption, the conditional expectations of (u0ai, u
1
ai, u
0
li, u
1
li) in equa-
tions (5.7a) and (5.7b) are
E[u0ai | Ti = 0] = E[u0ai | vi < −(ϕ0Xi + δzj)] = ρa0λ0i
E[u1ai | Ti = 1] = E[u1ai | vi ≥ −(ϕ0Xi + δzj)] = ρa1λ1i
E[u0li | Ti = 0] = E[u0li | vi < −(ϕ0Xi + δzj)] = ρl0λ0i
E[u1li | Ti = 1] = E[u1li | vi ≥ −(ϕ0Xi + δzj)] = ρl1λ1i
where
λ0i =
−φ(ϕ0Xi + δzj)
1− Φ(ϕ0Xi + δzj)
, λ1i =
φ(ϕ0Xi + δzj)
Φ(ϕ0Xi + δzj)
and φ and Φ denote the standard normal df and cdf, respectively. The inverse Mills
ratios λ0 and λ1 are computed from (consistent) Þrst stage probit estimates of (5.5e).
This provides an empirical speciÞcation for (5.6a) and (5.6b)
Ai = 1 [β
0
aXi + γaTi + ρa1λ1iTi + ρa0λ0i (1− Ti) + εai ≥ 0] (5.8a)
Li = 1 [β
0
lXi + γlTi + ρl1λ1iTi + ρl0λ0i (1− Ti) + εli ≥ 0] (5.8b)
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In this switching regression framework the selection terms capture the bias due to en-
dogenous programme participation trough the parameters (ρa0, ρa1, ρl0, ρl1). Selection on
unobservables (in the base state) implies ρa0 6= 0 or ρl0 6= 0. Selection on potential gains is
evaluated by testing ρa0 = ρa1 and ρl0 = ρl1. Note that (ρa, ρl, ρ01, ρ10) are not identiÞed,
since we never observe the outcomes of an individual child in both states.
Under the normality assumption, equations (5.8a) and (5.8b) can be estimated as
a bivariate probit, with (εai, εli) ∼ N (0,Σ). The simultaneous nature of labour and
schooling decisions is now expressed by the parameter ρ = corr (εai, εli).
26
The average eﬀects of the scholarships are calculated as
Pr
¡
A1 = 1
¢− Pr ¡A0 = 1¢ = Φ (β0aX + γaT )− Φ (β0aX) (5.9a)
Pr
¡
L1 = 1
¢− Pr ¡L0 = 1¢ = Φ (β0lX + γlT )− Φ (β0lX) (5.9b)
which are the marginal eﬀects of γa and γl.
Results
The bivariate probit estimates for the eﬀect of JPS scholarships on school attendance and
child labour are summarised by age group in table 5.8. The table provides the estimated
treatment parameters and correlation coeﬃcients.
The scholarship variable Ti is interacted with gender, per capita consumption group,
and a rural area dummy variable. The covariates further include age, household size, main
source of household income (agriculture/non-agriculture), head of household characteris-
tics (gender and level of education) and a variable indicating whether the child goes to
public or private school. The speciÞcation also includes regional welfare indicators P0,
P1, BPS96, the BKKBN poverty estimates for districts and sub-districts, IDT status
of the village, and 6 variables indicating the presence of schools in the village (primary,
junior secondary, and senior secondary, by public/private). Finally, the model includes
a set of province dummy variables.27 For convenience, the coeﬃcients for covariates are
omitted from the table. The Þrst stage probit (5.5e) includes the same covariates and
JPS96 as instrument. With P0, P1 and BPS96 controlling for non-random geographic
targeting, JPS96 reßects the mis-targeting residual. The JPS96 coeﬃcient is positive
and signiÞcant at a 1 percent level for all age groups. As poverty is overestimated in the
geographic targeting stage the probability of receiving a scholarship increases.28
26This implicitly assumes that correlation between ua and ul is constant between treatment states (i.e.,
ρ = ρal0 = ρal1).
27In 1999 Indonesia counted 27 provinces.
28The Þrst stage probit estimates are given in detail in table 5.15 in appendix 5.B.
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Overall, the scholarships do have an eﬀect on school attendance and child labour.
Although not all coeﬃcients are statistically signiÞcant, they are jointly signiÞcant for
both outcomes. The test statistic for joint signiÞcance is given in row 8 of each panel.
Looking at the diﬀerent age groups, the treatment parameters are always jointly signiÞcant
for labour. For school attendance there seems to be only an eﬀect for students aged 13 to
15.
There is some evidence of selection on unobservables (indicated by ρ0). Especially for
labour of the older students there is a strong correlation between u0li and vi. The results
also suggest that students are selected based on potential gains from the programme, as
the hypothesis that ρ0 = ρ1 is rejected. Again, for labour this result is stronger. The
schooling and labour decisions of students are not independent, given the covariates. The
correlation coeﬃcient ρ is signiÞcant at a 1 percent level. The correlation between both
decisions is negative and becomes stronger with age (varying from -0.20 to -0.34).29
The average eﬀects are given in table 5.9. Starting with the aggregate eﬀects of the
scholarships, the probability of attending school in the previous week is 1.5 percentage
point higher for students with a scholarship than for non-recipients. This seems a small
change in nominal terms, but given attendance rates of around 98 percent (table 5.1) this
implies that non-attendance has decreased by about 38 percent relative to the counter-
factual situation of no JPS programme. The eﬀect on child labour is larger, with the
probability of working decreasing by 3.8 percentage point for students with a scholarship.
This suggests that the programme reduced the incidence of child work from 14.0 to 10.2
percent, a 27 percent decrease relative to the base state (see table 5.2).
These results suggest that the scholarships reduced the need for child labour to smooth
household income during the crisis, raising the reservation wage for students. Note that
labour supply seems to be more sensitive to the programme than school attendance.
Increased school attendance takes account of at most half of the time reallocated away
from labour activities.
The absolute size of the eﬀects on labour increase with age. This results is in part
due to the fact that the incidence of child labour is higher amongst older students. Also,
the size of the scholarships increases with enrolment level. For the youngest age group
(10-12) the probability of working is reduced by 1.7 percentage point (20 percent rela-
tive decrease). For students aged 13-15 the eﬀect on labour is larger, at 5.1 percentage
point (30 percent relative decrease). For the oldest students a scholarship decreases the
probability of working by 10.0 percentage point (40 percent relative decrease).
29This follows Canagarajah and Coulombe (1997) and Nielsen (1998), who also analyse the joint decision
of school attendance and child labour with a bivariate probit. Both studies Þnd a negative and statistically
signiÞcant correlation coeﬃcient.
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Table 5.8: Bivariate probit estimates for the eﬀect of JPS scholarships on school
attendance and child labour, conditional on enrolment (equations (5.8a) and (5.8b))
Age group Parameter School attendance Child labour
Coeﬃcient [s.e.]1 Coeﬃcient [s.e.]1
10 to 12 γ 0.569 [0.365] 0.041 [0.222]
N=48,798 γ1−25 pctile −0.092 [0.123] 0.018 [0.101]
ρ= -0.197∗∗ γ25−50 pctile 0.037 [0.139] −0.166 [0.103]
γfemale −0.129 [0.103] 0.046 [0.077]
γrural −0.115 [0.166] −0.333 [0.123]∗∗
ρ1 −0.207 [0.135] 0.213 [0.101]∗
ρ0 0.064 [0.184] 0.205 [0.159]
Test joint sig. γ, χ2(5) 4.16 14.69∗
Test ρ0 = ρ1, χ
2(1) 1.91 0.00
13 to 15 γ 0.719 [0.350]∗ −0.229 [0.187]
N=39,561 γ1−25 pctile −0.121 [0.130] −0.117 [0.064]∗
ρ=-0.331∗∗ γ25−50 pctile 0.035 [0.141] −0.081 [0.074]
γfemale −0.186 [0.106] −0.060 [0.057]
γrural 0.027 [0.132] −0.113 [0.092]
ρ1 −0.345 [0.148]∗ 0.245 [0.083]∗∗
ρ0 −0.047 [0.214] 0.573 [0.156]∗∗
Test joint sig. γ, χ2(5) 11.05∗ 17.13∗∗
Test ρ0 = ρ1, χ
2(1) 2.48 5.56∗
16 to 18 γ 0.749 [0.592] −0.883 [0.288]∗∗
N=24,828 γ1−25 pctile 0.015 [0.222] −0.135 [0.105]
ρ=-0.343∗∗ γ25−50 pctile −0.081 [0.585] −0.093 [0.115]
γfemale 0.040 [0.177] −0.125 [0.095]
γrural −0.123 [0.206] 0.087 [0.106]
ρ1 −0.238 [0.265] 0.470 [0.119]∗∗
ρ0 −0.330 [0.363] 0.863 [0.263]∗∗
Test joint sig. γ, χ2(5) 3.33 18.97∗∗
Test ρ0 = ρ1, χ
2(1) 0.06 2.60
10 to 18 γ 0.627 [0.230]∗∗ −0.213 [0.137]
N=113,187 γ1−25 pctile −0.092 [0.087] −0.075 [0.052]
ρ=-0.295∗∗ γ25−50 pctile 0.025 [0.087] −0.104 [0.048]∗
γfemale −0.122 [0.060]∗ −0.034 [0.043]
γrural −0.071 [0.087] −0.113 [0.060]
ρ1 −0.245 [0.094]∗∗ 0.242 [0.061]∗∗
ρ0 −0.006 [0.129] 0.483 [0.124]∗∗
Test joint sig. γ, χ2(5) 11.99∗ 27.18∗∗
Test ρ0 = ρ1, χ
2(1) 3.41 5.80∗
SigniÞcance levels:  : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
1 Bootstrapped standard errors with 100 replications
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Table 5.9: Average eﬀects of JPS scholarships on school attendance and child labour,
conditional on enrolment (equations (5.9a) and (5.9b))
Age group Sub group School attendance Child labour
ATE [s.e.]1 ATE [s.e.]1
10 to 12 Average 0.012 [0.006]∗ −0.017 [0.010]
1-25 percentile 0.010 [0.006] −0.019 [0.014]
25-50 percentile 0.014 [0.006]∗ −0.022 [0.008]∗∗
50-100 percentile 0.011 [0.006]∗ −0.012 [0.010]
Male 0.013 [0.005]∗ −0.020 [0.012]
Female 0.010 [0.006] −0.013 [0.009]
Urban 0.010 [0.005]∗ 0.001 [0.007]
Rural 0.012 [0.006]∗ −0.024 [0.012]∗
13 to 15 Average 0.018 [0.005]∗∗ −0.051 [0.017]∗∗
1-25 percentile 0.020 [0.007]∗∗ −0.076 [0.022]∗∗
25-50 percentile 0.019 [0.005]∗∗ −0.055 [0.017]∗∗
50-100 percentile 0.017 [0.004]∗∗ −0.038 [0.016]∗
Male 0.019 [0.005]∗∗ −0.056 [0.021]∗∗
Female 0.017 [0.006]∗∗ −0.047 [0.014]∗∗
Urban 0.011 [0.003]∗∗ −0.017 [0.009]
Rural 0.022 [0.006]∗∗ −0.069 [0.022]∗∗
16 to 18 Average 0.022 [0.018] −0.100 [0.018]∗∗
1-25 percentile 0.034 [0.019] −0.149 [0.027]∗∗
25-50 percentile 0.025 [0.025] −0.112 [0.020]∗∗
50-100 percentile 0.019 [0.016] −0.085 [0.017]∗∗
Male 0.022 [0.017] −0.114 [0.023]∗∗
Female 0.023 [0.019] −0.086 [0.014]∗∗
Urban 0.015 [0.016] −0.053 [0.009]∗∗
Rural 0.029 [0.021] −0.147 [0.028]∗∗
10 to 18 Average 0.015 [0.004]∗∗ −0.038 [0.010]∗∗
1-25 percentile 0.015 [0.005]∗∗ −0.040 [0.009]∗∗
25-50 percentile 0.018 [0.004]∗∗ −0.039 [0.008]∗∗
50-100 percentile 0.017 [0.005]∗∗ −0.033 [0.010]∗∗
Male 0.016 [0.004]∗∗ −0.042 [0.013]∗∗
Female 0.014 [0.004]∗∗ −0.033 [0.009]∗∗
Urban 0.011 [0.003]∗∗ −0.014 [0.006]∗
Rural 0.017 [0.005]∗∗ −0.051 [0.013]∗∗
SigniÞcance levels:  : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
The calculated average eﬀects are based on estimation results reported in table (5.8)
1 Bootstrapped standard errors with 100 replications
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Table 5.10: Bivariate probit estimates for the eﬀect of JPS scholarships on school
attendance and child labour, conditional on net enrolment (equations (5.8a) and (5.8b))
Level Parameter School attendance Child labour
Coeﬃcient [s.e.]1 Coeﬃcient [s.e.]1
Primary γ 0.779 [0.609] −0.011 [0.279]
N=46,253 γ1−25 pctile −0.105 [0.140] −0.021 [0.107]
ρ= -0.190∗∗ γ25−50 pctile 0.095 [0.161] −0.184 [0.112]
γfemale −0.067 [0.118] 0.017 [0.072]
γrural −0.287 [0.504] −0.272 [0.126]∗
ρ1 −0.255 [0.150] 0.239 [0.116]∗
ρ0 0.043 [0.194] 0.220 [0.183]
Test joint sig. γ, χ2(5) 6.57 10.86
Test ρ0 = ρ1, χ
2(1) 2.27 0.01
Junior Secondary γ 1.049 [0.431]∗∗ −0.552 [0.243]∗
N=27,840 γ1−25 pctile −0.157 [0.169] −0.064 [0.089]
ρ=-0.326∗∗ γ25−50 pctile −0.024 [0.164] −0.046 [0.090]
γfemale −0.097 [0.136] −0.104 [0.071]
γrural 0.112 [0.158] −0.124 [0.084]
ρ1 −0.541 [0.183]∗∗ 0.421 [0.111]∗∗
ρ0 −0.445 [0.251] 0.688 [0.185]∗∗
Test joint sig. γ, χ2(5) 13.65∗ 23.52∗∗
Test ρ0 = ρ1, χ
2(1) 0.15 2.48
Senior Secondary γ 0.788 [1.310] −1.138 [0.541]∗
N=17,911 γ1−25 pctile 0.079 [1.145] 0.090 [0.184]
ρ=-0.261∗∗ γ25−50 pctile 0.066 [0.709] −0.094 [0.152]
γfemale −0.302 [0.549] −0.192 [0.140]
γrural 0.051 [0.898] 0.220 [0.162]
ρ1 −0.150 [0.410] 0.512 [0.224]∗
ρ0 −1.670 [0.668]∗ 1.738 [0.424]∗∗
Test joint sig. γ, χ2(5) 3.05 12.39∗
Test ρ0 = ρ1, χ
2(1) 6.13∗ 9.96∗∗
SigniÞcance levels:  : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
1 Bootstrapped standard errors with 100 replications
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Table 5.11: Average eﬀects of JPS scholarships on school attendance and child labour,
conditional on net enrolment (equations (5.9a) and (5.9b))
Level Sub group School attendance Child labour
ATE [s.e.]1 ATE [s.e.]1
Primary Average 0.013 [0.005]∗∗ −0.018 [0.013]
1-25 percentile 0.011 [0.006] −0.022 [0.016]
25-50 percentile 0.017 [0.006]∗∗ −0.023 [0.010]∗
50-100 percentile 0.013 [0.005]∗ −0.012 [0.013]
Male 0.014 [0.005]∗∗ −0.022 [0.015]
Female 0.012 [0.005]∗ −0.015 [0.011]
Urban 0.012 [0.003]∗∗ −0.001 [0.008]
Rural 0.014 [0.006]∗ −0.025 [0.015]
Junior Secondary Average 0.023 [0.004]∗∗ −0.077 [0.016]∗∗
1-25 percentile 0.028 [0.007]∗∗ −0.106 [0.022]∗∗
25-50 percentile 0.026 [0.005]∗∗ −0.085 [0.018]∗∗
50-100 percentile 0.021 [0.004]∗∗ −0.063 [0.015]∗∗
Male 0.023 [0.004]∗∗ −0.085 [0.020]∗∗
Female 0.024 [0.005]∗∗ −0.069 [0.013]∗∗
Urban 0.013 [0.003]∗∗ −0.030 [0.008]∗∗
Rural 0.030 [0.005]∗∗ −0.106 [0.022]∗∗
Senior Secondary Average 0.022 [0.048] −0.101 [0.028]∗∗
1-25 percentile 0.038 [0.036] −0.130 [0.043]∗∗
25-50 percentile 0.028 [0.048] −0.121 [0.030]∗∗
50-100 percentile 0.018 [0.051] −0.091 [0.027]∗∗
Male 0.024 [0.032] −0.112 [0.034]∗∗
Female 0.021 [0.065] −0.090 [0.023]∗∗
Urban 0.016 [0.052] −0.062 [0.016]∗∗
Rural 0.030 [0.045] −0.151 [0.046]∗∗
SigniÞcance levels:  : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
The calculated average eﬀects are based on estimation results reported in table (5.10)
1 Bootstrapped standard errors with 100 replications
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The eﬀects vary with the characteristics of the students. Generally, the eﬀects on
labour were largest for students from poor households, in rural areas, and for boys. This
suggest that reservation wages are lower for the poor, and in rural areas. The fact that
labour supply is more responsive for boys may reßect the fact that boys are more often
engaged in own farm and wage labour, while girls may be more committed to domestic
work. This pattern is seen for all but the youngest age groups. The biggest diﬀerences
are found for urban and rural areas. The probability of working in rural areas decreased
by 5.1 percentage point, against 1.4 in urban areas. In case of school attendance the
diﬀerences in the eﬀects are smaller and often not signiÞcant, except for the urban-rural
diﬀerential. The eﬀect on school attendance is larger in rural areas.
The bivariate probit estimates and average eﬀects by (net) enrolment level are given
in tables 5.10 and 5.11 show similar results.
Finally, a remark about possible external eﬀects of the scholarships within the house-
holds. Because the cash transfers relax the budget constraint for the whole households,
the scholarship of one students may have positive spillover eﬀects on siblings that were
not selected into the programme. If this is the case then the estimated treatment eﬀects
may be biased because observations are no longer independent. The appendix 5.A inves-
tigates the robustness of the bivariate probit estimates. The overall conclusion is that the
estimates seem not to be contaminated by confounding spillover eﬀects. The exception is
school attendance for children age 10 to 12, which seems to be sensitive to the indepen-
dence assumption. School attendance for the youngest is increased if a brother or sister
has received a scholarship.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter analyses the eﬀectiveness of the Indonesian Social Safety Net scholarship
programme, which was introduced in August 1998 to protect the educational sector dur-
ing the East Asian economic crisis. The programme appears to have been eﬀective in
protecting access to education, despite considerable problems concerning geographical
targeting in the initial year.
The impact of the programme is identiÞed by exploiting the decentralised structure
of the programme design and the fact that at the initial stage of the programme only
incomplete information on the eﬀects of the crisis was available to policy makers. This
incomplete information on regional poverty gave rise to some geographic mis-targeting.
Instrumental variables are constructed from this mis-targeting, using data on the selection
rules and ex-post information on the regional poverty proÞle. The availability of pre-
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intervention data makes it possible to verify the credibility of the identifying assumptions
and the validity of the instrument.
Without the JPS programme enrolment would have dropped substantially, especially
in primary school. Ten percent of programme participants between 10 and 12 years old
would have dropped out of school if they had not received a scholarship. In absence of
the programme, the enrolment rate for this group would have been 0.6 percentage point
lower. This suggests that the programme has actually prevented enrolment to decrease
from 1998 to 1999. For the age group 13-15 the programme increased the enrolment rate
by 0.8 percentage point, although these estimates are not precise. This would account for
half of the observed increase in enrolment. However, most of this eﬀect concerns children
in primary school. This is an important result because this is the age group where, in
general, the transition from primary to junior secondary school takes place. It is at this
transition point that many students leave school. Amongst children aged 16 to 18 no
signiÞcant eﬀect was found. These results suggest that secondary school scholarships did
little to aﬀect enrolment.
The scholarships were especially eﬀective for children whose education attainment
was most vulnerable to the eﬀects of the crisis. In response to the crisis, poor rural
households facing resource constraints reduced investment in education of the youngest
children in the household for consumption smoothing reasons, and protected the education
of older children (Thomas et al., 2004). This reßects the diﬀerences in future earnings
from secondary and primary education, the fact that households have already invested in
secondary education of older children, and the relatively low secondary school enrolment
amongst students from poor families. Accordingly, the strongest eﬀects of the scholarships
were found amongst children at primary school in rural areas, from households that live
below the poverty line.
The JPS programme also aﬀected the decisions regarding school attendance and labour
activities of enrolled children. Scholarship recipients were more likely to go to school and
less likely to work. Although it was not an explicit goal of the programme, the scholarships
raised the reservation wage for students. The cash transfers relieved the pressure on
households to draw on the labour of their children to smooth income. The eﬀects on child
labour are largest for the poor, suggesting that reservation wages for the poor are lower
than for the non-poor.
Labour supply is much more sensitive to programme participation than school atten-
dance, in absolute terms. This result diﬀers from studies by Ravallion and Wodon (2000),
SkouÞas and Parker (2001) and Schultz (2004), who Þnd that increased schooling is only
partly explained by a reduction in labour. The diﬀerence in these results is most likely
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explained by the extreme setting of the South-east Asian economic crisis. Under these
circumstances the pressure on households to draw on child labour strongly increased. The
estimation results then suggest that this came only partly at the expense of school atten-
dance. This supports the notion by Suryahadi et al. (2005) that schooling and part time
work often go together in Indonesia.
Concluding, the JPS scholarships have proved to be an eﬀective instrument for pro-
tecting access to education. On the other hand, the allocation committees appear to have
been only partly capable of identifying the poor. A large part of the funds have been
allocated to students who would not have dropped out of school. More accurate target-
ing would greatly improve the programmes eﬀectiveness. Furthermore, priority should
have been placed on protecting primary school enrolment, where the scholarships seem
most eﬀective, and with providing support for children from the poorest households in
the transition from primary to secondary schooling.
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5.A Spillover eﬀects
The JPS scholarships are cash transfers to children. These transfers relax the households
budget constraint. Children that did not receive scholarships but have a sibling that does,
may therefore still beneÞt from the programme. If this is the case then the estimated
treatment eﬀects may be biased downward.
To analyse the extent of the bias, I re-estimate the treatment eﬀects for diﬀerent sub-
samples. In particular, I compare students that received a scholarship but their sibling
not (T = 1, S = 0), students that did not receive a scholarship but their sibling did
(T = 0, S = 1), and students from households where nobody received a scholarship
(T = 0, S = 0). These students have three possible outcomes (Y ):
1. T = 1, S = 0 : Y 10 = α0 + βTT + u
10
2. T = 0, S = 1 : Y 01 = α0 + βSS + u
01
3. T = 0, S = 0 : Y 00 = α0 + u00
where u is the unobserved component, and α0 the base state. The spillover eﬀects of schol-
arships cause the estimated treatment eﬀect to be biased by contaminating the control
group through βSS in sub-sample 2. Therefore, a switching regression model is estimated
for groups 1 and 3 to Þnd the treatment eﬀect
E[Y ] = α0 + βTT + TE[u
10 | T = 1] + (1− T )E[u00 | T = 0]
and groups 2 and 3 to Þnd the spillover eﬀect
E[Y ] = α0 + βSS + SE[u
01 | S = 1] + (1− S)E[u00 | S = 0]
With a binary outcome Y , the average treatment eﬀect (∆T ) and spillover eﬀect (∆S) are
calculated as
∆T = Pr (Y
10 = 1)− Pr (Y 00 = 1) = Φ (α0 + βTT )−Φ (α0)
∆S = Pr (Y
01 = 1)− Pr (Y 00 = 1) = Φ (α0 + βSS)− Φ (α0)
The results are given in table 5.12 below. For ease of comparison the estimated
treatment eﬀect using the full sample (copied from table 5.9) is also reported in the table,
indicated by ∆∗T . Except for the choice of sub-sample, the estimation procedure and
speciÞcation are identical to that in section 5.4.
The estimates for child work do not seem to be eﬀected by spillover eﬀects. For all age
groups the treatment eﬀects (∆∗T and∆T ) are very similar. The spillover eﬀect on working
has a negative sign: children are less likely to work if their brother or sister has received
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a scholarship. However, the estimates are not statistically signiÞcant for children younger
than 16. For older children the estimated spillover eﬀect is statistically signiÞcant. There
is no statistically signiÞcant spillover eﬀect of scholarships on school attendance, for any
age group. Nevertheless, the results for school attendance are a more sensitive to the
choice of sub-sample than for work activities. For 10 to 12 year olds the estimate of ∆T
is smaller end less precise than ∆∗T . For the other age groups the results are more robust.
Overall, the estimates and interpretation of the results seem not to be contaminated
by confounding spillover eﬀects. There is no evidence of underestimated treatment eﬀects
when using the full sample.
Table 5.12: Test for spillover eﬀects (by age group)
Age group ATE Attendance [s.e.] Work [s.e.] N
10-12
∆∗T 0.012 [0.006]
∗ -0.017 [0.010] 48,798
∆T 0.002 [0.013] -0.016 [0.015] 46,306
∆S 0.013 [0.008] -0.003 [0.038] 45,668
13-15
∆∗T 0.018 [0.005]
∗∗ -0.051 [0.017]∗∗ 39,561
∆T 0.013 [0.009] -0.049 [0.023]∗ 37,556
∆S -0.007 [0.038] -0.015 [0.057] 35,910
16-18
∆∗T 0.022 [0.018] -0.100 [0.018]
∗∗ 24,828
∆T 0.022 [0.013] -0.114 [0.021]∗∗ 23,695
∆S 0.020 [0.031] -0.101 [0.038]∗∗ 23,539
10-18
∆∗T 0.015 [0.004]
∗∗ -0.038 [0.010]∗∗ 113,187
∆T 0.008 [0.006] -0.034 [0.013]∗∗ 107,557
∆S 0.011 [0.009] -0.039 [0.018]∗∗ 105,117
SigniÞcance levels:  : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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5.B Supplementary tables
Table 5.13: Eﬀect of the JPS scholarships on enrolment, controlling for "no-treatment"
districts
Age group τ [s.e.] θno−treat [s.e.] N
OLS
10 to 12 0.074 [0.026]∗∗ −0.002 [0.008] 294
13 to 15 0.021 [0.052] −0.022 [0.017] 294
16 to 18 0.083 [0.147] 0.010 [0.013] 294
10 to 18 0.054 [0.048] 0.002 [0.018] 294
IV
10 to 12 0.100 [0.037]∗∗ −0.000 [0.008] 294
13 to 15 0.106 [0.077] −0.016 [0.017] 294
16 to 18 0.031 [0.261] 0.009 [0.015] 294
10 to 18 0.130 [0.066] 0.007 [0.019] 294
SigniÞcance levels:  : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Table 5.14: Eﬀect of the JPS scholarships on enrolment, controlling for per capita DBO
transfers
Age group τ [s.e.] τDBO [s.e.] N
OLS
10 to 12 0.086 [0.028]∗∗ −0.001 [0.001] 294
13 to 15 0.036 [0.053] 0.000 [0.004] 294
16 to 18 0.067 [0.142] −0.003 [0.004] 294
10 to 18 0.053 [0.051] −0.000 [0.001] 294
IV
10 to 12 0.117 [0.040]∗∗ −0.001 [0.001] 294
13 to 15 0.127 [0.081] −0.002 [0.004] 294
16 to 18 0.035 [0.249] −0.003 [0.004] 294
10 to 18 0.140 [0.074] −0.000 [0.001] 294
SigniÞcance levels:  : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
5.B. SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES 123
Table 5.15: First stage probit estimates, probability of receiving a JPS scholarship
Variable 10-18 10-12 13-15 16-18
Coeﬃcient [s.e.] Coeﬃcient [s.e.] Coeﬃcient [s.e.] Coeﬃcient [s.e.]
Age 0.035 [0.003]∗∗ 0.154 [0.012]∗∗ 0.029 [0.012] −0.035 [0.018]
Female 0.102 [0.012]∗∗ 0.128 [0.019]∗∗ 0.090 [0.019]∗ 0.076 [0.029]∗∗
Public school 0.099 [0.017]∗∗ 0.045 [0.034] 0.078 [0.024]∗∗ 0.130 [0.033]∗∗
Female head of household 0.332 [0.020]∗∗ 0.390 [0.033]∗∗ 0.315 [0.032]∗∗ 0.278 [0.046]∗∗
Education head of household
None (= reference)
Primary −0.084 [0.014]∗∗ −0.057 [0.022]∗∗ −0.102 [0.022]∗∗ −0.101 [0.036]∗∗
Junior seconadry −0.206 [0.021]∗∗ −0.147 [0.035]∗∗ −0.206 [0.033]∗∗ −0.245 [0.047]∗∗
Senior secondary −0.364 [0.024]∗∗ −0.351 [0.042]∗∗ −0.325 [0.037]∗∗ −0.441 [0.053]∗∗
Tertiary −0.488 [0.045]∗∗ −0.566 [0.095]∗∗ −0.488 [0.069]∗∗ −0.438 [0.082]∗∗
Ln(household size) −0.014 [0.021] −0.046 [0.034] −0.046 [0.033] 0.035 [0.046]
Agriculture main income source 0.063 [0.015]∗∗ 0.107 [0.025]∗∗ 0.035 [0.024] 0.028 [0.038]
Per capita expenditure
1-25 pctile 0.298 [0.017]∗∗ 0.318 [0.028]∗∗ 0.292 [0.027]∗∗ 0.283 [0.041]∗∗
25-50 pctile 0.195 [0.016]∗∗ 0.215 [0.026]∗∗ 0.200 [0.025]∗∗ 0.125 [0.036]∗∗
50-100 pctile (= reference)
JPS96 targeting rule 4.589 [0.131]∗∗ 4.847 [0.206]∗∗ 4.830 [0.207]∗∗ 3.717 [0.306]∗∗
District poverty proÞle
Poverty headcount (P0) −0.030 [0.083] −0.137 [0.131] 0.018 [0.130] 0.181 [0.206]
Poverty gap (P1) 0.309 [0.064]∗∗ 0.409 [0.102]∗∗ 0.203 [0.100]∗ 0.378 [0.148]∗∗
Continued on next page...
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... table 5.15 continued
Variable 10-18 10-12 13-15 16-18
Coeﬃcient [s.e.] Coeﬃcient [s.e.] Coeﬃcient [s.e.] Coeﬃcient [s.e.]
1996 headcount (BPS) −0.588 [0.120]∗∗ −0.672 [0.191]∗∗ −0.708 [0.190]∗∗ −0.243 [0.283]
BKKBN rate district −0.446 [0.068]∗∗ −0.473 [0.110]∗∗ −0.431 [0.105]∗∗ −0.588 [0.159]∗∗
BKKBN rate sub-district 0.445 [0.041]∗∗ 0.408 [0.064]∗∗ 0.437 [0.065]∗∗ 0.608 [0.098]∗∗
Village
IDT village 0.075 [0.016]∗∗ 0.074 [0.024]∗∗ 0.067 [0.025]∗∗ 0.091 [0.040]∗
Rural area 0.023 [0.019] −0.021 [0.032] 0.035 [0.030] 0.002 [0.042]
Public primary school 0.084 [0.030]∗∗ 0.083 [0.047] 0.052 [0.047] 0.166 [0.071]∗
Private primary school 0.011 [0.014] 0.002 [0.023] 0.026 [0.022] −0.025 [0.033]
Public jun. sec. school 0.013 [0.015] −0.023 [0.025] 0.027 [0.024] 0.049 [0.034]
Private jun. sec. school 0.045 [0.017]∗∗ −0.013 [0.027] 0.089 [0.026]∗∗ 0.044 [0.038]
Public sen. sec. school −0.007 [0.021] 0.094 [0.037]∗ −0.046 [0.033] −0.060 [0.044]
Private sen. sec. school −0.066 [0.020]∗∗ −0.071 [0.035]∗ −0.078 [0.031]∗ −0.019 [0.043]
Constant −3.241 [0.083]∗∗ −4.544 [0.177]∗∗ −2.943 [0.203]∗∗ −2.259 [0.029]∗∗
Province Þxed eﬀects yes yes yes yes
Observations 113,187 48,798 39,561 24,828
Pseudo R-squared 0.131 0.142 0.130 0.131
Robust standard errors in brackets.
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Figure 5.2: Correlation between JPS96j and enrolment (1998 district means).
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Figure 5.3: Correlation between zj and enrolment (1998 district means).
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Figure 5.4: Correlation between JPS96j and school attendance (1998 district means).
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Figure 5.5: Correlation between zj and school attendance (1998 district means).
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Figure 5.6: Correlation between JPS96j and child labour (1998 district means).
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Figure 5.7: Correlation between zj and child labour (1998 district means).
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Chapter 6
Did the Health Card Programme
Ensure Access to Medical Care for
the Poor During Indonesias
Economic Crisis?
6.1 Introduction
In the current debate on the provision of health care services in developing countries,
many authors have found high inequalities in the utilisation of public health care and
hence the beneÞt incidence of public spending. Health spending is generally found not
to be pro-poor, as public policy typically lacks the incentives for health care providers
to serve the poor. Ensuring that the poor beneÞt from health care and receive a basic
package is a widely shared policy objective (World Bank, 2004). Empirical evidence that
shows high income elasticities for health care, and thus large inequalities between poor
and rich, but rather low price elasticities that tend to be larger for the poor (Jimenez,
1995; Gertler and Hammer, 1997). Targeted prices subsidies for medical care are therefore
often advocated as means to increase access to medical care for the poor, as demand side
subsidies for medical care are often argued to be more eﬀective in reaching the poor than
supply side interventions. However, there is little direct empirical evidence on the merits
of this recommendation.
The health care component of the Indonesian Social Safety Net programme, initiated
to protect the poor from the eﬀects of the economic crisis that hit the country in 1997, is
a very particular kind of health care intervention, which included both a targeted price
subsidy and a public spending component. Households that were thought to be most
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vulnerable to economic shocks were allocated health cards, which entitled all household
members to the price subsidy. Health care facilities that provided the subsidised care
received extra budgetary support to compensate for the increased demand.
There are some distinct features to the JPS health programme. First, the price subsidy
only applied to public service providers. Private sector health care providers were not
included in the scheme. Second, targeting and allocation of the budgetary support to
health care providers was decentralised to district committees. However, the transfers were
made directly from Jakarta to the public health care facilities, through specially created
accounts at the post oﬃce. Third, there was a loose relationship between the utilisation
of the health card and the compensation that the health care providers received in return.
Compensation was allocated to districts based on the estimated number of households
eligible for the health card programme and not based on actual utilisation of the health
cards.
This chapter focuses on the eﬀect of the Indonesian health card programme on demand
for primary outpatient health care. The particular design allows us to investigate a number
of interesting questions.
First, it provides the opportunity of an ex post evaluation of a targeted price subsidy
for health care which was implemented on a national scale. Most studies that discuss the
eﬀectiveness of health policy draw on simulation based health care demand models, which
make ex ante predictions of possible policy scenarios given some estimated parameters.
The drawback of these simulations is that the underlying estimates are often based on cross
sectional data which typically show little (spatial) variation. In eﬀect, these simulations
often concern out of sample prediction where the forecasted interventions lie outside the
range of the observed price data (Gertler and Hammer, 1997). Although ex post studies
do not suﬀer from this problem, there is relatively little empirical work that evaluates
actual pricing policies in health care. Moreover, only few of these studies take account of
the endogenous nature of public interventions in their estimation strategy.1 This chapter
aims to contribute to that literature.
Second, since the health card only entitled the user to free services at public providers
we can directly investigate substitution eﬀects between private and public providers. This
is diﬃcult in health care demand studies, as information on the price menu oﬀered by
1Using data from a randomised health insurance and cost sharing experiment in the United States,
Manning et al. (1987) estimate the demand for outpatient care. Gertler and Molyneaux (1997) use panel
data to evaluate an experiment of a user fee increase for outpatient services in Indonesia. Regarding
targeted health care subsidies, the Medicaid programme in the US is probably the most studied. Currie
and Gruber (1996) and Currie and Thomas (1995) exploit variation in legislature across states to control
for endogeneity of the programme. In an analysis of a school based health insurance scheme in Egypt,
Yip and Berman (2001) treat participation as selection on observables.
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alternative health care providers is often not available. As an alternative to exogenous
price data many models estimate the demand for medical care based on proxy variables
derived from (endogenous) household expenditure data2 or variation in indirect cost mea-
sures, such as opportunity costs due to loss of work or travel time to the nearest provider.3
However, opportunity costs do not vary by public or private provider and the same will
often hold for travel time. For instance, doctors working at public providers in Indonesia
also often maintain private practices making it impossible to use travel time variation to
estimate substitution eﬀects. Studies that do manage to identify price variation across
provider types generally Þnd substantial substitution eﬀects between public and private
providers as a result of public price policy.4
The third contribution of this chapter is that we compare the eﬀect of a targeted
price subsidy with that of increased public health care spending. Existing empirical
evidence is inconclusive regarding causality between spending and health outcomes (World
Bank, 2004; Filmer and Pritchett, 1999). In the health care demand literature policy
scenarios such as reinvesting funds (from raising user fees, for example) into the public
health sector are often discussed and simulated. While appealing for policy, this requires
strong assumptions about the supply response of health care providers (such as the cost
structure and the performance of the government or local authorities). In case of the JPS
intervention we directly observe eﬀect of increased public spending without making these
assumptions. There are empirical studies that use actual provider or community data to
show that an increase in supply and quality of care, and especially drug availability at
health facilities, has a signiÞcant eﬀect on utilisation.5 The problem with these quality
and supply variables is that they are often endogenous due to government policy, and
that the measured eﬀects are likely to capture both supply and demand eﬀects. While
some studies manage to control for the former problem, it is much harder to control for
the latter.
In this chapter we make an attempt to disentangle the health card eﬀect and the
eﬀect of the budgetary support on utilisation. Given the weak link between the health
card programme and the compensation to health care providers, our approach will be
to treat these two components of the programme as two separate interventions. We will
2E.g. Gertler, Locay and Sanderson (1987), Lavy and Quigley (1993), Ching (1995), Mocan, Tekin
and Zax (2000).
3E.g., Gertler and van der Gaag (1990), Dow (1999).
4E.g., Mwabu, Ainsworth and Nyamete (1993); Sahn, Younger and Genicot (2003).
5Lavy and Quigley (1993) deÞne quality as the type of provider for a study in Ghana; Lavy and
Germain (1994) Þnd strong eﬀects of supply of drugs, staﬀ and services; Mwabu et al. (1993), Akin,
Guilkey and Denton (1995), and Akin et al. (1998) use facility level data and Þnd large eﬀects of drug
availability; Sahn et al. (2003) use community level data to Þnd similarly strong eﬀects of availability of
drug and medical staﬀ.
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argue that the transfers made to the public sector providers beneÞted all potential users
while the price subsidy was only available to those who received a health card. We make
an attempt to disentangle the two eﬀects. Our results suggest that the largest share of
the programmes eﬀect is due to increased public spending.
Finally, we evaluate the distribution of the eﬀects of both the demand and supply side
interventions. The literature suggests that the poor are more sensitive to price eﬀects
than the rich.6 But even if households receive their health cards, there may still be barri-
ers to using these beneÞts, such as lack of information, regional shortage of providers, or
opportunity costs unabridged by the health card. Such barriers are likely to vary by pop-
ulation sub-group, households or even individual characteristics (Blank and Card, 1991;
Currie and Thomas, 1995) and are likely to be higher for the poor. Alternatively, health
card recipients may be reluctant to utilise their beneÞts simply because of a preconcep-
tion that subsidised care is of inferior quality to non-subsidised health care (Arhin, 1994).
Evidence of such barriers to using the health card has been discussed at length in chapter
3, showing that under-usage of the health cards is indeed higher for the poor than for the
non-poor. Given the loose relationship between JPS budgetary support and the actual
use of health cards, it may also be that health care facilities are reluctant to provide free
services, or at least service of similar quality as provided to non-subsidised patients. In
this case the non-poor are likely to capture a large part of the beneÞts from extra public
health care spending.
The results in this chapter show the eﬀects of the price subsidy and supply impulse to
diﬀer by income group. For low-income groups (with relatively high price elasticity) we
Þnd both a substitution from public to private care and an increase in total utilisation
due to the health card, but little eﬀect from increased spending. However, for the more
wealthy groups (less sensitive to price changes) we Þnd the substitution eﬀect to be more
dominant and the supply-induced eﬀect of the budget increase to be larger, possibly since
the rich typically face less barriers to access to medical care than the poor. Overall, the
non-poor captured most of the beneÞt, despite pro-poor targeting of the health cards.
The weak link between Þnancing and utilisation of health cards resulted in that most
programme beneÞts were captured by the rich.
The organisation of the chapter is as follows. The next section gives an overview of
the data. Section 6.3 focuses on the evaluation problem and sets out the strategy for
disentangling and estimating the impact of both the health card and the supply impulse
on utilisation of outpatient care. Section 6.4 highlights some caveats and examines the
6E.g., Gertler et al. (1987), Manning et al. (1987), Sauerborn, Nougtara and Latimer (1994), Ching
(1995), Yip and Berman (2001), Sahn et al. (2003).
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sensitivity of the results to the main assumptions of the study. Section 6.5 concludes.
6.2 The data
This study draws on Indonesias nation-wide socioeconomic household survey (Susenas).
The 1999 JPS module provides information on household participation in the health card
programme. The survey was Þelded in February 1999, while the health card programme
started in the fall of 1998. The results of this analysis therefore reßect the experience of
the Þrst months of operation of the programme. For this reason, and data limitations, we
limit the analysis to the impact of the programme on the access to medical care (in terms
of utilisation), and do not endeavour to estimate the eﬀect on health. Health eﬀects are
likely to take longer to materialise. The JPS module sampled 202,089 households and
collected a wide range of socioeconomic indicators along with a measure of consumption.
In the area of health, the survey collected information on self-reported illness, utilisation
of medical services, user fees and ownership and utilisation of the health card. We also
use the 1998 Susenas as this provides the pre-intervention data needed for the analysis.
This round is also Þelded in February, includes 207,645 households and covers the same
questionnaire and variables as the 1999 survey, except for the JPS programmes.
The 1996 village level census, Podes, provides pre-intervention information on acces-
sibility and supply of health services, and various other community characteristics. The
1996 Podes includes 66,486 villages (desa) and townships (kelurahan) and can be merged
with the Susenas.
Besides the micro data we also use administrative data concerning the 1998/1999
budget for the Social Safety Net programme. This data includes the budget allocated to
293 districts (kabupaten) to implement the health card programme and to compensate the
public health clinics (Puskesmas) and village midwives (Bidan di desa) for the expected
extra demand for health services resulting from the health card programme. The largest
share of this budget was directly transferred to public health care providers. The transfers
were made in two to four phases, depending on the province, starting in the last quarter
of 1998. By the time of the survey JPS budgets had arrived at the health centres.
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6.3 Impact of the Health Card Programme on Utili-
sation
6.3.1 Utilisation of medical services and the health card pro-
gramme
The trend in health care utilisation has already been described in chapter 2. For the
analysis in this chapter it suﬃces to recall the decline in health care utilisation that was
observed in 1998. Utilisation of public care suﬀered the most during the crisis. The
blame for the bad performance of the public sector has been placed with budget cuts and
rising costs of drugs and medical supplies, which has lead to a strong decline in quality
and supply of care. However, in 1999 the public sector saw a revival. This chapter will
investigate to what extent the JPS health programme has been responsible for this revival.
By February 1999 the health card programme was already of a substantial magnitude
with 10.6 percent of Indonesians reporting that their household was allocated a health
card (see chapter 3). For the poor this percentage is even higher: 32 percent of the people
from the two poorest quintiles lived in a household that was allocated a health card. So
even though we are analysing the programme in its very early stages, it was already in
full swing at the time of the 1999 Susenas survey.
6.3.2 Disentangling eﬀects of two interventions
What would have been the utilisation of outpatient health services if the SSN health card
programme had not existed? This question comprises two eﬀects: the eﬀect of the health
card price subsidy and the eﬀect of the additional budgetary resources made available to
public sector services trough the SSN programme. By virtue of the weak link between
these two components of the programme, our approach will be to treat the two eﬀects as
two separate interventions.
The maintained assumption is that the Þrst intervention  the distribution of health
cards  accrues beneÞts only to those who actually own a health card, while the second
intervention can potentially beneÞt the whole population, depending on the size of the
grant to the health care provider. This assumption rules out external or general equilib-
rium eﬀects. Because we are dealing with short term impacts, we will assume that health
related general equilibrium eﬀects are not substantial since they are likely to take longer
to materialise. However, externalities through congestion or crowding out induced by the
programme may also compromise the independence assumption. We will investigate the
sensitivity to this assumption later in the chapter.
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Under the independence assumption, the combined average impact of the two inter-
ventions can be written as the sum of the two impacts separately. Let Yi (hi, qj) denote
the outcome for individual i, living in district j, as a function of the two interventions. If
a person lives in a household that has received a health card then hi = 1, while hi = 0
for non-recipients. qj reßects the JPS budgetary support to public health care providers
in the area where the person lives (indicated by JPSj).
We want to know to what extent the observed development in utilisation from 1998
to 1999 is due to these two interventions. The overall impact of the programme that we
want to retrieve can be expressed as a weighted mean of the impact on the population
with a health card (hi = 1, qj = JPSj) and people who did not receive a health card, but
only beneÞted from the budget increase (hi = 0, qj = JPSj). Assuming that utilisation
of health card owners and that of non-health card owners is independent, we can write
the overall impact as
pE [Yi (1, JPSj)− Yi (0, 0) | hi = 1, qj = JPSj ] (6.1)
+(1− p)E [Yi (0, JPSj)− Yi (0, 0) | hi = 0, qj = JPSj ]
where p = P (hi = 1) is the probability of receiving a health card. The observed average
outcome for the population with a health card is given by E[Yi (1, JPSj) | hi = 1, qj =
JPSj ], while E[Yi (0, JPSj) | hi = 0, qj = JPSj] reßects the observed average outcome
for individuals who did not receive a health card. The counterfactual, Yi (0, 0), is the
outcome in the event that the Social Safety Net had not been implemented. By adding
and subtracting pE[Yi (0, JPSj) | hi = 1, qj = JPSj], we can rewrite equation (6.1) as
pE [Yi (1, JPSj)− Yi (0, JPSj) | hi = 1, qj = JPSj ] (6.2)
+E [Yi (0, JPSj)− Yi (0, 0) | qj = JPSj]
Here the Þrst term (weighted by p) gives the impact of the pure health card programme
conditional on the budget increase, for those who own a health card. We will refer to
this as the direct eﬀect of the programme. The second term reßects the eﬀect of budget
increase for the whole population, which we will refer to as the indirect eﬀect of the JPS
programme.
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6.3.3 Estimation strategy
We will estimate both the direct health card eﬀect and the overall eﬀect. We cannot
directly identify the indirect eﬀect of the programme. Instead, we derive the impact of
the general increase in funding to public services by subtracting the direct eﬀect estimate
from the total eﬀect estimate.
First, we concentrate on the estimation of the direct eﬀect of the health card inter-
vention. Since both health card and non-health card owners beneÞted from the trans-
fer of funds to health care providers, this measures the diﬀerential eﬀect of owning a
health card conditional on the transfer programme. For obvious reasons, a direct com-
parison between health card owners and non-health card owners after the introduction
of the programme does not yield a valid impact estimate. The expressions above are
conditional upon selection and since selection was not random, we cannot presume that
E[Yi (0, JPSj) | hi = 1, qj = JPSj] = E[Yi (0, JPSj) | hi = 0, qj = JPSj ]. The health
card was distributed to poor households, and even without a health card their utilisation
would have been diﬀerent from the relatively wealthier non-health card households. It is
also possible that the health cards may have been allocated based on needs. In that case
health card recipients would, on average, use more health care, even without the health
card.
There are various approaches one can take to correct for this non-random placement of
the programme (e.g., Heckman, LaLonde and Smith, 1999). A frequently used method is
propensity score matching, which relies on matching on observables, and the assumption
of conditional independence.7 That is, conditional on a set of observed characteristics
selection into the programme can be treated as random (Heckman and Robb, 1985; Hol-
land, 1986). Recent advances have greatly increased the popularity of this method.8 The
success in reducing the systematic diﬀerences between the control and treatment group
increases when more variables are used to match households. However, the more variables
are used, the more diﬃcult it will become to match households. Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1983) proved that if it is valid to match on all of the selected variables separately, it is
equally valid to match on the propensity score only. The propensity score is the probabil-
ity of obtaining treatment as a function of the observed matching variables. This result
7We experimented with instrumental variables but abandoned this approach because we are not con-
vinced that we are able to construct adequate instruments. We used variables that measure the perception
of fairness of the distribution of health cards in the district. But the results were very sensitive to speci-
Þcation and choice of instrument. We also experimented with 1997 district BKKBN estimates. However,
using 1998 data we found that these variables appear to be correlated with the level of utilisation (but
not with changes).
8See Imbens (2003) for a survey. Smith and Todd (2005) provide an insightful discussion on the
application and pitfalls of propensity score matching in the recent literature.
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greatly reduces the dimensionality of the problem. Instead of having to match on several
variables, it now suﬃces to condition on just one variable, the propensity score. The
propensity score function can be estimated with a logit model. The unit of our analysis is
the household, as health cards were distributed at this level. Households in the treatment
group are matched to households in the potential control group. Note that as a result,
the sample size of the treatment and matched control group  in terms of individuals 
are diﬀerent as the household sizes vary.
The main weakness of this method is that one cannot be sure that all systematic
diﬀerences between the control and treatment group that inßuence utilisation have been
removed during the match. The extent in which the propensity score matching will reduce
the bias depends on the speciÞcation of the propensity score model and the quality of
the control variables (Heckman, Ichimura and Todd, 1997; Heckman, Ichimura, Smith
and Todd, 1998). It is therefore crucial to understand the programme design and to
include suﬃcient information about the selection procedure (at all allocation levels) in
the model. There are three sources of bias that we want to deal with. The Þrst is
the endogenous placement of health cards with households. Second, since we want to
estimate the direct health card eﬀect, we want to purge it from any systematic diﬀerences
in regional programme intensity between the control and treatment group. Finally, we
need to take account of increased demand for public services, which may result from the
allocation of health cards.
To control for the latter two soures of bias we include district Þxed eﬀects. These cap-
ture any between district variation in allocation of health cards and JPS funding. BKKBN
poverty estimates for sub-districts control for allocation of subsidy within districts and
the number of health cards issued in the areas covered by the facilities. Thus, we are
matching households who live in areas that enjoy/suﬀer similar programme intensity (in
terms of health card coverage and JPS budget) and similar supply shocks in health care.
Endogenous programme placement is caused by purposive targeting at diﬀerent stages
in the decentralised allocation process. To control for endogenous programme placement
at the village level we include variables from the Podes that reßect pre-programme access
to health care. These include the number of public health clinics, auxiliary health clinics
and maternity facilities in the village, dummy variables indicating whether the majority
of village traﬃc is by land, and a dummy variable reßecting the village leaders opinion
about the accessibility of health clinics. As local facility staﬀ distributes the health cards,
we include the number of doctors and village midwives living in the village (per 1000
inhabitants) as a proxy for informal contacts within the village. Finally, the level of
education of the village leader is included, as well as dummy variables indicating IDT
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eligibility and whether the village is located in a rural area.
For households we include the Þve BKKBN allocation criteria as dummy variables.
Other household welfare variables refer to housing characteristics (status of house occu-
pied, type of roof, walls and ßoor, sewage, sanitation and drinking water facilities, and
source of light), sector of main source of household income, and employment status of
the head of household. We further control for household composition (gender and age),
household size and head of household characteristics (gender and education level). Per
capita consumption is endogenous since a health card reduces health care expenses, and
is therefore omitted. A household with a health card would, on average, report a lower
consumption level than it would if it had not received a health card. If we add household
expenditure to the propensity score function we would be constructing a control group
that is less wealthy than the intervention group.9 Consequently, we would overestimate
the health card eﬀect.
Health status is the one important unobserved variable that is missing from this spec-
iÞcation. Soelaksono et al. (1999) provide some evidence that health cards were allocated
based on illness. This is further reinforced by the fact that self-reported illness is higher
amongst health card owners. This would actually suggest that the positive bias due to
health status outweighs the negative bias due to pro-poor targeting. The Susenas records
self-reported illness, but this is typically prone to reporting bias, and may be endogenous
to health card allocation.10 We therefore omit health status from the propensity score
function. Many of the individual characteristics will reduce the health bias (e.g. age,
housing and sanitary conditions, BKKBN criteria) but we acknowledge that some may
remain. However, later in the paper we will show that the potential bias from omitting
health status is small, and that the estimation results are robust and within reasonable
bounds.
We estimated the propensity score function separately for Þve main regions in Indone-
sia.11 In this way we restricted the match to households living in the same region. A
household with a health card living in Java could for instance, never be matched with
a household without a health card living in Sumatra. The reason for doing so is that
9See van de Walle (2003) for a discussion on assumptions about behavioural responses regarding the
eﬀect of public policy on household consumption.
10Using an experiment with user fee increases in Indonesia, Dow et al. (2000) provide a nice illustration
of the problem of reporting bias and measurement error in self reported health status. Whereas objective
measures of health show that increasing user fees leads to a deterioration of health status, self reported
measures suggest an improvement in health. They argue that this reporting bias is correlated with
exposure to the health system, which is aﬀected by the user fee increase. See also Strauss and Thomas
(1998) for a more general discussion.
11The 5 regions we deÞne are (i) Java and Bali, (ii) Sumatra, (iii) Sulawesi, (iv) Kalimantan and (v)
Other Islands.
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we believe that there are unobserved characteristics which vary by region that inßuence
the eﬀect that other variables have on the probability of receiving a health card.12 The
Pseudo R-squared for the regional models ranged from 0.12 to 0.26.13
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Figure 6.1: Histogram of the propensity score for matched households (bin size = 0.02)
Households that own a health card are matched to households without a health card,
based on the estimated propensity score. There is a variety of matching methods that
can be applied (Dehejia and Wahba, 1999 and 2002; Imbens, 2003). We implemented
nearest neighbour matching, the simplest matching procedure. For each household in the
treatment group we selected a control-household with the nearest value of the propensity
score. This way of constructing a control group basically boils down to re-weighing the
potential control group. Those households that are not matched receive a weight of
zero, those who are matched once receive a weight of one, and those matched more
than once receive a weight higher than one. The choice between allowing matching with
replacement or without involves the trade-oﬀ between increasing precision and reducing
the bias. Matching with replacement will give the least biased estimate, but reduces
precision of the estimate, as the weights for multiple matched observations increase the
variance. The drawback of matching without replacement is that it yields a shortage of
possible matches for those households with a high propensity score. We used the rule
12See, for example, Smith and Todd (2005), Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997), and Heckman,
Ichimura, Smith and Todd (1998), who raise concern about the potential bias due to geographic mis-
match in the matching process.
13See table 6.9 in appendix 6.A for the propensity score function estimation results.
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that when the match obtained without replacement had a propensity score that diﬀered
more than 0.001 from the propensity score of the household in the treatment group, we
resorted to matching with replacement. If no match was found within a radius of 0.001
we did not match the household to a control.
The quality of match is best illustrated using a graph. Figure 6.1 graphs the distri-
bution of the propensity score for the matched households in a histogram, while table
6.1 depicts the distribution of the propensity score for the intervention group, potential
controls and households matched more than once. The number of matched households
decreases as the probability of selection increases. The region of overlapping support
ranges from 0.0008 to 0.8473. Households outside this range are not considered in the
matching procedure.
Table 6.1: Distribution of propensity score for all households and for the matched pairs
Propensity All households Matched pairs Nr. of households in
score No health Health No health Health control group matched
card card card card more than once
0.0 - 0.1 128,128 4,658 4,658 4,658 0
0.1 - 0.2 26,544 4,405 4,406 4,405 0
0.2 - 0.3 10,003 3,388 3,386 3,387 3
0.3 - 0.4 4,828 2,605 2,589 2,588 21
0.4 - 0.5 2,318 1,839 1,788 1,794 68
0.5 - 0.6 1,105 1,238 1,208 1,203 161
0.6 - 0.7 378 664 620 620 137
0.7 - 0.8 57 177 72 72 16
0.8 - 0.9 5 19 0 0 0
Total 173,366 18,993 18,727 18,727 406
Note: Range of common support: [0.0008, 0.8473].
Table 6.2 provides descriptive statistics for health card owners and others. Column
2 shows the statistics for households without a health card, while column 3 shows the
characteristics for households that did receive a health card. It appears that, before the
match, households that own a health card perform worse on the BKKBN criteria, slightly
larger and work more often in agriculture compared to non-health card owners. Heads of
households with a health card have on average a lower education and are more likely to
be females.
The matched households are very similar on the basis of the individual observed char-
acteristics, which entered into the matching function. Columns 4 and 5 in table 6.2
present the descriptive statistics for the matched samples, and columns 6 and 7 show the
diﬀerence in means of the covariates. The top panel presents variables that were included
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in the matching function, and shows that the two samples are well balanced across the
observed characteristics.
The second panel shows that the district dummy variables managed to control for the
supply shock in the matching process. Both programme intensity variables are balanced
for the matched households, while they diﬀer strongly for the non-matched households.
This conÞrms that the district dummy variables in the matching function managed to
control for variation in the size of the grants and health cards coverage in the district.
The matching has also balanced the weight for age Z score (WAZ) of children under 5.14
Weight is indicative for the health children over a period of time of which, in this case, will
mostly reßect the period before the launch of the health card. It is thus  in the absence
of panel data  our best proxy for balance in pre-intervention outcome variables.15 In
section 6.4 we will further investigate the robustness of the impact estimate to health
status.
The diﬀerential impact of ownership of a health card is estimated by comparing util-
isation patterns of the treatment and matched control group. Comparing means yields
the average impact of the direct health card intervention on health card owners. It can
easily be obtained by estimating the regression
Yi = c+ βhi + εi (6.3)
on the matched sample applying sample weights, where c is a constant and εi an i.i.d
error term. β is an unbiased estimate of the treatment eﬀect for those who are selected
into the programme, i.e.
β = E [Yi (1, JPSj)− Yi (0, JPSj) | hi = 1, qj = JPSj] (6.4)
Weighting this by the estimated probability of selection into the programme, p = P (hi =
1), gives us the average direct health card eﬀect, pβ, deÞned in equation (6.2).
14The WAZ score is based on a 1999 Susenas nutrition module, covering 72,848 children under 5.
15Waters et al. (2003) Þnd that the crisis had no observable eﬀect on the WAZ score. Eﬀects of the
health card programme on the WAZ are unlikely as this did not cover nutritional programmes.
142 CHAPTER 6. THE HEALTH CARD PROGRAMME
Table 6.2: Descriptive statistics for households with and without a health card, and for matched pairs
All households Matched pairs
Variables No health card Health card No health card 1 Health card Diﬀ. [s.e]
Propensity score 0.0823 0.2488 0.2433 0.2433 -0.0000 0.0018
Female head of household 0.1268 0.1608 0.1618 0.1601 -0.0017 0.0038
Education head of household
No education completed 0.3641 0.5087 0.5090 0.5073 -0.0017 0.0052
Primary 0.2985 0.3324 0.3289 0.3327 0.0038 0.0049
Junior secondary 0.1220 0.0814 0.0818 0.0818 0.0000 0.0028
Senior secondary 0.1689 0.0667 0.0693 0.0674 -0.0019 0.0026
Higher 0.0465 0.0107 0.0111 0.0108 -0.0003 0.0011
Head of household unemployed 0.0079 0.0074 0.0075 0.0074 -0.0001 0.0009
Household size 4.2043 4.2576 4.2211 4.2449 0.0238 0.0189
BKKBN criteria
Worship 0.9343 0.8894 0.8911 0.8902 -0.0010 0.0032
Food 0.9835 0.9778 0.9785 0.9790 0.0004 0.0015
Clothing 0.9645 0.9473 0.9487 0.9487 0.0000 0.0023
Floor 0.8193 0.5935 0.5962 0.5954 -0.0008 0.0051
Health 0.8899 0.9061 0.9056 0.9057 0.0001 0.0030
Main source of household income
Agriculture, farming 0.4551 0.5568 0.5526 0.5546 0.0020 0.0051
Mining, quarrying 0.0097 0.0089 0.0089 0.0089 -0.0001 0.0010
Processing industry 0.0687 0.0685 0.0655 0.0682 0.0027 0.0026
Continued on next page...
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... table 6.2 continued
All households Matched pairs
Variables No health card Health card No health card 1 Health card Diﬀ. [s.e]
Electricity, gas, water 0.0022 0.0007 0.0009 0.0007 -0.0002 0.0003
Construction 0.0400 0.0494 0.0507 0.0496 -0.0011 0.0023
Trade 0.1482 0.1180 0.1206 0.1193 -0.0013 0.0034
Transport., storage, comm. 0.0510 0.0519 0.0522 0.0521 -0.0002 0.0023
Finance, insurance, real estate 0.0091 0.0031 0.0026 0.0031 0.0005 0.0006
Services 0.1462 0.0931 0.0957 0.0936 -0.0021 0.0030
Other 0.0028 0.0037 0.0033 0.0036 0.0004 0.0006
Income recipient 0.0672 0.0459 0.0470 0.0464 -0.0006 0.0022
Rural area 0.6792 0.7880 0.7856 0.7862 0.0006 0.0042
IDT village 0.2822 0.3495 0.3476 0.3444 -0.0032 0.0049
BKKBN rate per sub-district 0.3088 0.4407 0.4417 0.4390 -0.0028 0.0026
Program intensity at district level
JPS budget per capita 1.6164 1.8178 1.8154 1.8147 -0.0007 0.0099
Health card coverage 0.0886 0.1885 0.1865 0.1870 0.0004 0.0012
Member of household ill 0.3110 0.3620 0.3293 0.3605 0.0312 0.0049
Weight for Age Z-score, children under 5 2 -1.2116 -1.2943 -1.2924 -1.2987 -0.0063 0.0244
Number of observations 173,366 18,993 18,727 18,727
1 Includes 406 households that are matched more than once.
2 Susenas nutrition module, 1999. Total sample is 7,902 (health card) and 64,946 (no health card) children. The matched sample
contains 7,502 (health card) and 6,891 (no health card) children.
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The overall impact of the programme (equation (6.1)) is obtained by exploiting regional
variation in the Þnancial compensation for the health card programme to public health
care providers, and the fact that the allocation to districts was based on pre-intervention
poverty estimates. We analyse the utilisation rates before the introduction of the health
card programme  based on the 1998 Susenas  and compare these with the situation
right after the introduction of the health card programme. The resulting impact estimate
is a result of the two interventions acting simultaneously. Later in the chapter we evaluate
the robustness of this approach. To measure the variation in JPS compensation we use
administrative data concerning the 1998/1999 budget that was allocated for transfers
to public health facilities. The variation was substantial. For example, we found that
the amount of compensation, weighted by the district population size, in Sulawesi is 29
percent higher than in Sumatra and 34 percent higher that in Java/Bali, but about half
of what is allocated to the smaller islands (table 6.3).
Table 6.3: JPS budget allocation to public health care providers, 1998/1999 (1000
Rupiah)
Region Total budget Population Budget Health Number
Puskesmas size per card of
and village capita coverage districts
midwife∗
Java and Bali 158,524,734 123,646,893 1.282 0.139 117
Sumatra 57,686,076 43,396,301 1.329 0.072 73
Sulawesi 25,009,892 14,553,660 1.718 0.049 40
Kalimantan 15,747,384 11,210,671 1.405 0.052 29
Other islands 36,024,406 11,860,142 3.037 0.085 34
Indonesia 292,992,492 204,667,667 1.432 0.106 293
Source: ∗ Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, Indonesia,  Susenas.
We model the eﬀect of the general increase in funding as a linear function of the budget
allocation. For district j, in time period t, the utilisation of health services is written as
Yjt = αj + γ
JPSjt
Njt
+ φ0Wjt + θ0dt +
5X
r=2
θrdrdt + εjt (6.5)
where JPSj is the amount of compensation for public health clinics allocated to district j,
Nj denotes the district population size. Subscript t indicates time and refers to either the
time period before the intervention (1998) or the time period after the intervention (1999).
We include a time dummy variable, taking value dt = 0 if t = 1998 or dt = 1 if t = 1999.
The time variable has been interacted with 5 region speciÞc Þxed eﬀects, dr, in order
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to allow for some ßexibility in capturing the time eﬀect.16 In the pre-intervention year
JPSj equals zero for all districts. We also add a set of regional welfare and demographic
characteristics, Wjt, to the model. These include the poverty proÞle of the districts17,
the average age and household size, the district population size, and the fraction of the
population living in a rural area. Frankenberg, Smith and Thomas (2003) show evidence
of changes in household size, migration between urban and rural areas due to households
restructuring their composition in response to the crisis. While the average household size
increased in (lower cost) rural areas, the number of working age family members increased
in urban households.
The non-random allocation of the JPS budget is accounted for by a district Þxed
eﬀect, αj. This removes any bias due to unobserved time invariant factors that aﬀect
geographic allocation and are also correlated with health care utilisation. The fact that
the JPS budget allocation was determined by static pre-programme poverty estimates,
the BKKBN classiÞcation, and not on the basis of dynamic changes in poverty legitimises
the Þxed eﬀects approach.
Taking diﬀerences across districts over time gives
∆Yjt = γ
JPSjt
Njt
+ φ0∆Wjt + θ0 +
5X
r=2
θrdr +∆εjt (6.6)
Estimating (6.5) by OLS yields unbiased estimates under the assumption that the allo-
cation of JPS funds is not correlated with time variant unobservables. If the geographic
allocation is correlated with important district-level trends that are not captured by the
time dummies or ∆Wjt, then OLS estimates may still be biased. This is not very likely,
given that the BKKBN indices are badly suited for capturing the changes in welfare. Fur-
ther reassurance is given by the fact that we Þnd no correlation between JPS allocation
(per capita) and changes in utilisation from 1997 to 1998.18
The overall impact of the programme is then obtained by taking a population weighted
average of the eﬀects for the districts
JX
j=1
γ
JPSj
Nj
Nj
N
= γJPSj (6.7)
16Java and Bali (region 1) are used as reference group.
17The poverty proÞle is portrayed by the poverty rate (P0) and poverty gap (P1), based on the expen-
diture data from Susenas. As in chapter 5, the povertylines are set such that the average head count for
Indonesia is 24.1% in February 1998 and 27.1% in February 1999 (Suryahadi, Sumarto and Pritchett,
2003).
18See table 6.10 in appendix 6.A.
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where JPSj is the average Þnancial compensation for the health card programme per
person across the country, and J the number of districts.
The estimated impact of the supply impulse on the utilisation of outpatient services
(i.e., the indirect eﬀect) is given by the diﬀerence between the estimate of the average
total eﬀect and the average direct health card. Inserting (6.7) and the estimate of the
direct eﬀect, (6.4), into (6.2) yields an expression for the impact of the general budget
increase for public service providers
γJPSj − pβ = E [Yi (0, JPSj)− Yi (0, 0) | qj = JPSj ] (6.8)
6.3.4 Results
The estimation results of the direct health card eﬀect on outpatient utilisation for health
card owners (β) and the average direct eﬀect (pβ), are given in table 6.4. The estimate
of p is simply the fraction of individuals living in a household that owns a health card.
The table also shows contact rates for outpatient services for the matched intervention
and control groups, and the percentage change relative to the counterfactual. The eﬀects
are estimated for reported utilisation over a one-month reference period.19
Health card ownership resulted in a 1 percentage point increase in the use of outpatient
services, which is a 9.1 percent increase relative to the base counterfactual. This increase
was due to an increase in utilisation from the poorest four quintiles, while for the richer
quintile we only observe a substitution eﬀect from private to public health care providers.
The highest increase, relative to the base, is seen for the third quintile (16.8 percent),
followed by the poorest group (14.2). For all income groups health card ownership resulted
in an increase in the use of public sector services and a decrease in the use of private
sector services. For the richest quintile the two eﬀects cancelled out, as we see a small,
statistically not signiÞcant, increase in overall utilisation. The shift from private to public
care seems to have occurred in both urban and rural areas. The health card programme
aﬀected utilisation amongst women more than it did amongst men, possibly because of the
maternity services covered under the health card programme. Both the overall increase in
outpatient visits and the substitution eﬀect from private to public were larger for women.
19Each year the Core of the Susenas collects utilisation using a one-month reference period. We also
estimated the eﬀects based on a three months reference period, which was used in the 1999 JPS module.
However, these data may partly reßect pre-intervention outcomes, so we need to be careful interpreting
these results. Nevertheless, the estimates show a similar impact as the one-month recall period. These
results are reported in table 6.11 in appendix 6.A.
6.3. IMPACT ON UTILISATION 147
Table 6.4: Impact of health card on utilisation of outpatient services (direct health card eﬀect, one month reference period)
Intervention Control Diﬀerence [s.e.]1 % Change Direct eﬀect p Number of observations
group group (β) (pβ) Intervention Control
All outpatient care
Quintile 1 (poor) 0.0993 0.0869 0.0123 [0.0032]∗∗ 14.2 0.0023 0.184 25,029 20,411
Quintile 2 0.1206 0.1080 0.0126 [0.0040]∗∗ 11.7 0.0017 0.137 19,561 17,905
Quintile 3 0.1333 0.1142 0.0191 [0.0045]∗∗ 16.8 0.0020 0.106 15,658 15,426
Quintile 4 0.1453 0.1292 0.0161 [0.0055]∗∗ 12.4 0.0011 0.071 10,922 12,048
Quintile 5 (rich) 0.1510 0.1451 0.0059 [0.0079] 4.0 0.0002 0.037 5,642 8,090
Male 0.1158 0.1069 0.0089 [0.0030]∗∗ 8.3 0.0009 0.105 38,062 36,641
Female 0.1270 0.1157 0.0113 [0.0029]∗∗ 9.8 0.0012 0.107 38,841 37,345
Urban 0.1392 0.1281 0.0110 [0.0051]∗∗ 8.6 0.0008 0.073 17,888 16,853
Rural 0.1149 0.1061 0.0088 [0.0021]∗∗ 8.3 0.0011 0.128 59,015 57,133
All 0.1215 0.1113 0.0101 [0.0020]∗∗ 9.1 0.0011 0.106 76,903 73,986
Public outpatient care
Quintile 1 (poor) 0.0729 0.0542 0.0187 [0.0026]∗∗ 34.6 0.0035 0.184 25,029 20,411
Quintile 2 0.0784 0.0585 0.0200 [0.0032]∗∗ 34.1 0.0027 0.137 19,561 17,905
Quintile 3 0.0859 0.0575 0.0284 [0.0033]∗∗ 49.3 0.0030 0.106 15,658 15,426
Quintile 4 0.0916 0.0627 0.0289 [0.0043]∗∗ 46.1 0.0020 0.071 10,922 12,048
Quintile 5 (rich) 0.0841 0.0590 0.0251 [0.0057]∗∗ 42.5 0.0009 0.037 5,642 8,090
Male 0.0734 0.0537 0.0197 [0.0021]∗∗ 36.8 0.0021 0.105 38,062 36,641
Female 0.0871 0.0622 0.0249 [0.0022]∗∗ 40.1 0.0027 0.107 38,841 37,345
Urban 0.0869 0.0628 0.0241 [0.0034]∗∗ 38.3 0.0017 0.073 17,888 16,853
Rural 0.0779 0.0565 0.0214 [0.0017]∗∗ 38.0 0.0027 0.128 59,015 57,133
All 0.0804 0.0580 0.0224 [0.0015]∗∗ 38.6 0.0024 0.106 76,903 73,986
Private outpatient care
Quintile 1 (poor) 0.0305 0.0371 -0.0066 [0.0022]∗∗ −17.7 -0.0012 0.184 25,029 20,411
Quintile 2 0.0497 0.0547 -0.0051 [0.0030]∗ −9.3 -0.0007 0.137 19,561 17,905
Quintile 3 0.0571 0.0641 -0.0070 [0.0036]∗∗ −11.0 -0.0007 0.106 15,658 15,426
Quintile 4 0.0655 0.0765 -0.0110 [0.0041]∗∗ −14.4 -0.0008 0.071 10,922 12,048
Quintile 5 (rich) 0.0803 0.0983 -0.0179 [0.0068]∗∗ −18.2 -0.0007 0.037 5,642 8,090
Male 0.0501 0.0601 -0.0100 [0.0023]∗∗ −16.6 -0.0010 0.105 38,062 36,641
Female 0.0477 0.0606 -0.0129 [0.0021]∗∗ −21.3 -0.0014 0.107 38,841 37,345
Urban 0.0613 0.0726 -0.0113 [0.0041]∗∗ −15.5 -0.0008 0.073 17,888 16,853
Rural 0.0442 0.0565 -0.0123 [0.0015]∗∗ −21.7 -0.0016 0.128 59,015 57,133
All 0.0489 0.0604 -0.0115 [0.0015]∗∗ −19.0 -0.0012 0.106 76,903 73,986
1 Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications.
SigniÞcance levels:  : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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Table 6.5 presents the estimates of γ from equation (6.6), and the estimates of the
overall eﬀect of the programme (γJPSj), deÞned in equation (6.7). These estimates are
also based on a one-month reference period. The results indicate an absolute increase
in the use of outpatient services of 0.5 percentage point, which stems mainly from an
increase in the use of public services, as the programme does not seem to aﬀect the
private sector. We Þnd that the eﬀect is larger for the wealthier quintiles. For the Þrst
and third quintiles the estimates are small and not signiÞcant. As with the direct health
card eﬀect, the overall eﬀect of the programme on public services is larger for females than
for males. The programme had the largest impact on the use of public care in rural areas,
while for urban areas the estimates are not precise. Since private care seems unaﬀected,
we Þnd similar results for the overall eﬀect on utilisation.
The indirect eﬀect, which could be attributed to an overall supply or quality impulse
as a result of the extra budget support in the public sector, seems to have been a main
contributor to the increase in the use of public health care services. Combining the
estimates in table 6.5 with those referring to the one month reference period in table 6.4
allows us to investigate what share of the increase in the use of public sector services
is due to the indirect eﬀect (as deÞned in equation (6.8)), and to the direct health card
eﬀect. The share of the indirect eﬀect to the total eﬀect is given by
1− p
β
γJPSj
About 80 percent of the overall increase in utilisation is a result of the indirect eﬀect. In
the public sector about half of the total increase can be attributed to the indirect eﬀect of
the budget increase. The results also suggest that the indirect beneÞts of the programme
increase with income. For the richest quintile only 7 percent of the increased utilisation
of public care can be attributed to the health card itself, while for the poor there is less
clear evidence of an indirect eﬀect. The indirect eﬀect for the poor is smaller, but based
on an imprecise estimate. Finally, the supply impulse had an above average eﬀect in rural
areas, emphasising the shortage of resources with rural public health care providers.
So can the revival of the public sector utilisation be attributed to the Social Safety Net
Programme? It appears to be. The estimates reported in table 6.5 can be used to estimate
the utilisation if the health card programme had not existed. From (6.7) it shows that
the impact on overall utilisation is the estimate of γ times the average compensation to
health care providers (JPSj). The results indicate that health card programme increased
outpatient contact rate by 0.55 percentage point and the contact rate at public facilities
by 0.47 percentage point. Table 6.6 shows the trend in health care utilisation (copied from
6.3. IMPACT ON UTILISATION 149
Table 6.5: Overall eﬀect of JPS interventions (1 month reference period)
Coeﬃcient [s.e.] Overall eﬀect 1 Number of
(γ) (γJPS) districts
All outpatient care
Quintile 1 (poor) 0.0039 [0.0041] 0.0056 290
Quintile 2 0.0073 [0.0038] 0.0105 293
Quintile 3 0.0012 [0.0029] 0.0017 293
Quintile 4 0.0065 [0.0032]∗ 0.0093 293
Quintile 5 (rich) 0.0075 [0.0036]∗ 0.0108 293
Male 0.0037 [0.0022] 0.0053 293
Female 0.0040 [0.0024] 0.0058 293
Urban 0.0045 [0.0048] 0.0064 286
Rural 0.0060 [0.0028]∗ 0.0086 276
All 0.0039 [0.0022] 0.0055 293
Public outpatient care
Quintile 1 (poor) 0.0035 [0.0033] 0.0049 290
Quintile 2 0.0080 [0.0033]∗ 0.0115 293
Quintile 3 −0.0001 [0.0022] −0.0001 293
Quintile 4 0.0059 [0.0023]∗ 0.0085 293
Quintile 5 (rich) 0.0094 [0.0023]∗∗ 0.0134 293
Male 0.0026 [0.0014] 0.0037 293
Female 0.0040 [0.0017]∗ 0.0057 293
Urban 0.0016 [0.0032] 0.0023 286
Rural 0.0053 [0.0020]∗∗ 0.0076 276
All 0.0033 [0.0015]∗ 0.0047 293
Private outpatient care
Quintile 1 (poor) 0.0020 [0.0025] 0.0028 290
Quintile 2 −0.0002 [0.0018] −0.0003 293
Quintile 3 0.0016 [0.0017] 0.0023 293
Quintile 4 0.0004 [0.0020] 0.0006 293
Quintile 5 (rich) −0.0016 [0.0028] −0.0023 293
Male 0.0012 [0.0014] 0.0017 293
Female 0.0005 [0.0014] 0.0008 293
Urban 0.0031 [0.0031] 0.0045 286
Rural 0.0013 [0.0017] 0.0019 276
All 0.0009 [0.0013] 0.0013 293
Note: Detailed estimation results given in tables 6.12 to 6.14 (appendix 6.A).
1 JPS = 1.432 (see table 6.3).
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Table 6.6: Observed trend in outpatient contact rate from 1995 to 1999, and the
counterfactual if the JPS program had not been implemented
Type of provider Observed trend with JPS without JPS
1995 1997 1998 1999 1999
Public 7.00 6.65 5.03 5.34 4.87
Private 6.48 6.71 6.11 5.80 5.67
Modern 12.83 12.83 10.48 10.53 9.98
table 2.5) together with the counterfactual of what would have been public and private
sector utilisation in absence of the health card programme. From 1998 to 1999 the contact
rate for public sector services increased from 5.0 to 5.3 percent, while the contact rate for
modern health care providers remained stable at 10.5 percent. The estimates suggest that
without the health card programme public sector utilisation would have dropped further
to 4.9 percent, and the overall contact rate would have dropped to 10.0 percent.
6.4 Caveats and sensitivity analysis
6.4.1 Crowding out, congestion and interaction eﬀects
The main assumption underlying our study is that utilisation of health card owners is
independent from that of non-health card households. This implies that the number of
health card recipients (i.e. programme intensity) in the region does not aﬀect utilisation
of care for non-recipients, and that both groups enjoy similar beneÞts from JPS budget.
However, if health care supply would be inelastic, then distributing health cards could
lead to congestion and crowding out. For example, if services are delivered to health card
owners according to set standards, resources would be redistributed from non-recipients
to health card recipients. In this case the estimated direct eﬀect of the health card will
be biased upward. The diﬀerence in utilisation would consist of the true health card
eﬀect and the crowding out eﬀect. Alternatively, externalities can manifest themselves
if the direct beneÞts of the health cards do not follow set standards, but are contingent
on the available resources. The quality of care provided to health card owners will then
increase with the JPS budget.
One might argue that external eﬀects due to health card allocation are likely to be
small. Since health card coverage is 11 percent and concentrated among the poor whose
health care demand is typically low, it is unlikely that the programme would seriously
strain the capacity of health care facilities. For example, if we double the utilisation
of public services for health card owners, this will result in 16 percent more outpatient
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visits for a typical public health care facility. The district dummy variables included in
the matching functions do capture programme intensity and the supply shock induced by
the JPS (see table 6.2). Moreover, our estimation method allows for eﬀect heterogeneity
due to regional variation in programme intensity, since we simply average the estimated
impact for all the households with a health card.
Nevertheless, we can test the presence of externalities by controlling for programme
intensity when we estimate the direct eﬀect, and including interaction eﬀects of health
card ownership with the average number of health cards distributed in the district and
the amount of per capita JPS subsidy. Crowding out or congestion would imply that the
interaction eﬀects for programme intensity are statistically signiÞcant. If crowding out or
congestion eﬀects are important, we would expect those to be stronger in areas where the
programme is under funded. These are areas where there are relatively many health cards
distributed in comparison with the budget that is received. We can test this by including
the amount of JPS subsidy per allocated health card as regressor, and interact this with
the health card dummy variable. Statistically signiÞcant interaction eﬀects would indicate
that general equilibrium and external eﬀects are present.
The results in table 6.7 suggest that the estimated direct eﬀect is not biased due
to externalities. SpeciÞcation (1) gives the initial estimates. SpeciÞcations (2) and (3)
include the interaction terms, and control for the fraction of the population with a health
card and the SSN budget per capita allocated to the districts, the sub-district BKKBN
index, and district poverty indicators P0 and P1. It further includes a set of individual
and households characteristics, IDT village and rural area dummies, and the availability
of health facilities in the village. The interaction eﬀects are not statistically signiÞcant for
public and overall outpatient care. For private care, we Þnd a small and weakly signiÞcant
eﬀect only for the SSN subsidy interaction term. This is an interesting Þnding, because
doctors working at public providers in Indonesia often maintain private practices. This
could suggest that in districts with relative SSN budget abundance, some doctors have
used SSN subsidy to treat health card recipients in their private practice. The impact
estimate is robust to diﬀerent speciÞcations. The point estimate for the direct health card
eﬀect on overall utilisation is slightly larger, but still within one standard deviation, while
the substitution eﬀect between public and private is also slightly larger.
6.4.2 Selection on health status
A third problem, and potentially more serious, is that we have not taken account of the
possibility that households may have been selected based on health status. Those with
poor health may have received a health card because of their higher anticipated need while
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Table 6.7: Sensitivity direct eﬀect estimate (one month reference period)
(1) 1 (2) 2 (3) 2 (4) 3
All outpatient care
Health card 0.0101 0.0106 0.0114 0.0081
[0.0020]∗∗ [0.0052]∗∗ [0.0021]∗∗ [0.0020]∗∗
Health card × JPS per capita 0.0034
[0.0025]
Health card × health card coverage -0.0289
[0.0188]
Health card × JPS per health card -0.0001
[0.0000]
Public outpatient care
Health card 0.0224 0.0272 0.0239 0.0201
[0.0015]∗∗ [0.0038]∗∗ [0.0016]∗∗ [0.0016]∗∗
Health card × JPS per capita -0.0015
[0.0019]
Health card × health card coverage -0.0059
[0.0137]
Health card × JPS per health card -0.0000
[0.0000]
Private outpatient care
Health card -0.0115 -0.0140 -0.0109 -0.0117
[0.0015]∗∗ [0.0038]∗∗ [0.0016]∗∗ [0.0015]∗∗
Health card × JPS per capita 0.0035
[0.0019]
Health card × health card coverage -0.0161
[0.0140]
Health card × JPS per health card -0.0001
[0.0001]
Number of observations 150,889 150,889 150,889 151,219
SigniÞcance levels:  : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
1 Original estimates from table 6.4.
2 Probit marginal eﬀects. The sample concerns the same set of individuals from matched
households as in table 6.4. Detailed estimation results are given in tables 6.15 to 6.17
(appendix 6.A).
3 Sensitivity to selection on needs bias. The propensity score function includes a dummy
variable that indicates whether a health complaint has disrupted work, school or daily
activities of a household member. Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications.
Detailed estimation results are given in table 6.18 (appendix 6.A).
6.4. CAVEATS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 153
other  otherwise similar  persons did not receive one. Oﬃcially health cards should have
been distributed based on BKKBN criteria but health status could well have played a role
in the actual distribution. If this is true, not including a measure of health status in the
matching function will result in an intervention group with a worse health status than
the control group. Poor health will, ceteris paribus, increase the demand for health care.
The resulting impact estimate will be larger or equal to the true eﬀect.
The only measure of health status the Susenas collects is self-reported illness. However,
including self-reported illness in the matching function would likely have resulted in an
underestimate of the true health card eﬀect. The evidence indicates that self-reported
illness depends on the aﬀordability of care. We Þnd that the rich report more often ill
compared to the poor, which is surely not a result of the rich having a worse health
status than the poor. If self-reported illness indeed depends on the aﬀordability of health
care, and health care is more aﬀordable for those who own a health card, then matching
on self reported illness will result in a control group with worse health status than the
intervention group. Better health will, ceteris paribus, decrease the demand for primary
health care. Hence our impact estimate would have been an underestimate.
The two impact estimates, obtained without and with including self-reported illness
in the matching function, can give us some notion on the extent of the bias. The health
card eﬀect should lie between the estimate that does control for self-reported illness (lower
bound) and that which does not (upper bound). The results suggest that our estimates
and conclusions are not sensitive to systematic diﬀerences in health status, since the
estimated bounds lie close to each other. We included a dummy variable that indicated
whether a health complaint has disrupted work, school or daily activities for any member
of the household during the last month in the matching function. SpeciÞcation (4) in
table 6.7 gives the results for a one-month reference period. Comparing it with table 6.4,
we see that the estimate for all outpatient care decreases slightly, from 0.0101 to 0.0081.
The point estimates are within one standard deviation. This leads to an upper- and lower
bound for the direct eﬀect of 0.11 to 0.09 percentage point, respectively. The diﬀerence
comes from the change in demand for public care. The estimated eﬀect for private care
remains unchanged.
6.4.3 Total eﬀect
Is the combined eﬀect of the JPS funding and the allocation of health cards, as we deÞned
it in equation (6.1), identiÞed if general equilibrium eﬀects compromise the independence
assumption? It could be, for example, that the indirect eﬀect of the subsidy decreases
if health card allocation is relatively high. Alternatively, there could be districts with a
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high JPS allocation but with a delay in health card distribution at the time of the survey.
Does the variation in JPS budget then adequately capture the total eﬀect, and does this
allow clear interpretation of the indirect eﬀect? To investigate this we added health card
coverage to the model, as well as an interaction term with the JPS variable. If the budget
allocation does not identify the total eﬀect, we expect the results to be sensitive to the
new variables.
Table 6.8: Sensitivity total eﬀect estimate (IV)
(1) 1 (2) (3)
coef. [s.e.] coef. [s.e.] coef. [s.e.]
All outpatient care
JPS per capita 0.0039 [0.0022] 0.0042 [0.0028] 0.0044 [0.0032]
Health card coverage -0.0118 [0.0628]
JPS × health card coverage -0.0054 [0.0244]
Public outpatient care
JPS per capita 0.0033∗ [0.0015] 0.0037 [0.0019] 0.0039 [0.0022]
Health card coverage -0.0159 [0.0421]
JPS × health card coverage -0.0060 [0.0163]
Private outpatient care
JPS per capita 0.0009 [0.0013] 0.0007 [0.0017] 0.0007 [0.0020]
Health card coverage 0.0081 [0.0381]
JPS × health card coverage 0.0020 [0.0148]
Instrumented 2 Health card JPS × health
coverage card coverage
Standard errors in brackets.
SigniÞcance levels:  : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
1 Original estimates from table 6.5.
2 BKKBN pre-prosperous and KS1 indices for December 1997 are used as instruments.
Detailed estimation results are given in table 6.19 (appendix 6.A).
Note that health card allocation data is likely to be endogenous. Unlike the JPS bud-
get, it is not administrative data driven by pre-programme welfare indicators. It reßects
the actual allocation of health cards, which depends on district speciÞc infrastructure,
organisation and welfare characteristics, and is likely to be correlated with the heteroge-
neous eﬀects of the crisis.20 Therefore, we use the BKKBN indices from December 1997
as instruments for health card allocation.21
20A similar issue arises in section 5.4.2 with the estimation of the impact of scholarships on school
enrolment. There it is shown that the assumption of a constant time trend across districts is a prob-
lem when using the actual allocation of scholarships reported in the Susenas. OLS estimates are then
likely to be biased, as time variant unobservables are correlated with regional variation in programme
implementation.
21We use the indices for the two poorest BKKBN classiÞcations (pre-prosperous and KS1). Households
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The results are given in table 6.8 and suggest that our original estimates are fairly
robust and capture the combined eﬀect of the programme. When we add health card
coverage, the coeﬃcients for the JPS grants are a slightly larger and a little less pre-
cise. Neither the coeﬃcient of the health card variable or that of the interaction term is
signiÞcant.
6.5 Conclusion
This chapter presented an impact evaluation of the health card programme as it operated
under the Social Safety Net in its very Þrst months. It shows that in many ways the
programme was a success. In other ways the programme has achieved things which may
not have been the objective at the outset.
The health card programme has a particular design that allows both components of
the programme to be treated as separate interventions, and the eﬀectiveness of a health
care cost waiver to be compared with that of a broadly targeted supply impulse. The
health card entitled households to a price subsidy at public health care providers, while
the facilities that provided the subsidised received budgetary support. However, there is a
weak link between the Þnancial compensation and the provision of free services to health
card recipients. The budgetary support was not conditional on the actual utilisation of
the health cards, but on the expected number of eligible households in the area served by
the health facility.
For all households health card ownership resulted in a large substitution eﬀect away
from the private sector to the public sector, with a net increase in the overall use of
outpatient medical services. A dynamic analysis further indicates that the combined
JPS programme resulted in an increase of the outpatient contact rate at modern health
care providers of 0.55 percentage point. In the event the programme would not have
existed outpatient utilisation would have further fallen in 1999. However, the increased
utilisation due to the direct health card eﬀect only contributes about 20 percent to that.
A considerable proportion of the impact of the programme seems to have been through
the budgetary support for public services. If this is true, the comeback of the public
sector in the provision of outpatient care can be attributed for a large part to the supply
impulse induced by the increased spending under the JPS health programme.
However, the eﬀects of both the direct health card and the supply impulse show a
strong heterogeneous pattern across sub groups of the population. While the targeting
ranked in one of these groups are eligible for a health card. The instruments are not correlated with the
pre-crisis trend. An over-identifying restrictions test further validates the instruments. Detailed results
are given in tables 6.19 and 6.20 in appendix 6.A.
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and impact of the direct health card programme is pro-poor, the total eﬀect is not.
The poor are responsive to a price subsidy but not to a supply impulse. The health card
increased utilisation and led to a substitution eﬀect from private to subsidised public care.
For the non-poor, however, utilisation seems to be mainly supply driven, as the health
card only aﬀected their choice of health care provider without increasing utilisation. This
also points to the potential impact that such programmes can have on the public/private
mix if the design does not take those factors into account.
The impact of the programme has suﬀered from the weak link between reimbursements
for public service providers and utilisation of the health card. Those in the poorest quintile
beneÞted only from the programme if they received a health card, as the results indicate
that they did not beneÞt from the supply impulse. In the end, the non-poor captured most
of the beneÞts of the overall programme. This emphasises that in the absence of clear
incentive mechanisms for health care providers, general increases in public spending are
relatively ineﬀective in reaching the poor. A stronger link between provision of services
and budget would likely have improved the targeting to the poor.
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6.A Supplementary tables
Table 6.9: Propensity score estimations (logit), by region
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Java Sumatra Sulawesi Kalimantan Other
& Bali islands
Female head of household 0.351 0.351 0.268 0.694 -0.101
[0.042]∗∗ [0.076]∗∗ [0.116]∗∗ [0.146]∗∗ [0.112]
Education head of household (reference = not completed)
Primary -0.133 -0.091 0.008 0.010 0.091
[0.027]∗∗ [0.050] [0.077] [0.091] [0.067]
Junior secondary -0.326 -0.240 -0.179 -0.208 0.026
[0.046]∗∗ [0.069]∗∗ [0.113] [0.148] [0.104]
Senior secondary -0.706 -0.474 -0.312 -0.110 -0.089
[0.054]∗∗ [0.079]∗∗ [0.120] [0.160] [0.108]
Higher -1.107 -0.735 -0.438 -0.768 -0.160
[0.115]∗∗ [0.171]∗∗ [0.258] [0.417] [0.207]
Head of household unemployed 0.275 0.277 0.111 -0.274 -0.370
[0.115]∗ [0.264] [0.423] [0.741] [0.399]
Ln(household size) 0.313 0.360 0.284 0.314 0.287
[0.033]∗∗ [0.059]∗∗ [0.091]∗∗ [0.110]∗∗ [0.080]∗∗
Household composition (reference = share of males age 18-60)
Share of males age < 18 0.533 0.296 0.178 0.443 0.779
[0.088]∗∗ [0.158] [0.248] [0.293] [0.221]∗∗
Share of females age < 18 0.567 0.205 -0.100 0.357 0.705
[0.089]∗∗ [0.160] [0.257] [0.298] [0.225]∗∗
Share of females age 18-60 0.299 0.185 0.337 -0.231 0.560
[0.097]∗∗ [0.184] [0.278] [0.330] [0.256]∗
Share of males age > 60 0.419 0.328 0.159 1.302 0.537
[0.094]∗∗ [0.213] [0.320] [0.347]∗∗ [0.272]∗
Share of females age > 60 0.362 0.321 0.677 0.668 0.810
[0.097]∗∗ [0.205] [0.308]∗ [0.351] [0.303]∗∗
BKKBN criteria
Worship -0.000 -0.176 -0.053 0.051 0.603
[0.037] [0.085]∗ [0.105] [0.143] [0.177]∗∗
Food -0.278 -0.264 0.174 -0.528 -0.183
[0.096]∗∗ [0.151] [0.246] [0.211]∗ [0.119]
Clothing -0.178 -0.372 -0.620 -0.753 0.241
Continued on next page...
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
[0.057]∗∗ [0.107]∗∗ [0.159]∗∗ [0.164]∗∗ [0.100]∗∗
Floor -0.201 -0.064 -0.091 -0.676 0.066
[0.041]∗∗ [0.075] [0.125] [0.163]∗∗ [0.089]
Health 0.237 0.367 0.677 0.274 0.321
[0.040]∗∗ [0.075]∗∗ [0.114]∗∗ [0.131]∗ [0.087]∗∗
Main source of subsistence (reference = agriculture)
Mining, quarrying 0.218 0.246 -0.056 -0.264 -0.064
[0.135] [0.184] [0.411] [0.222] [0.548]
Processing industry 0.080 -0.054 0.226 -0.051 0.064
[0.043] [0.107] [0.138] [0.169] [0.165]
Electricity, gas, water -0.397 -0.907 -0.246 0.086
[0.354] [0.726] [1.031] [0.847]
Construction 0.277 0.206 0.299 0.250 0.321
[0.050]∗∗ [0.109] [0.165] [0.199] [0.165]
Trade -0.061 -0.167 -0.093 -0.661 -0.067
[0.035] [0.076]∗ [0.109] [0.170]∗∗ [0.122]
Transport, storage, 0.182 0.069 0.213 -0.212 -0.181
or communication [0.050]∗∗ [0.100] [0.148] [0.217] [0.180]
Finance, real estate -0.196 -0.805 -0.687 -1.021 -0.839
[0.161] [0.463] [0.740] [1.023] [0.755]
Services 0.081 0.075 -0.163 -0.031 -0.027
[0.043] [0.082] [0.131] [0.161] [0.108]
Other -0.017 0.381 0.601 -1.428 0.816
[0.175] [0.318] [0.567] [1.026] [0.852]
Income recipient -0.197 -0.315 -0.394 -0.604 -0.033
[0.054]∗∗ [0.121]∗∗ [0.160]∗ [0.264]∗ [0.165]
Household owns holy book -0.083 0.213 0.071 0.178 0.344
[0.028]∗∗ [0.074]∗∗ [0.100] [0.115] [0.070]∗∗
Status of house (reference = own property)
Lease -0.495 -0.139 -0.301 -0.623 -1.093
[0.090]∗∗ [0.127] [0.262] [0.524] [0.440]∗
Rent -0.561 0.097 -1.263 -0.884 -1.110
[0.123]∗∗ [0.095] [0.466]∗∗ [0.301]∗∗ [0.310]∗∗
Oﬃcial 0.507 0.050 -0.205 -0.569 -0.271
[0.131]∗∗ [0.139] [0.340] [0.334] [0.182]
Free 0.055 0.141 0.064 -0.221 0.193
[0.065] [0.095] [0.152] [0.234] [0.170]
Continued on next page...
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Other 0.030 0.233 0.607 -0.327 0.072
[0.103] [0.158] [0.202]∗∗ [0.342] [0.233]
Type of roof (reference = concrete
Corrugated tile 0.066 -0.368 -0.256 -1.098 -0.985
[0.113] [0.169]∗ [0.320] [0.504]∗ [0.276]∗∗
Shingle roof -0.344 -0.072 0.348 -0.964 -1.111
[0.323] [0.267] [0.423] [0.477]∗ [0.589]
Iron sheeting -0.080 -0.376 -0.223 -0.819 -0.552
[0.133] [0.160]∗ [0.267] [0.476] [0.269]∗
Asbestos 0.006 -0.078 -0.385 -2.108 -0.725
[0.178] [0.259] [0.502] [0.855]∗ [0.455]
Sugar palm Þbre 0.085 -0.481 -0.136 -0.004 -0.434
[0.322] [0.354] [0.363] [0.609] [0.493]
Leaves, other -0.097 0.043 0.194 -0.569 -0.795
[0.158] [0.172] [0.279] [0.479] [0.273]∗∗
Type of wall (reference = brick)
Wood 0.162 0.438 0.264 0.492 0.568
[0.036]∗∗ [0.059]∗∗ [0.107] [0.227]∗ [0.102]∗∗
Bamboo 0.522 0.600 0.461 0.805 0.270
[0.034]∗∗ [0.097]∗∗ [0.126]∗∗ [0.320]∗ [0.091]∗∗
Other 0.242 0.191 0.243 0.453 0.338
[0.145] [0.196] [0.162] [0.250] [0.100]∗∗
Type of ßoor (reference = marble, ceramic)
Floor tile 0.460 0.152 0.125 -0.257 0.624
[0.059]∗∗ [0.200] [0.372] [0.531] [0.349]
Cement plaster 0.901 0.405 0.869 0.391 0.604
[0.057]∗∗ [0.151]∗∗ [0.308]∗∗ [0.436] [0.270]∗
Wood 0.810 0.240 0.602 -0.007 0.506
[0.101]∗∗ [0.162] [0.321] [0.420] [0.293]
Bamboo 1.070 0.430 0.977 0.158 0.514
[0.100]∗∗ [0.247] [0.349]∗∗ [0.566] [0.319]
Earth 1.137 0.575 1.073 0.443 0.817
[0.070]∗∗ [0.176]∗∗ [0.337]∗∗ [0.477] [0.286]∗∗
Other 0.138 0.515 0.167 1.401 1.398
[0.234] [0.561] [0.578] [0.611]∗ [0.325]∗∗
Source drinking of water (reference = bottled water)
Tap -0.402 0.064 0.540 1.343 0.288
Continued on next page...
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
[0.167]∗ [0.305] [0.487] [1.056] [0.515]
Pump -0.476 0.223 -0.347 0.777 0.538
[0.181]∗∗ [0.338] [0.534] [1.144] [0.560]
Protected well -0.462 0.282 0.318 0.855 0.150
[0.180]∗ [0.323] [0.518] [1.143] [0.558]
Unprotected well -0.346 0.097 0.463 0.829 0.617
[0.182] [0.325] [0.522] [1.139] [0.558]
Protected spring -0.393 0.396 0.631 -0.705 0.190
[0.181]∗ [0.327] [0.518] [1.227] [0.556]
Unprotected spring -0.457 0.013 0.063 0.680 0.415
[0.184]∗ [0.333] [0.538] [1.202] [0.557]
River -0.182 0.104 -0.132 0.563 0.120
[0.205] [0.326] [0.560] [1.135] [0.561]
Rain water, other -0.202 0.532 -0.046 0.461 -0.339
[0.194] [0.332] [0.547] [1.139] [0.570]
Do not purchase drinking water 0.106 -0.069 0.236 0.502 -0.041
[0.071] [0.116] [0.188] [0.433] [0.214]
Drinking water facility (reference = private)
Shared 0.251 0.256 0.161 0.216 0.316
[0.029]∗∗ [0.059]∗∗ [0.085] [0.136] [0.090]∗∗
Public 0.061 0.259 -0.186 -0.172 0.457
[0.037] [0.072]∗∗ [0.106] [0.154] [0.091]∗∗
None 0.081 0.192 0.241 0.476 0.459
[0.059] [0.087]∗ [0.141] [0.134]∗∗ [0.127]∗∗
Source of light (reference = PLN electricity)
Non-PLN electricity -0.199 -0.173 0.667 -1.143 0.265
[0.124] [0.114] [0.200]∗∗ [0.378]∗∗ [0.166]
Pump lantern -0.073 0.160 0.431 0.286 0.559
[0.097] [0.078]∗ [0.120]∗∗ [0.176] [0.137]∗∗
Oil lamp 0.019 0.308 0.131 0.183 0.145
[0.043] [0.061]∗∗ [0.095] [0.100] [0.080]
Other -0.221 0.008 -0.098 -0.068 -0.048
[0.247] [0.248] [0.459] [0.421] [0.189]
Toilet facilities (reference = private)
Shared 0.061 -0.000 0.078 0.596 -0.007
[0.039] [0.083] [0.115] [0.138]∗∗ [0.115]
Public 0.320 0.419 0.639 0.755 0.213
Continued on next page...
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
[0.051]∗∗ [0.085]∗∗ [0.167]∗∗ [0.151]∗∗ [0.152]
Other 0.228 0.151 0.028 -0.115 0.237
[0.048]∗∗ [0.077] [0.130] [0.137] [0.103]∗
Toilet disposal (reference = septic tank)
Pond, rice Þeld -0.045 0.417 -0.015 -0.005 0.793
[0.063] [0.123]∗∗ [0.260] [0.494] [0.277]∗∗
River, lake, sea 0.200 0.218 0.303 0.496 0.180
[0.049]∗∗ [0.085]∗∗ [0.147]∗ [0.168]∗∗ [0.133]
Hole 0.220 0.306 0.139 0.233 0.441
[0.036]∗∗ [0.071]∗∗ [0.099] [0.156] [0.098]∗∗
Shore, open Þeld 0.363 0.209 0.291 0.519 0.168
[0.072]∗∗ [0.112] [0.142]∗ [0.217]∗ [0.133]
Other 0.016 0.195 0.029 0.460 0.297
[0.089] [0.111] [0.185] [0.239] [0.140]∗
Village characteristics
IDT village 0.066 0.205 0.103 -0.071 0.034
[0.030]∗ [0.056]∗∗ [0.082] [0.093] [0.096]
Rural area -0.159 0.243 -0.095 -0.194 0.235
[0.039]∗∗ [0.084]∗∗ [0.123] [0.186] [0.111]∗
Nr. of Puskesmas 0.004 -0.011 0.051 -0.046 -0.113
[0.031] [0.061] [0.091] [0.102] [0.070]
Nr. of supporting Puskesmas -0.186 -0.058 -0.051 -0.127 -0.311
[0.025]∗∗ [0.041] [0.067] [0.073] [0.057]∗∗
Nr. of Polindes -0.016 -0.137 -0.094 0.072 -0.258
[0.028] [0.051]∗∗ [0.094] [0.088] [0.081]∗∗
Nr. doctors per 0.236 0.131 -0.174 -0.037 0.080
1,000 inhabitant [0.037]∗∗ [0.046]∗∗ [0.108] [0.152] [0.048]
Nr. village midwifes per 0.326 0.193 -0.002 0.366 0.116
1,000 inhabitants [0.067] [0.032]∗∗ [0.110] [0.081]∗∗ [0.048]∗
Majority of inter village -0.942 0.651 0.182 0.417 0.075
traﬃc by land [0.378]∗ [0.119]∗∗ [0.190] [0.112]∗∗ [0.134]
Health facilities easy or 0.064 -0.117 -0.293 0.036 0.236
very easy to reach [0.061] [0.070] [0.115]∗ [0.125] [0.087]∗∗
Education head of village (reference = not completed)
Primary -0.217 -0.375 0.015 1.189 0.499
[0.140] [0.141]∗∗ [0.311] [0.274]∗∗ [0.154]∗∗
Junior secondary -0.159 -0.516 0.228 1.025 0.226
Continued on next page...
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
[0.140] [0.141]∗∗ [0.295] [0.277]∗∗ [0.158]
Senior secondary -0.117 -0.471 0.208 0.818 0.259
[0.139] [0.140]∗∗ [0.293] [0.280]∗∗ [0.160]
Higher -0.176 -0.420 0.365 0.774 0.472
[0.141] [0.156]∗∗ [0.301] [0.327]∗ [0.179]∗∗
BKKBN rate per sub-district 0.892 0.835 0.358 0.893 0.114
[0.085]∗∗ [0.162]∗∗ [0.292] [0.294]∗∗ [0.185]
Constant -2.201 -3.783 -4.565 -4.503 -6.587
[0.493]∗∗ [0.491]∗∗ [0.798]∗∗ [1.300]∗∗ [0.777]∗∗
District Þxed eﬀects yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 87,061 43,381 23,779 15,697 22,441
Pseudo R-squared 0.20 0.12 0.17 0.15 0.26
Robust standard errors in brackets.
SigniÞcance levels:  : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Table 6.10: Exogeneity of JPS budget data with respect to the trend in utilisation 1997
- 1998 (OLS; dependent variable: change in contact rate in districts)
(1) (2) (3)
All Public Private
outpatient outpatient outpatient
JPS budget per capita per district -0.0013 -0.0014 0.00003
[0.0020] [0.0013] [0.00116]
Constant -0.0252 -0.0162 -0.0077
[0.0038]∗∗ [0.0026]∗∗ [0.0023]∗∗
Observations 292 292 292
R-squared 0.0015 0.0036 0.0000
F-test model (Prob > F) 0.5081 0.3098 0.9803
Standard errors in brackets.
SigniÞcance levels:  : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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Table 6.11: Impact of health card on utilisation of outpatient services (direct health card eﬀect, 3 month reference period)
Intervention Control Diﬀerence [s.e.]1 % Change Direct eﬀect p Number of observations
group group (β) (pβ) Intervention Control
All outpatient care
Quintile 1 (poor) 0.1264 0.1110 0.0153 [0.0036]∗∗ 13.8 0.0028 0.185 24,901 20,283
Quintile 2 0.1475 0.1362 0.0113 [0.0045]∗∗ 8.3 0.0015 0.137 19,447 17,825
Quintile 3 0.1592 0.1420 0.0172 [0.0049]∗∗ 12.1 0.0018 0.106 15,582 15,347
Quintile 4 0.1767 0.1598 0.0170 [0.0061]∗∗ 10.6 0.0012 0.071 10,866 11,997
Quintile 5 (rich) 0.1773 0.1754 0.0019 [0.0084]∗∗ 1.1 0.0001 0.037 5,586 8,040
Male 0.1409 0.1325 0.0083 [0.0032]∗∗ 6.3 0.0009 0.105 37,854 36,437
Female 0.1566 0.1454 0.0111 [0.0033]∗∗ 7.6 0.0012 0.108 38,619 37,161
Urban 0.1615 0.1514 0.0101 [0.0049]∗∗ 6.7 0.0007 0.072 17,780 16,761
Rural 0.1440 0.1352 0.0089 [0.0025]∗∗ 6.6 0.0011 0.128 58,693 56,837
All 0.1488 0.1391 0.0098 [0.0022]∗∗ 7.0 0.0010 0.106 76,473 73,598
Public outpatient care
Quintile 1 (poor) 0.0950 0.0710 0.0240 [0.0031]∗∗ 33.9 0.0044 0.185 24,901 20,283
Quintile 2 0.1000 0.0755 0.0245 [0.0035]∗∗ 32.4 0.0034 0.137 19,447 17,825
Quintile 3 0.1056 0.0762 0.0293 [0.0039]∗∗ 38.5 0.0031 0.106 15,582 15,347
Quintile 4 0.1115 0.0820 0.0296 [0.0047]∗∗ 36.1 0.0021 0.071 10,866 11,997
Quintile 5 (rich) 0.1146 0.0731 0.0414 [0.0063]∗∗ 56.7 0.0015 0.037 5,586 8,040
Male 0.0922 0.0697 0.0225 [0.0024]∗∗ 32.3 0.0024 0.105 37,854 36,437
Female 0.1118 0.0810 0.0308 [0.0027]∗∗ 38.1 0.0033 0.108 38,619 37,161
Urban 0.1030 0.0734 0.0296 [0.0038]∗∗ 40.4 0.0021 0.072 17,780 16,761
Rural 0.1018 0.0760 0.0258 [0.0020]∗∗ 34.0 0.0033 0.128 58,693 56,837
All 0.1021 0.0754 0.0268 [0.0018]∗∗ 35.5 0.0028 0.106 76,473 73,598
Private outpatient care
Quintile 1 (poor) 0.0313 0.0400 -0.0087 [0.0021]∗∗ −21.8 -0.0016 0.185 24,901 20,283
Quintile 2 0.0475 0.0608 -0.0132 [0.0031]∗∗ −21.7 -0.0018 0.137 19,447 17,825
Quintile 3 0.0537 0.0658 -0.0121 [0.0034]∗∗ −18.4 -0.0013 0.106 15,582 15,347
Quintile 4 0.0652 0.0778 -0.0126 [0.0042]∗∗ −16.2 -0.0009 0.071 10,866 11,997
Quintile 5 (rich) 0.0627 0.1023 -0.0396 [0.0068]∗∗ −38.7 -0.0015 0.037 5,586 8,040
Male 0.0486 0.0629 -0.0142 [0.0023]∗∗ −22.6 -0.0015 0.105 37,854 36,437
Female 0.0447 0.0645 -0.0197 [0.0022]∗∗ −30.6 -0.0021 0.108 38,619 37,161
Urban 0.0585 0.0780 -0.0195 [0.0039]∗∗ −25.0 -0.0014 0.072 17,780 16,761
Rural 0.0422 0.0592 -0.0169 [0.0016]∗∗ −28.6 -0.0022 0.128 58,693 56,837
All 0.0467 0.0637 -0.0170 [0.0014]∗∗ −26.7 -0.0018 0.106 76,473 73,598
1 Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications.
SigniÞcance levels:  : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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Table 6.12: Total eﬀect of JPS budget allocation on change in use of outpatient care (public and private)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
All Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Male Female Urban Rural
JPS budget per capita 0.0039 0.0039 0.0073 0.0012 0.0065 0.0075 0.0037 0.0040 0.0045 0.0060
[0.0022] [0.0041] [0.0038] [0.0029] [0.0032]∗ [0.0036]∗ [0.0022] [0.0024] [0.0048] [0.0028]∗
Diﬀ. age -0.0028 -0.0023 -0.0109 0.0004 -0.0030 0.0002 -0.0047 -0.0007 0.0044 -0.0011
[0.0031] [0.0059] [0.0053]∗ [0.0041] [0.0045] [0.0051] [0.0032] [0.0034] [0.0061] [0.0040]
Diﬀ. household size 0.0073 -0.0056 -0.0394 -0.0025 0.0185 0.0144 0.0059 0.0089 -0.0140 0.0153
[0.0121] [0.0230] [0.0207] [0.0158] [0.0175] [0.0200] [0.0123] [0.0130] [0.0233] [0.0155]
Diﬀ. % rural population 0.0032 0.0600 0.0107 -0.0409 0.0112 0.0792 -0.0042 0.0103 -0.0069 0.0078
[0.0306] [0.0601] [0.0522] [0.0399] [0.0441] [0.0504] [0.0310] [0.0329] [0.0636] [0.0381]
Diﬀ. population -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
Diﬀ. poverty rate -0.0065 -0.0200 0.0375 0.0436 0.0172 0.0281 -0.0074 -0.0060 -0.0193 -0.0187
[0.0182] [0.0339] [0.0310] [0.0237] [0.0262] [0.0299] [0.0184] [0.0195] [0.0350] [0.0228]
Diﬀ. poverty gap 0.0387 -0.0121 0.0330 0.0579 0.0554 0.0445 0.0272 0.0495 0.0245 0.0302
[0.0159]∗ [0.0300] [0.0272] [0.0208]∗∗ [0.0230]∗ [0.0263] [0.0161] [0.0172]∗∗ [0.0306] [0.0205]
Sumatra 0.0001 -0.0062 -0.0038 0.0035 -0.0016 -0.0070 0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0129 0.0032
[0.0049] [0.0092] [0.0083] [0.0064] [0.0071] [0.0081] [0.0050] [0.0053] [0.0093] [0.0063]
Sulawesi -0.0203 -0.0156 -0.0182 -0.0178 -0.0274 -0.0202 -0.0168 -0.0236 -0.0307 -0.0192
[0.0063]∗∗ [0.0118] [0.0108] [0.0082]∗ [0.0091]∗∗ [0.0104] [0.0064]∗∗ [0.0068]∗∗ [0.0122]∗ [0.0081]∗
Kalimantan -0.0044 0.0013 -0.0036 -0.0047 0.0044 -0.0111 -0.0039 -0.0050 -0.0060 0.0021
[0.0067] [0.0125] [0.0114] [0.0087] [0.0096] [0.0110] [0.0068] [0.0072] [0.0129] [0.0084]
Other islands 0.0041 -0.0134 -0.0139 0.0105 -0.0068 -0.0135 0.0041 0.0044 -0.0259 0.0017
[0.0080] [0.0151] [0.0137] [0.0105] [0.0116] [0.0133] [0.0081] [0.0087] [0.0157] [0.0101]
Constant -0.0151 0.0087 -0.0173 -0.0281 -0.0301 -0.0279 -0.0103 -0.0197 -0.0103 -0.0155
[0.0087] [0.0164] [0.0148] [0.0113]∗ [0.0125]∗ [0.0143] [0.0088] [0.0094]∗ [0.0170] [0.0112]
Observations 293 290 293 293 293 293 293 293 286 276
R-squared 0.08 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.03 0.06
Standard errors in brackets.
SigniÞcance levels:  : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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Table 6.13: Total eﬀect of JPS budget allocation on change in use of public outpatient care
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
All Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Male Female Urban Rural
JPS budget per capita 0.0033 0.0035 0.0080 -0.0001 0.0059 0.0094 0.0026 0.0040 0.0016 0.0053
[0.0015]∗ [0.0033] [0.0033]∗ [0.0022] [0.0023]∗ [0.0023]∗∗ [0.0014] [0.0017]∗ [0.0032] [0.0020]∗∗
Diﬀ. age -0.0028 -0.0022 -0.0122 -0.0019 -0.0035 -0.0012 -0.0038 -0.0017 -0.0019 -0.0005
[0.0021] [0.0047] [0.0047]∗ [0.0031] [0.0033] [0.0032] [0.0020] [0.0024] [0.0041] [0.0028]
Diﬀ. household size 0.0029 -0.0088 -0.0353 -0.0079 0.0075 -0.0032 0.0033 0.0029 -0.0127 0.0119
[0.0081] [0.0184] [0.0184] [0.0119] [0.0127] [0.0125] [0.0077] [0.0092] [0.0156] [0.0110]
Diﬀ. % rural population 0.0252 0.0787 0.0246 -0.0555 0.0476 0.1037 0.0075 0.0426 -0.0136 -0.0015
[0.0203] [0.0481] [0.0464] [0.0300] [0.0321] [0.0314]∗∗ [0.0194] [0.0233] [0.0427] [0.0271]
Diﬀ. population 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
Diﬀ. poverty rate 0.0082 -0.0058 0.0077 0.0407 0.0082 0.0034 0.0047 0.0114 -0.0070 0.0100
[0.0121] [0.0272] [0.0275] [0.0178]∗ [0.0191] [0.0186] [0.0115] [0.0138] [0.0235] [0.0163]
Diﬀ. poverty gap 0.0356 -0.0027 0.0174 0.0476 0.0366 0.0133 0.0240 0.0464 0.0179 0.0343
[0.0106]∗∗ [0.0240] [0.0242] [0.0156]∗∗ [0.0167]∗ [0.0164] [0.0101]∗ [0.0122]∗∗ [0.0205] [0.0146]∗
Sumatra -0.0015 -0.0005 -0.0099 0.0024 0.0006 -0.0055 -0.0030 0.0000 -0.0157 0.0039
[0.0032] [0.0074] [0.0074] [0.0048] [0.0051] [0.0050] [0.0031] [0.0037] [0.0062]∗ [0.0045]
Sulawesi -0.0153 -0.0121 -0.0186 -0.0151 -0.0203 -0.0171 -0.0136 -0.0170 -0.0236 -0.0153
[0.0042]∗∗ [0.0094] [0.0096] [0.0062]∗ [0.0066]∗∗ [0.0065]∗∗ [0.0040]∗∗ [0.0048]∗∗ [0.0082]∗∗ [0.0057]∗∗
Kalimantan 0.0013 0.0066 -0.0003 -0.0007 0.0053 -0.0033 0.0008 0.0017 -0.0037 0.0052
[0.0044] [0.0100] [0.0101] [0.0066] [0.0070] [0.0069] [0.0042] [0.0051] [0.0087] [0.0060]
Other islands -0.0011 -0.0122 -0.0214 0.0019 -0.0137 -0.0277 0.0003 -0.0023 -0.0269 -0.0005
[0.0053] [0.0121] [0.0122] [0.0079] [0.0084] [0.0083]∗∗ [0.0051] [0.0061] [0.0105]∗ [0.0072]
Constant -0.0128 0.0054 -0.0055 -0.0180 -0.0170 -0.0125 -0.0071 -0.0182 -0.0007 -0.0192
[0.0058]∗ [0.0131] [0.0132] [0.0085]∗ [0.0091] [0.0089] [0.0055] [0.0066]∗∗ [0.0114] [0.0079]∗
Observations 293 290 293 293 293 293 293 293 286 276
R-squared 0.11 0.02 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.06 0.09
Standard errors in brackets.
SigniÞcance levels:  : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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Table 6.14: Total eﬀect of JPS budget allocation on change in use of private outpatient care
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
All Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Male Female Urban Rural
JPS budget per capita 0.0009 0.0020 -0.0002 0.0016 0.0004 -0.0016 0.0012 0.0005 0.0031 0.0013
[0.0013] [0.0025] [0.0018] [0.0017] [0.0020] [0.0028] [0.0014] [0.0014] [0.0031] [0.0017]
Diﬀ. age -0.0000 -0.0019 -0.0004 0.0039 0.0012 0.0004 -0.0012 0.0012 0.0065 -0.0004
[0.0019] [0.0035] [0.0026] [0.0024] [0.0029] [0.0040] [0.0020] [0.0020] [0.0039] [0.0025]
Diﬀ. household size 0.0085 0.0017 -0.0026 0.0106 0.0158 0.0257 0.0085 0.0085 0.0045 0.0064
[0.0074] [0.0137] [0.0101] [0.0095] [0.0111] [0.0156] [0.0078] [0.0077] [0.0148] [0.0096]
Diﬀ. % rural population -0.0269 -0.0061 -0.0141 0.0119 -0.0370 -0.0289 -0.0285 -0.0253 -0.0002 0.0103
[0.0187] [0.0358] [0.0255] [0.0240] [0.0280] [0.0394] [0.0197] [0.0195] [0.0404] [0.0236]
Diﬀ. population -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]∗∗ [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
Diﬀ. poverty rate -0.0195 -0.0219 0.0267 0.0054 0.0086 0.0158 -0.0178 -0.0213 -0.0153 -0.0352
[0.0111] [0.0202] [0.0151] [0.0142] [0.0166] [0.0234] [0.0117] [0.0116] [0.0222] [0.0142]∗
Diﬀ. poverty gap 0.0039 -0.0256 0.0194 0.0191 0.0262 0.0265 0.0027 0.0052 0.0012 -0.0033
[0.0097] [0.0179] [0.0133] [0.0125] [0.0146] [0.0206] [0.0103] [0.0102] [0.0194] [0.0127]
Sumatra 0.0017 -0.0038 0.0054 0.0014 -0.0017 -0.0014 0.0034 -0.0000 0.0025 -0.0004
[0.0030] [0.0055] [0.0041] [0.0038] [0.0045] [0.0063] [0.0032] [0.0031] [0.0059] [0.0039]
Sulawesi -0.0061 -0.0028 -0.0015 -0.0044 -0.0090 -0.0045 -0.0044 -0.0079 -0.0108 -0.0053
[0.0039] [0.0070] [0.0053] [0.0049] [0.0058] [0.0082] [0.0041] [0.0040] [0.0078] [0.0050]
Kalimantan -0.0063 -0.0042 -0.0030 -0.0056 -0.0001 -0.0065 -0.0054 -0.0073 -0.0034 -0.0037
[0.0041] [0.0074] [0.0056] [0.0052] [0.0061] [0.0086] [0.0043] [0.0043] [0.0082] [0.0052]
Other islands 0.0069 -0.0023 0.0072 0.0101 0.0101 0.0187 0.0068 0.0070 0.0024 0.0030
[0.0049] [0.0090] [0.0067] [0.0063] [0.0074] [0.0104] [0.0052] [0.0051] [0.0100] [0.0063]
Constant -0.0029 0.0086 -0.0134 -0.0159 -0.0175 -0.0141 -0.0028 -0.0031 -0.0078 0.0027
[0.0053] [0.0098] [0.0072] [0.0068]∗ [0.0080]∗ [0.0112] [0.0056] [0.0056] [0.0108] [0.0069]
Observations 293 290 293 293 293 293 293 293 286 276
R-squared 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.04
Standard errors in brackets.
SigniÞcance levels:  : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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Table 6.15: Sensitivity direct eﬀect estimate, outpatient care (one month recall; probit
marginal eﬀects
(1) (2) (3)
Health card 0.0109∗∗ 0.0106∗ 0.0114∗∗
[0.0020] [0.0052] [0.0021]
Health card × JPS per capita 0.0034
[0.0025]
Health card × health card coverage -0.0289
[0.0188]
Health card × JPS per health card -0.0001
[0.0000]
Age 0.0007∗∗ 0.0007∗∗ 0.0007∗∗
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]
Female 0.0075∗∗ 0.0075∗∗ 0.0076∗∗
[0.0020] [0.0020] [0.0020]
Female head of household -0.0115∗∗ -0.0115∗∗ -0.0116∗∗
[0.0031] [0.0031] [0.0031]
Education head of household
Primary -0.0025 -0.0025 -0.0027
[0.0022] [0.0022] [0.0022]
Junior secondary 0.0069 0.0069 0.0063
[0.0042] [0.0042] [0.0042]
Senior secondary 0.0103∗ 0.0102∗ 0.0095∗
[0.0044] [0.0044] [0.0044]
Higher 0.0489∗ 0.0486∗ 0.0472∗
[0.0211] [0.0211] [0.0207]
Ln(household size) -0.0381∗∗ -0.0380∗∗ -0.0382∗∗
[0.0026] [0.0026] [0.0026]
BKKBN criteria
Worship 0.0126∗∗ 0.0125∗∗ 0.0130∗∗
[0.0030] [0.0030] [0.0030]
Food -0.0086 -0.0088 -0.0075
[0.0076] [0.0076] [0.0075]
Clothing 0.0061 0.0061 0.0084
Continued on next page...
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... table 6.15 continued
(1) (2) (3)
[0.0047] [0.0047] [0.0047]
Floor 0.0024 0.0024 -0.0005
[0.0022] [0.0022] [0.0023]
Health 0.0494∗∗ 0.0493∗∗ 0.0505∗∗
[0.0028] [0.0028] [0.0028]
Agriculture main source of income -0.0220∗∗ -0.0220∗∗ -0.0224∗∗
[0.0023] [0.0023] [0.0023]
Village characteristics
Rural area -0.0102∗∗ -0.0103∗∗ -0.0080∗∗
[0.0031] [0.0030] [0.0030]
IDT village -0.0037 -0.0036 -0.0019
[0.0023] [0.0023] [0.0022]
Nr. of Puskesmas 0.0119∗∗ 0.0119∗∗ 0.0109∗∗
[0.0025] [0.0025] [0.0025]
Nr. of supporting Puskesmas 0.0081∗∗ 0.0081∗∗ 0.0073∗∗
[0.0020] [0.0020] [0.0020]
BKKBN rate per sub-district -0.0269∗∗ -0.0270∗∗ 0.0014
[0.0060] [0.0060] [0.0053]
JPS per capita in district 0.0126∗∗ 0.0112∗∗
[0.0016] [0.0020]
Health card coverage in district 0.1059∗∗ 0.1195∗∗
[0.0109] [0.0146]
JPS per health card in district 0.0000
[0.0000]
Poverty rate in district -0.0179∗∗ -0.0181∗∗ 0.0139∗
[0.0067] [0.0067] [0.0060]
Poverty gap in district -0.0041 -0.0029 0.0277∗∗
[0.0106] [0.0106] [0.0103]
Observations 150,889 150,889 150,424
Pseudo R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.01
Standard errors in brackets.
SigniÞcance levels:  : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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Table 6.16: Sensitivity direct eﬀect estimate, public care (one month recall; probit
marginal eﬀects
(1) (2) (3)
Health card 0.0235∗∗ 0.0272∗∗ 0.0239∗∗
[0.0015] [0.0038] [0.0016]
Health card × JPS per capita -0.0015
[0.0019]
Health card × health card coverage -0.0059
[0.0137]
Health card × JPS per health card -0.0000
[0.0000]
Age 0.0002∗∗ 0.0002∗∗ 0.0002∗∗
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
Female 0.0097∗∗ 0.0097∗∗ 0.0097∗∗
[0.0015] [0.0015] [0.0015]
Female head of household -0.0065∗∗ -0.0065∗∗ -0.0065∗∗
[0.0024] [0.0024] [0.0024]
Education head of household
Primary -0.0040∗ -0.0040∗ -0.0043∗
[0.0017] [0.0017] [0.0017]
Junior secondary 0.0003 0.0002 0.0001
[0.0030] [0.0030] [0.0030]
Senior secondary -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0011
[0.0032] [0.0032] [0.0032]
Higher -0.0229∗∗ -0.0229∗∗ -0.0227∗∗
[0.0059] [0.0059] [0.0060]
Ln(household size) -0.0234∗∗ -0.0234∗∗ -0.0233∗∗
[0.0020] [0.0020] [0.0020]
BKKBN criteria
Worship 0.0154∗∗ 0.0153∗∗ 0.0161∗∗
[0.0022] [0.0022] [0.0022]
Food -0.0133∗ -0.0132∗ -0.0137∗
[0.0062] [0.0062] [0.0062]
Clothing -0.0039 -0.0039 -0.0028
Continued on next page...
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... table 6.16 continued
(1) (2) (3)
[0.0040] [0.0039] [0.0039]
Floor 0.0044∗∗ 0.0044∗ 0.0029
[0.0017] [0.0017] [0.0017]
Health 0.0307∗∗ 0.0307∗∗ 0.0311∗∗
[0.0021] [0.0021] [0.0021]
Agriculture main source of income -0.0125∗∗ -0.0125∗∗ -0.0124∗∗
[0.0017] [0.0017] [0.0018]
Village characteristics
Rural area -0.0027 -0.0027 -0.0006
[0.0023] [0.0023] [0.0022]
IDT village 0.0021 0.0020 0.0043∗
[0.0017] [0.0017] [0.0017]
Nr. of Puskesmas 0.0098∗∗ 0.0098∗∗ 0.0094∗∗
[0.0019] [0.0019] [0.0019]
Nr. of supporting Puskesmas 0.0118∗∗ 0.0119∗∗ 0.0116∗∗
[0.0015] [0.0015] [0.0015]
BKKBN rate per sub-district -0.0199∗∗ -0.0198∗∗ -0.0015
[0.0041] [0.0041] [0.0038]
JPS per capita in district 0.0119∗∗ 0.0125∗∗
[0.0012] [0.0015]
Health card coverage in district 0.0470∗∗ 0.0507∗∗
[0.0077] [0.0114]
JPS per health card in district 0.0000
[0.0000]
Poverty rate in district -0.0087 -0.0090 0.0142∗∗
[0.0051] [0.0051] [0.0045]
Poverty gap in district 0.0261∗∗ 0.0258∗∗ 0.0474∗∗
[0.0077] [0.0077] [0.0076]
Observations 150,889 150,889 150,424
Pseudo R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.01
Standard errors in brackets.
SigniÞcance levels:  : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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Table 6.17: Sensitivity direct eﬀect estimate, private care (one month recall; probit
marginal eﬀects
(1) (2) (3)
Health card -0.0113∗∗ -0.0140∗∗ -0.0109∗∗
[0.0015] [0.0038]  [0.0016]
Health card × JPS per capita 0.0035
[0.0019]
Health card × health card coverage -0.0161
[0.0140]
Health card × JPS per health card -0.0001
[0.0001]
Age 0.0006∗∗ 0.0006∗∗ 0.0006∗∗
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
Female -0.0022 -0.0022 -0.0022
[0.0014] [0.0014] [0.0014]
Female head of household -0.0072∗∗ -0.0073∗∗ -0.0073∗∗
[0.0021] [0.0021] [0.0021]
Education head of household
Primary 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009
[0.0016] [0.0016] [0.0016]
Junior secondary 0.0057 0.0057 0.0053
[0.0032] [0.0032] [0.0032]
Senior secondary 0.0117∗∗ 0.0117∗∗ 0.0110∗∗
[0.0033] [0.0033] [0.0033]
Higher 0.0685∗∗ 0.0682∗∗ 0.0666∗∗
[0.0210] [0.0210] [0.0206]
Ln(household size) -0.0184∗∗ -0.0183∗∗ -0.0186∗∗
[0.0018] [0.0018] [0.0018]
BKKBN criteria
Worship -0.0017 -0.0017 -0.0020
[0.0022] [0.0022] [0.0022]
Food 0.0034 0.0032 0.0044
[0.0049] [0.0049] [0.0048]
Clothing 0.0106∗∗ 0.0106∗∗ 0.0117∗∗
Continued on next page...
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... table 6.17 continued
(1) (2) (3)
[0.0031] [0.0031] [0.0031]
Floor -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0027
[0.0016] [0.0016] [0.0016]
Health 0.0210∗∗ 0.0210∗∗ 0.0218∗∗
[0.0020] [0.0020] [0.0019]
Agriculture main source of income -0.0118∗∗ -0.0118∗∗ -0.0123∗∗
[0.0016] [0.0016] [0.0016]
Village characteristics
Rural area -0.0076∗∗ -0.0077∗∗ -0.0074∗∗
[0.0022] [0.0022] [0.0023]
IDT village -0.0061∗∗ -0.0060∗∗ -0.0061∗∗
[0.0016] [0.0016] [0.0016]
Nr. of Puskesmas 0.0022 0.0022 0.0016
[0.0018] [0.0018] [0.0018]
Nr. of supporting Puskesmas -0.0039∗∗ -0.0039∗∗ -0.0044∗∗
[0.0014] [0.0014] [0.0014]
BKKBN rate per sub-district -0.0066 -0.0066 0.0055
[0.0046] [0.0046] [0.0040]
JPS per capita in district 0.0014 -0.0000
[0.0012] [0.0014]
Health card coverage in district 0.0693∗∗ 0.0760∗∗
[0.0082] [0.0101]
JPS per health card in district -0.0001
[0.0000]
Poverty rate in district -0.0155∗∗ -0.0155∗∗ -0.0038
[0.0047] [0.0047] [0.0043]
Poverty gap in district -0.0336∗∗ -0.0328∗∗ -0.0200∗∗
[0.0078] [0.0078] [0.0075]
Observations 150,889 150,889 150,424
Pseudo R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.03
Standard errors in brackets.
SigniÞcance levels:  : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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Table 6.18: Sensitivity direct eﬀect estimate to selection on needs bias (pure health card eﬀect, one month reference period)
Intervention Control Diﬀerence [s.e.]1 % Change Direct eﬀect p Number of observations
group group (β) (pβ) Intervention Control
All outpatient care
Quintile 1 (poor) 0.0993 0.0866 0.0127 [0.0031]∗∗ 14.7 0.0023 0.184 25,046 20,796
Quintile 2 0.1205 0.1056 0.0149 [0.0041]∗∗ 14.1 0.0020 0.137 19,611 17,658
Quintile 3 0.1330 0.1197 0.0132 [0.0047]∗∗ 11.0 0.0014 0.106 15,655 15,393
Quintile 4 0.1450 0.1378 0.0072 [0.0058] 5.2 0.0005 0.071 10,912 12,374
Quintile 5 (rich) 0.1509 0.1468 0.0041 [0.0076] 2.8 0.0002 0.037 5,641 7,942
Male 0.1155 0.1097 0.0059 [0.0028]∗ 5.4 0.0006 0.105 38,085 36,843
Female 0.1269 0.1167 0.0102 [0.0029]∗∗ 8.8 0.0011 0.107 38,871 37,420
Urban 0.1390 0.1316 0.0074 [0.0049] 5.6 0.0005 0.073 17,879 17,048
Rural 0.1147 0.1073 0.0074 [0.0022]∗∗ 6.9 0.0009 0.128 59,077 57,215
All 0.1213 0.1132 0.0081 [0.0020]∗∗ 7.1 0.0009 0.106 76,956 74,263
Public outpatient care
Quintile 1 (poor) 0.0729 0.0534 0.0195 [0.0025]∗∗ 36.5 0.0036 0.184 25,046 20,796
Quintile 2 0.0784 0.0577 0.0207 [0.0032]∗∗ 35.9 0.0028 0.137 19,611 17,658
Quintile 3 0.0855 0.0614 0.0240 [0.0036]∗∗ 39.2 0.0025 0.106 15,655 15,393
Quintile 4 0.0914 0.0685 0.0230 [0.0044]∗∗ 33.5 0.0016 0.071 10,912 12,374
Quintile 5 (rich) 0.0840 0.0665 0.0175 [0.0056]∗∗ 26.3 0.0006 0.037 5,641 7,942
Male 0.0732 0.0561 0.0171 [0.0022]∗∗ 30.5 0.0018 0.105 38,085 36,843
Female 0.0871 0.0639 0.0231 [0.0023]∗∗ 36.1 0.0025 0.107 38,871 37,420
Urban 0.0867 0.0681 0.0187 [0.0036]∗∗ 27.4 0.0014 0.073 17,879 17,048
Rural 0.0778 0.0575 0.0203 [0.0017]∗∗ 35.3 0.0026 0.128 59,077 57,215
All 0.0802 0.0601 0.0201 [0.0016]∗∗ 33.5 0.0021 0.106 76,956 74,263
Private outpatient care
Quintile 1 (poor) 0.0305 0.0374 -0.0069 [0.0020]∗∗ −18.3 -0.0013 0.184 25,046 20,796
Quintile 2 0.0495 0.0544 -0.0048 [0.0029] −8.9 -0.0007 0.137 19,611 17,658
Quintile 3 0.0572 0.0655 -0.0083 [0.0035]∗ −12.7 -0.0009 0.106 15,655 15,393
Quintile 4 0.0654 0.0796 -0.0142 [0.0043]∗ −17.8 -0.0010 0.071 10,912 12,374
Quintile 5 (rich) 0.0803 0.0941 -0.0138 [0.0062]∗ −14.6 -0.0005 0.037 5,641 7,942
Male 0.0500 0.0606 -0.0106 [0.0022]∗∗ −17.5 -0.0011 0.105 38,085 36,843
Female 0.0478 0.0605 -0.0127 [0.0021]∗∗ −21.1 -0.0014 0.107 38,871 37,420
Urban 0.0613 0.0706 -0.0092 [0.0037]∗∗ −13.1 -0.0007 0.073 17,879 17,048
Rural 0.0442 0.0574 -0.0132 [0.0016]∗∗ −22.9 -0.0017 0.128 59,077 57,215
All 0.0489 0.0606 -0.0117 [0.0015]∗∗ −19.3 -0.0012 0.106 76,956 74,263
1 Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications.
SigniÞcance levels:  : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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Table 6.19: Sensitivity total eﬀect estimate (IV)
Outpatient Public Private
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
JPS per capita in district 0.0042 0.0044 0.0037 0.0039 0.0007 0.0007
[0.0028] [0.0032] [0.0019]∗ [0.0022] [0.0017] [0.0020]
Health card coverage in district -0.0118 -0.0159 0.0081
[0.0628] [0.0421] [0.0381]
JPS per capita × health card coverage -0.0054 -0.0060 0.0020
[0.0244] [0.0163] [0.0148]
Diﬀ. age -0.0028 -0.0028 -0.0029 -0.0028 0.0000 -0.0000
[0.0032] [0.0032] [0.0021] [0.0021] [0.0019] [0.0019]
Diﬀ. household size 0.0081 0.0083 0.0039 0.0040 0.0080 0.0082
[0.0128] [0.0129] [0.0086] [0.0086] [0.0078] [0.0078]
Diﬀ. % rural population 0.0033 0.0034 0.0254 0.0255 -0.0270 -0.0269
[0.0308] [0.0308] [0.0207] [0.0206] [0.0187] [0.0187]
Diﬀ. population -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
Diﬀ. poverty rate -0.0060 -0.0063 0.0088 0.0084 -0.0198 -0.0196
[0.0184] [0.0183] [0.0124] [0.0122] [0.0112] [0.0111]
Diﬀ. poverty gap 0.0385 0.0381 0.0353 0.0349 0.0040 0.0041
[0.0161]∗ [0.0163]∗ [0.0108]∗∗ [0.0109]∗∗ [0.0098] [0.0099]
Sumatra -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0025 -0.0022 0.0022 0.0019
[0.0064] [0.0057] [0.0043] [0.0038] [0.0039] [0.0035]
Continued on next page...
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... table 6.19 continued
Outpatient Public Private
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sulawesi -0.0214 -0.0213 -0.0169 -0.0164 -0.0053 -0.0058
[0.0090]∗ [0.0078]∗∗ [0.0060]∗∗ [0.0052]∗∗ [0.0054] [0.0047]
Kalimantan -0.0055 -0.0053 -0.0003 0.0003 -0.0056 -0.0060
[0.0090] [0.0079] [0.0060] [0.0053] [0.0055] [0.0048]
Other islands 0.0029 0.0036 -0.0027 -0.0017 0.0077 0.0071
[0.0102] [0.0085] [0.0068] [0.0057] [0.0062] [0.0051]
Constant -0.0138 -0.0143 -0.0110 -0.0119 -0.0038 -0.0032
[0.0113] [0.0095] [0.0076] [0.0063] [0.0068] [0.0058]
Observations 293 293 293 293 293 293
R-squared 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.06
Instrumented HC JPS × HC HC JPS × HC HC JPS × HC
Over-identifying restrictions test
χ-squared (1) 0.110 0.096 0.009 0.018 0.662 0.690
Probability 0.741 0.756 0.923 0.893 0.416 0.406
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test
F (1, 279) 1.667 1.592 3.784 3.888 0.027 0.008
Probability 0.198 0.208 0.053 0.050 0.870 0.928
Continued on next page...
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... table 6.19 continued
Outpatient Public Private
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
First stage regression HC JPS × HC
Instruments
BKKBN pre-prosperous 0.2315 0.5833
[0.0347]∗∗ [0.0823]∗∗
BKKBN KS1 0.0285 -0.0187
[0.0535] [0.1270]
(other results omitted)
Joint signiÞcance instruments
F (2, 279) 22.807 26.786
Probability 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in brackets.
SigniÞcance levels:  : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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Table 6.20: Exogeneity of BKKBN data with respect to the trend in utilisation 1997 -
1998 (OLS; dependent variable: change in contact rate in districts)
(1) (2) (3)
All Public Private
outpatient outpatient outpatient
BKKBN pre-prosperous -0.0045 -0.0027 -0.0030
[0.0111] [0.0076] [0.0066]
BKKBN prosperous I -0.0143 -0.0182 -0.0006
[0.0190] [0.0130] [0.0113]
Constant -0.0230 -0.0135 -0.0070
[0.0056]∗∗ [0.0038]∗∗ [0.0033]∗∗
Observations 292 292 292
R-squared 0.0024 0.0070 0.0007
F-test model (Prob > F) 0.7051 0.3622 0.9029
Standard errors in brackets.
SigniÞcance levels:  : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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Chapter 7
Summary and Conclusions
This dissertation investigates the eﬀectiveness of targeted interventions in health and edu-
cation as a tool to protect access to these services for the poor in times of economic crisis,
using Indonesia as case study. In particular, it investigates whether narrowly targeted
interventions are suitable in crisis situations, when policy makers are faced with severe
information and time constraints, and how these demand side interventions compare with
broadly targeted, supply side programmes.
In 1997 Indonesia experienced a severe economic crisis that saw GPD drop by about
14 percent in 1998, strong increases in poverty, rising food prices and sharp budget cuts
in social sectors. Chapter 2 gives an account of the consequences of these events for the
delivery of public services, and describes the changes in health care utilisation and school
enrolment during the crisis, on the basis of Indonesias main socioeconomic household sur-
vey - Susenas. The crisis seems to have slowed down the positive trend in enrolment that
was observed before the crisis, and there is some evidence that children were temporarily
taken out of school. The eﬀects on education were largest with the rural poor. However,
in 1999 enrolment rates recovered, reaching levels higher than before the crisis.
Outpatient health care utilisation decreased during the crisis, as real household income
diminished and quality of health services deteriorated. Utilisation of both public and
private outpatient care decreased for all income groups. The main explanation is that
quality and supply of public care suﬀered considerably from the crisis, turning people
away from the public sector. The public sector saw a comeback in 1999, while utilisation
of private care did not recover.
In August 1998 two nationwide health and education programmes were introduced,
both of which were part of the larger Indonesian Social Safety Net - Jaring Pengaman
Sosial (JPS). These two components of the JPS intervention aimed to protect access to
health and education for the poor during the crisis. The design and implementation of
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these health and education programmes are discussed in chapter 3.
The education programme consisted of a cash transfer programme, under which almost
4 million scholarships were awarded to primary and secondary school students. The size
of the scholarship increased with the school level, amounting to about 7 to 18 percent of
average per capita household consumption.
The health care intervention included both a targeted price subsidy and a public
spending component. Health cards were targeted to households that were thought to be
most vulnerable to economic shocks. The health cards entitled all household members to
the price subsidy at public health care providers. Health care facilities that provided the
subsidised care received extra budgetary support to compensate for the increased demand.
However, there was a loose relationship between the utilisation of the health card and the
compensation that the health care providers received in return. Service providers were
reimbursed using a lump sum transfer based on the estimated number of poor households
in their area of inßuence. As a result, serving a health card owner did not result in a
direct Þnancial reward to the service provider.
Both programmes followed a partly decentralised allocation process, involving both
geographic and community based individual targeting. Poorer districts received relatively
more scholarships and health cards. Within the districts the programme beneÞts were
targeted to schools and health care facilities in village communities, which in turn selected
the students and households.
The programmes have been implemented at a remarkable speed. By the time of
the 1999 Susenas, February 1999, approximately 22 million people (about 11 percent of
Indonesians) lived in households that received a health card, and 2.1 million children
aged 10 to 18 (about 5 percent) had received a scholarship. The decentralised programme
design may well have facilitated this swift reaction, by relying on existing administrative
and operational infrastructure within the districts. However, at such short notice there
was no reliable data on the impact of the crisis across districts. Geographic targeting
criteria were therefore based on pre-crisis poverty estimates, which reßect the actual level
of poverty to some extent but do not capture the impact of the crisis. This introduced
some degree of targeting error as there appears to be no correlation between the initial
level of poverty and the impact of the crisis. Moreover, relative prices had changed during
the crisis, which are not accounted for in the targeting design when applying the pre-crisis
poverty estimates as allocation rule.
Targeting performance of scholarships diﬀered strongly between school levels. At pri-
mary and junior secondary level targeting was pro-poor, but with considerable leakage to
wealthier groups. At senior secondary school the scholarships were not allocated pro-poor
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at all, but instead distributed quite evenly across the per capita consumption quintiles.
The health card programme was pro-poor in the sense that the poor had a higher
probability of receiving a health card and using it to obtain free health services, pre-
sumably making them healthier. However, despite pro-poor targeting, a large number of
health cards went to households in the richer quintiles. Service providers also seem to
have distributed health cards based on health status and to patients that show up to ask
for services.
A notable Þnding is that some health card owners did not use their health card when
obtaining care from public service providers. It seems like several factors are in play. The
particular design resulted in a discrepancy between health card ownership and utilisation.
High rejection rates could follow from the delays in the lump sum transfers made to the
providers. Patients could also perceive health care obtained using a health card to be
inferior to the service and medicines given to patients who pay the normal user fees.
Utilisation of services is less pro-poor than ownership. Conditional on ownership, the
rich have a higher propensity to use their health card, suggesting that barriers to access
to health care are not fully overcome by a price subsidy. The direct and indirect costs
of using the health card are relatively higher in the more remote and rural villages with
little access to public health care providers.
In chapter 4 a micro-simulation based approach is applied to dynamic marginal
beneÞt incidence analysis of the JPS scholarship and health card programmes, for the
period 1999-2002. This method builds on the recent extensions of the Oaxaca-Blinder
decomposition, providing more insight on the underlying factors driving observed changes
in targeting performance. Especially in a decentralised setting, the existing methods for
dynamic marginal beneÞt incidence leave some questions unanswered regarding the eﬀects
of changes in geographic or local targeting. The proposed method is easily applied to other
social policy instruments, and in other contexts.
From 1999 and 2002, both the health card and the scholarship programme had ex-
panded. After 1999 the geographic targeting rules had been altered, as more accurate
information on regional poverty during the crisis became available. But with the expan-
sion the marginal changes in the distribution of scholarships and health cards show quite
diﬀerent patterns. The poor have been the main beneÞciaries of an increase in scholar-
ships, whereas the expansion of the health card does not show a pro-poor pattern. The
simulation based decomposition approach allows investigation into what extent the dis-
tributional outcome of the programmes expansion is a result of changes in geographical
targeting, changes in local targeting, or simply the expansion of the programmes.
The simulation method can provide more nuance to the observed patterns in target-
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ing of social programmes, and facilitate interpretation of conventional marginal beneÞt
incidence results. In the case of the scholarship programme the existing measures for dy-
namic marginal beneÞt incidence are misleading for policy advice. The pro-poor marginal
incidence observed with the scholarship programme seems to be driven by improved local
and geographical targeting over time. Expanding the programme without simultaneously
improving the targeting process will increase leakage to the non-poor. For the health
card programme, the decomposition results do not conßict with marginal incidence re-
sults. Instead, the results highlight which targeting instruments would be most eﬀective
in reallocating health cards to the poor.
Chapter 5 analyses the eﬀectiveness of the JPS scholarship programme during crisis,
showing that the programme has been eﬀective in protecting access to education, despite
the considerable problems concerning geographical targeting in the initial year.
The impact of the programme is identiÞed by exploiting the decentralised structure
of the programme design and the fact that at the initial stage of the programme only
incomplete information on the eﬀects of the crisis was available to policy makers. This
incomplete information on regional poverty gave rise to some geographic mis-targeting.
Instrumental variables are constructed from this mis-targeting, using data on the selection
rules and ex-post information on the regional poverty proÞle. The availability of pre-
intervention data makes it possible to verify the credibility of the identifying assumptions
and the validity of the instrument.
Without the JPS programme enrolment would have dropped substantially, especially
in primary school. Ten percent of programme participants between 10 and 12 years old
would have dropped out of school if they had not received a scholarship. Although the
estimate is not precise, there seems to be a positive eﬀect amongst children aged 13 to 15
still enrolled in primary school. This is an important result because this is the age group
where, in general, the transition from primary to junior secondary school takes place. It
is at this transition point that many students leave school. The scholarships have had
very little eﬀect on enrolment at junior and senior secondary schools.
The scholarships were especially eﬀective for children whose education attainment was
most vulnerable to the eﬀects of the crisis. In response to the crisis, poor rural households
facing resource constraints reduced investment in education of the youngest children in
the household for consumption smoothing reasons, and protected the education of older
children. This reßects the diﬀerences in future earnings from secondary and primary
education, the fact that households have already invested in secondary education of older
children, and the relatively low secondary school enrolment amongst students from poor
families. Accordingly, the strongest eﬀects of the scholarships were found amongst children
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at primary school in rural areas, from households that live below the poverty line.
The JPS programme also aﬀected the decisions regarding school attendance and labour
activities of enrolled children. Scholarship recipients were more likely to go to school and
less likely to work. Although it was not an explicit goal of the programme, the scholarships
raised the reservation wage for students. The cash transfers relieved the pressure on
households to draw on the labour of their children to smooth income. The eﬀects on child
labour are largest for the poor, suggesting that reservation wages for the poor are lower
than for the non-poor.
Labour supply is much more sensitive to programme participation than school atten-
dance, which diﬀers from other studies that Þnd that increased schooling is only partly
explained by a reduction in labour. The diﬀerence in these results is most likely explained
by the extreme setting of the South-east Asian economic crisis. Under these circumstances
the pressure on households to draw on child labour strongly increased. The estimation
results then suggest that this came only partly at the expense of school attendance, sup-
porting the notion that schooling and part time work often go together in Indonesia.
Overall, the JPS scholarships have proved to be an eﬀective instrument for protecting
access to education. On the other hand, the allocation committees appear to have been
only partly capable of identifying the poor. A large part of the funds have been allocated
to students who would not have dropped out of school. More accurate targeting would
greatly improve the programmes eﬀectiveness. Furthermore, priority should have been
given to protecting primary school enrolment, where the scholarships seem most eﬀective,
and with providing support for children from the poorest households in the transition
from primary to secondary schooling.
Chapter 6 presented an impact evaluation of the health card programme as it op-
erated in its very Þrst months. The weak link between the Þnancial compensation and
the provision of free services to health card recipients allows both components of the
programme to be treated as separate interventions, and the eﬀectiveness of a health care
cost waiver to be compared with that of a broadly targeted supply impulse. This ex-post
analysis of health care supply and demand interventions supplements the existing health
care demand literature, which so far has mostly relied on ex-ante structural modeling.
The JPS health programme has prevented outpatient utilisation from decreasing fur-
ther in 1999. Although the health card has had a clear positive eﬀect on utilisation, the
comeback of the public sector in the provision of outpatient care is attributed for the
most part to the supply impulse induced by the increased spending under the JPS health
programme. For all households health card ownership resulted in a large substitution
eﬀect away from the private sector to the public sector, with a net increase in the overall
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use of outpatient medical services. But the increased utilisation due to the direct health
card eﬀect only contributes about 20 percent to the eﬀect of the combined JPS health
programme.
The eﬀects of both the direct health card and the supply impulse show a strong
heterogeneous pattern across sub groups of the population. While the targeting and
impact of the pure health card programme is pro-poor, the total eﬀect is not. The poor
are responsive to a price subsidy but not to a supply impulse. The health card increased
utilisation and led to a substitution eﬀect from private to subsidised public care. For
the non-poor, however, utilisation seems to be mainly supply driven, as the health card
only aﬀected their choice of health care provider without increasing utilisation. This also
points to the potential impact that such programmes can have on the public/private mix
if the design does not take those factors into account.
The impact of the programme has suﬀered from the weak link between reimbursements
for public service providers and utilisation of the health card. In the end, the non-poor
captured most of the beneÞts of the overall programme. This emphasises that in the
absence of clear incentive mechanisms for health care providers, general increases in public
spending are relatively ineﬀective in reaching the poor. A stronger link between provision
of services and budget would likely have improved the targeting to the poor.
The results and methodology presented in this dissertation contribute to the discus-
sion on the viability of social safety net programmes in a crisis situation. This facili-
tates transparency regarding the implementation and management of crisis intervention
programmes, and their cost eﬀectiveness; points which have typically been a source of
criticism for social safety nets. However, to gain full insight in the cost-eﬀectiveness of
intervention programmes, future research is needed to investigate how the short term im-
pact of cash transfer programmes, price subsidies and economic crises translate into long
term eﬀects on education attainment and health outcomes. For instance, does dropping
out of school in 1999 mean a permanent decrease in education of one year? What are the
long term eﬀects of reduced investments of health care? The results in chapters 5 and 6
(and the available data) can not answer these questions. The estimated treatment eﬀects
in the previous chapters reßect the impact of the programme for the Þrst year of the JPS
intervention, at the height of the Indonesian economic crisis. In order to translate these
eﬀects into overall gains in education and health, one would need to extrapolate these
eﬀects to the coming years. Given the transient and extreme nature of the Indonesian
crisis, such extrapolations would be unrealistic. Further research would need to focus on
longitudinal aspects of the crisis and intervention programmes.
Without information on long term eﬀects a rigorous cost-beneÞt analysis, which evalu-
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ates the costs of the programme against the economic beneÞts of the programmes impact,
is not feasible. Although a cost-beneÞt analysis is intrinsically of interest to an economist,
it is omitted from most impact evaluation studies, including those in this dissertation. In
the case of the JPS a cost beneÞt analysis would entail relating the costs of the interven-
tions to the net present value of the gains in school enrolment and health care utilisation
brought about by the JPS programmes. But even if these long term eﬀects would be
known to us, we would still need to rely strong assumptions about the economic returns
to education and health care. There are several studies that estimate returns to educa-
tion in Indonesia.1 The problem with using these estimates for calculating the net present
value of the beneÞt from the scholarships is that we would need to ignore cohort eﬀects,
assuming that these returns are constant over the professional lifetime of the current
scholarship recipients. This is a highly debatable assumption for a country like Indonesia
with a fast developing economy. Age-earning proÞles for the coming decades are likely
to be very diﬀerent to those estimated for the 1970s and 1980s. Even more problems are
encountered with the returns to health care, as these are simply not known.2
Questions also remain as to whether the programme would have been more eﬀective if
a social safety net would have been in place before the crisis (for example, in a dormant
state, or on smaller scale). Some authors argue that such a pre-emptive design is more
ßexible in reaching the poor and cushioning the fall in a crisis.3 However, the question is
if such a design would be more eﬀective in identifying those aﬀected more by the crisis.
The impact of the crisis varied greatly across regions and within communities, with large
movement in and out of poverty. Under these circumstances targeting would be diﬃcult
even for an existing programme. Further research would need to investigate how local
information can best be exploited under decentralised and community based targeting in
signalling such poverty dynamics.
1E.g. Behrman and Dealolikar (1991, 1993 and 1995) and Dußo (2001). See chapter 5, footnote 1.
2Strauss and Thomas (1998) review the empirical literature and conclude that, although there is some
evidence of positive eﬀects of health on labour market outcomes, most results are still wrought with
endogeneity and measurement bias.
3See, for example, Ferreira, Prennushi, and Ravallion (1999), Ravallion (2003), and SkouÞas (2003).
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Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)
Een primaire beleidskwestie ten tijde van een economische crisis in ontwikkelingslanden
is het beschermen van de sociale sector en met name hoe toegang tot gezondheidszorg en
onderwijs voor de armen gehandhaafd kan worden. Gerichte prijssubsidies die de kosten
hiervan voor kwetsbare groepen  zoals huishoudens die onder de armoedegrens leven 
verlagen worden vaak gebruikt als een beleidsreactie op macro-economische schokken. De
studies in dit proefschrift onderzoeken de eﬀectiviteit van gerichte interventies in gezond-
heidszorg en onderwijs als een middel om toegang tot deze voorzieningen voor de armen te
waarborgen ten tijde van de economische crisis in Indonesië. Het onderzoek concentreert
zich op de vraag of gerichte interventies geschikt zijn in crisissituaties, wanneer de beleids-
makers te maken hebben met ernstige tijdsbeperkingen enerzijds en gebrekkige informatie
over de omvang en het patroon van de crisis anderzijds, en hoe deze interventies aan de
vraagzijde te vergelijken zijn met bredere aanbodsimpulsen zoals algemene investeringen
in publieke diensten.
In 1997 werd Indonesië getroﬀen door een zware en onverwachte economische crisis,
veroorzaakt door een Þnanciële crisis in geheel Zuidoost Azië. Door de economische crisis
daalde het bruto nationaal product in 1998 met ongeveer 14 procent, nam de armoede toe,
stegen de voedselprijzen en daalden de overheidsbudgetten sterk. Tot aan de crisis boekte
Indonesië gestage vorderingen wat betreft de omvang en kwaliteit van gezondheidszorg
en onderwijsparticipatie. Bij aanvang van de crisis was een belangrijk punt van zorg of
de verbeteringen die de laatste decennia bereikt waren in de sociale sectoren behouden
konden worden. Om reële inkomens en de toegang tot sociale voorzieningen voor de
armen te beschermen introduceerde de Indonesische regering, met de hulp van bilaterale
donoren, een sociaal vangnet - Jaring Pengaman Sosial (JPS). Deze interventie bestond
onder andere uit een gezondheidszorg- en onderwijsprogramma.
Hoofdstuk 2 legt de basis voor de volgende hoofdstukken door de context van het
Indonesische sociale vangnet te schetsen. Het hoofdstuk beschrijft de verdeling in het ge-
bruik van gezondheidszorg en educatieve voorzieningen voor de crisis, en de veranderingen
in deze diensten tijdens de crisis, op basis van de belangrijkste socio-economisch enquête
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onder huishoudens - Susenas.
De crisis lijkt de positieve trend in het schoolbezoek niet te hebben gestopt, maar
heeft wel de groei in de onderwijsparticipatie in het basis- and middelbaar onderwijs
tijdelijk onderbroken. In 1999 herstelde het schoolbezoek zich echter ten opzichte van
1998 en bereikte een hoger niveau dan voor de crisis. Er zijn ook aanwijzingen dat de
gezinsuitgaven voor onderwijs en gezondheid tijdens de crisis zijn gedaald om de overige
consumptie op peil te houden, met name onder de armen op het platteland. De eﬀecten
van de crisis zijn tevens zichtbaar in het gebruik van de gezondheidszorg door huishoudens.
De toegenomen kosten van gezondheidszorg, negatieve inkomensschokken en verslechterde
voorzieningen bij zorgaanbieders werden gevolgd door een sterk verminderd gebruik van
de gezondheidszorg, vooral van publieke zorgvoorzieningen. De kwaliteit en omvang van
de publieke zorg leed sterk onder de stijgende kosten van medicijnen en de verminderde
overheidsuitgaven voor gezondheidszorg, waardoor men wegbleef bij de publieke zorgin-
stellingen. De publieke sector herstelde zich in 1999, terwijl dit voor private zorg niet het
geval was.
In 1998 werden het landelijke gezondheids- en onderwijsprogramma ingevoerd, welke
beide deel uitmaakten van het JPS. Deze twee JPS-programmas hadden ten doel de
toegang tot gezondheidszorg en onderwijs voor de armen tijdens de crisis te beschermen.
De opzet en de implementatie van deze gezondheids- en onderwijsprogrammas worden
beschreven in hoofdstuk 3.
Het onderwijsprogramma startte in augustus 1998 aan het begin van het schooljaar
1998/1999 en behelsde een studietoelage voor kinderen uit arme gezinnen. Bijna 4 miljoen
beurzen werden beschikbaar gesteld voor leerlingen in het basis- en middelbaar onderwijs.
De omvang van de beurs nam toe met het niveau van onderwijs en bedroeg 7 tot 18 procent
van de gemiddelde consumptie per hoofd.
Het gezondheidsprogramma werd geïntroduceerd in het laatste kwartaal van 1998. Dit
programma bestond uit een gerichte prijssubsidie in combinatie met een aanbodsimpuls in
de vorm van budgettaire steun voor publieke zorgverleners. De prijssubsidie werkte door
middel van een zorgpas - Kartu Sehat - programma. Deze zorgpassen werden toegekend
aan huishoudens die het kwetsbaarst voor economische schokken werden geacht. De zorg-
pas gaf alle leden van een huishouden recht op gratis zorg bij alle aanbieders van publieke
gezondheidszorg. De zorgvoorzieningen die de gesubsidieerde zorg uitvoerden ontvingen
budgettaire ondersteuning om de toegenomen vraag te compenseren. Er was echter geen
directe relatie tussen het gebruik van de zorgpashouders en de compensatie die de zor-
gaanbieders ontvingen. Zorgaanbieders kregen een vast bedrag uitgekeerd op basis van
het geschatte aantal arme huishoudens in hun verzorgingsgebied. Hierdoor resulteerde het
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bieden van zorg aan een persoon met een zorgpas niet in een directe Þnanciële beloning
voor de zorgaanbieder.
Beide programmas volgden een deels gedecentraliseerd allocatieproces. Dit hield in
dart in een eerste allocatie fase armere districten meer studiebeurzen en zorgpassen ontvin-
gen, afhankelijk van de geschatte armoede. In de tweede fase werden deze binnen de
districten via scholen en zorgvoorzieningen in de dorpen aan scholieren en huishoudens
uitgedeeld. Speciale selectiecomités in districten, dorpen en scholen kregen instructies
voor het identiÞceren en selecteren van huishoudens en kinderen die in aanmerking zouden
moeten komen voor de JPS-programmas.
De programmas zijn opmerkelijk snel ingevoerd. Ten tijde van de Susenas enquête in
februari 1999 maakten rond de 22 miljoen mensen (ongeveer 11 procent van de Indonesis-
che bevolking) deel uit van een huishouden dat in het bezit was van een zorgpas en hadden
2,1 miljoen kinderen tussen de 10 en 18 (ongeveer 5 procent) een beurs ontvangen. De
decentrale opzet van het programma heeft wellicht deze snelle reactie mogelijk gemaakt,
doordat gebruik is gemaakt van bestaande administratieve en operationele infrastruc-
tuur in de districten. Op deze korte termijn was er echter geen betrouwbare informatie
beschikbaar over de impact van de crisis in de verschillende de districten. De geograÞsche
toekenningscriteria waren daarom gebaseerd op armoedeschattingen van voor de crisis, die
wel het niveau van armoede enigszins weergaven maar niet de impact van de crisis. Dit
introduceerde een zekere discrepantie tussen geograÞsche allocatie en werkelijke armoede
omdat er geen verband blijkt te bestaan tussen het initiële niveau van armoede en de im-
pact van de crisis. Daarnaast traden er tijdens de crisis grote relatieve prijsveranderingen
op, zowel tussen regios als producten (vooral met betrekking tot voedsel). De geograÞs-
che toekenningscriteria hielden geen rekening met deze prijsveranderingen die vooral de
armen tot last waren.
Het identiÞceren van kinderen uit de armste gezinnen bleek bij het toekennen van
studiebeurzen niet overal vlekkeloos verlopen. In het basisonderwijs en de onderbouw
van het middelbaar onderwijs is een groot gedeelte aan de allerarmsten uitgereikt, maar
kwam ook een aanzienlijk deel bij de rijkere groepen terecht. Met name in de bovenbouw
van het middelbaar onderwijs bleek het bereiken van de allerarmsten een probleem.
Soortgelijke problemen traden op bij het zorgpasprogramma. Hoewel het toekennen op
de armen gericht was, ging toch een groot aantal zorgpassen naar rijkere huishoudens. Iets
meer dan de helft van de passen kwam in het bezit van mensen die onder de armoedegrens
leefden, maar daarnaast is ook 20 procent bij de rijkste 40 procent van de bevolking
terechtgekomen. De zorgaanbieders hebben schijnbaar ook zorgpassen uitgedeeld op basis
van gezondheidstoestand en aan patiënten die zorg kwamen vragen.
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Op het lokale niveau heeft het zorgpasprogramma niet alle barrières naar de toegang
tot gezondheidszorg voor de armen weten te slechten. Het gebruik van de zorg blijkt
minder in het voordeel van de armen dan het bezit van de pas. Dit betekent dat, mits
in het bezit van de pas, de rijken meer geneigd zijn hun pas te gebruiken. De directe en
indirecte kosten van het gebruik van de zorgpas zijn relatief hoger in de meer afgelegen
en agrarische gebieden met minder toegang tot publieke zorgaanbieders.
In hoofdstuk 4 is een microsimulatiemethode toegepast voor een dynamische mar-
ginal beneÞt incidence analyse van de JPS studiebeurs- en zorgpasprogrammas voor de
periode 1999-2002. Deze methode is gebaseerd op de recente uitbreidingen van de Oaxaca-
Blinder decompositie en geeft meer inzicht in de onderliggende factoren die veranderingen
in allocatie verklaren. Vooral in een decentrale setting kunnen de bestaande methoden
voor dynamischemarginal beneÞt incidence niet alle antwoorden geven met betrekking tot
de eﬀecten van wijzigingen in geograÞsche en lokale allocatie. De voorgestelde methode
kan tevens worden toegepast voor andere aspecten van sociaal beleid en in een andere
context.
Tussen 1999 en 2002 zijn zowel het zorgpas- als het studiebeurzenprogramma uitge-
breid. Na 1999 zijn de geograÞsche regels voor het toekennen gewijzigd nadat er betere
informatie over de regionale armoede tijdens de crisis beschikbaar kwam. Maar met deze
uitbreiding laten de marginale veranderingen in de verdeling van beurzen en zorgpassen
duidelijk verschillende patronen zien. De armen hebben het meeste proÞjt gehad van de
uitbreiding van het aantal studiebeurzen, maar de uitbreiding van het zorgpasprogramma
toont geen voordeel voor de armen. Met de microsimulatiemethode is het mogelijk te on-
derzoeken in hoeverre de verdelingseﬀecten van de programma-uitbreiding het resultaat
is van de wijzigingen in geograÞsche allocatie, wijzigingen in lokale allocatie of simpelweg
van de uitbreiding van de programmas.
De microsimulatiemethode voegt nuance toe aan de geobserveerde patronen in het
allocatiebeleid van sociale programmas en de interpretatie van conventionele marginal
beneÞt incidence methoden. Bij het beurzenprogramma zijn de resultaten van bestaande
methoden misleidend voor beleidsadvies. De marginale veranderingen die we observeer-
den voor het beurzenprogramma kunnen verklaard worden uit veranderingen in lokale
en geograÞsche allocatie in het voordeel van de allerarmsten. Uitbreiding van het pro-
gramma zonder tegelijkertijd de allocatie te verbeteren zal het weglekken van beurzen
naar de rijkere groepen opleveren. Voor het zorgpasprogramma zijn de resultaten van de
decompositie niet tegenstrijdig met het resultaat van de conventionele methoden. Inte-
gendeel, deze geven duidelijk aan welke allocatie-instrumenten het eﬀectiefst zijn in het
identiÞceren van de armen.
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Hoofdstuk 5 toont een analyse van de eﬀectiviteit van het JPS studiebeurzenpro-
gramma tijdens de crisis en laat zien dat het programma het beoogde eﬀect heeft gehad
om het onderwijs toegankelijk te houden, ondanks de aanzienlijke problemen in de ge-
ograÞsche allocatie in het eerste jaar van het programma. De belangrijkste uitdaging bij
ex-post evaluaties is om een betrouwbare schatting van de alternatieve situatie te maken:
wat zou er zijn gebeurd als het JPS-programma niet geïmplementeerd zou zijn? Omdat
het programma niet willekeurig is geïmplementeerd en vanwege beperkingen in de data,
zijn niet-experimentele methodes nodig om deze vraag te beantwoorden.
De impact van het programma wordt geïdentiÞceerd door gebruik te maken van de
decentrale opzet van het programma en het feit dat in er het beginstadium geen volledige
informatie over de eﬀecten van de crisis beschikbaar was. Deze onvolledige informatie
over regionale armoede heeft geleid tot een zekere mate van geograÞsche misallocatie. Op
basis van deze misallocatie zijn instrumentele variabelen geconstrueerd, waarbij gebruik
gemaakt is van data over de allocatiecriteria en ex-post informatie over de regionale ar-
moedepatronen. De beschikbaarheid van data vóór de JPS-interventie maakt het mogelijk
de validiteit van het instrument te veriÞëren.
De schattingresultaten suggereren dat in het geval dat het JPS-programma niet zou
zijn ingevoerd, onderwijsparticipatie aanzienlijk zou zijn afgenomen, vooral in het ba-
sisonderwijs. Tien procent van de deelnemers aan het programma tussen 10 en 12 jaar
zouden niet meer naar school zijn gegaan als ze geen beurs hadden ontvangen. Er lijkt
een positief eﬀect van het programma te zijn voor kinderen tussen de 13 en 15 die nog
naar het basisonderwijs gaan. Dit is een belangrijk resultaat omdat dit de leeftijdsgroep is
waar over het algemeen de overgang van basis- naar het middelbaar onderwijs plaatsvindt.
Bij deze overgang verlaten veel leerlingen het onderwijs. De beurzen hebben zeer weinig
eﬀect gehad op onderwijsparticipatie in het middelbaar onderwijs.
De beurzen zijn vooral eﬀectief geweest voor die kinderen wier scholing het meest
kwetsbaar was voor de eﬀecten van de crisis. Vooral de armere rurale huishoudens waren
sterk beperkt in hun inkomen en reserves en daarmee hun vermogen om de eﬀecten van
de crisis op te vangen. Het zijn deze huishoudens die als reactie op de crisis hun uitgaven
aan scholing van de jongere kinderen hebben moeten beperken, maar die daarentegen
de scholing van hun oudere kinderen hebben beschermd. Dit geeft de verschillen weer
in verwachte inkomsten uit basis- en middelbaar onderwijs, het feit dat huishoudens al
geïnvesteerd hebben in middelbaar onderwijs voor de oudere kinderen en het feit dat
relatief weinig kinderen uit arme families naar het middelbaar onderwijs gaan. De sterkste
eﬀecten van de beurzen zijn dan ook gevonden onder de kinderen in het basisonderwijs in
rurale gebieden, in huishoudens die onder de armoedegrens leven.
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Het JPS-programma heeft ook de beslissingen omtrent schoolbezoek en kinderarbeid
van schoolgaande kinderen beïnvloedt. Kinderen die beurzen ontvingen en op school
zaten, waren minder vaak afwezig en werkten minder vaak. Hoewel dit geen expliciet
doel was van het programma hebben de beurzen het reserveringsloon voor leerlingen
verhoogd. De studietoelagen hebben de druk op huishoudens om een beroep te doen op
de arbeid van hun kinderen - en zo hun inkomensverlies gedeeltelijk te compenseren -
verlicht. De eﬀecten op kinderarbeid zijn het grootste voor de armen, wat suggereert dat
het reserveringsloon lager is voor de armen dan voor de niet-armen.
In absolute zin is het arbeidsaanbod onder kinderen gevoeliger voor deelname aan het
programma dan schoolbezoek, dit in tegenstelling tot andere onderzoeken waarbij ver-
hoogd schoolbezoek slechts deels verklaard wordt uit verminderde arbeidsparticipatie. De
verschillen in deze resultaten kunnen verklaard worden uit de extreme omstandigheden in
de economische crisis in Indonesië. Onder deze omstandigheden is de druk op huishoudens
om van kinderarbeid gebruik te maken sterk verhoogd. De schattingsresultaten geven aan
dat dit slechts deels ten koste van het schoolbezoek is gegaan. Dit komt overeenkomt met
eerdere studies die aantonen dat scholing en deeltijdwerk in Indonesië vaak samengaan
onder de allerarmsten.
Over het algemeen zijn de JPS-studiebeurzen een eﬀectief middel gebleken om toe-
gang tot het onderwijs te waarborgen. Aan de andere kant lijken de toewijzingscom-
missies slechts ten dele in staat geweest om de armen te bereiken. Een groot deel van
de gelden is terechtgekomen bij leerlingen die ook zonder studietoelage niet van school
zouden zijn gegaan. Een nauwkeuriger gerichte allocatie zou de eﬀectiviteit van het pro-
gramma hebben verhoogd. Daarnaast had de prioriteit bij het basisonderwijs moeten
liggen waar de beurzen het eﬀectiefst lijken te zijn, en bij het ondersteunen van kinderen
uit de armste huishoudens in hun overgang van het basis- naar het middelbaar onderwijs.
Hoofdstuk 6 toont een impactevaluatie van het zorgpasprogramma zoals het in de
eerste maanden functioneerde. Het zwakke verband tussen de Þnanciële compensatie en
het aanbieden van gratis diensten aan zorgpashouders heeft ervoor gezorgd dat beide
componenten van het programma als aparte interventies kunnen worden gezien, en de ef-
fectiviteit van een prijssubsidie met die van een breed gerichte aanbodsimpuls kan worden
vergeleken. De budgettaire steun aan aanbieders in de publieke sector kwam ten goede
aan alle gebruikers van zorg terwijl de prijssubsidie alleen beschikbaar was voor diege-
nen met een zorgpas. In hoofdstuk 6 wordt een poging gedaan de eﬀecten ven de twee
componenten van het gezondheidszorgprogramma te onderscheiden. Deze ex-post analyse
van interventies in zorgaanbod en zorgvraag is een aanvulling op de bestaande literatuur
aangaande de zorgvraag in de gezondheidszorg, die tot nu toe vooral uitging van ex-ante
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analyse gebaseerd op structurele modellen.
De resultaten zijn meerledig. Allereerst was de prijssubsidie klaarblijkelijk eﬀectief in
het vergroten van de zorgvraag onder de armen: de zorgpas leidde tot een substitutie van
private naar gesubsidieerde publieke zorg en een netto toename van totaal gebruik van
gezondheidszorg. Voor de rijkste deel van de bevolking heeft de zorgpas alleen de keus
voor de zorgaanbieder beïnvloed zonder het totale gebruik te vergroten. Dit belicht de
potentiële impact die interventieprogrammas kunnen hebben op de mix tussen private
en publieke zorg als de opzet van het programma geen rekening houdt met substitutie-
eﬀecten. Ten tweede kan de opleving in het gebruik van de publieke gezondheidszorg
in 1999 toegeschreven worden aan het JPS-gezondheidszorgprogramma, maar dit is gro-
tendeels het resultaat van de verbeterde kwaliteit en het grotere aanbod van medische
zorg door de budgettaire ondersteuning aan de publieke aanbieders. De prijssubsidie op
zich blijkt slechts 20 procent van de totale impact van het programma te verklaren. Ten
derde zijn, bij afwezigheid van duidelijke aansporingsmechanismen voor zorgaanbieders,
algemene verhogingen van publieke uitgaven niet eﬀectief in het bereiken van de allerarm-
sten. De aanbods- en kwaliteitsimpuls hebben voornamelijk een eﬀect gehad op de rijken.
De armen zijn gevoelig voor een prijssubsidie maar niet voor een aanbodsimpuls, terwijl
het gebruik van zorg door de niet-armen voornamelijk gerelateerd is aan het aanbod.
De impact van het programma heeft geleden onder het zwakke verband tussen de bud-
gettaire steun voor publieke zorgaanbieders en de prijssubsidie. De allerarmsten hebben
alleen proÞjt gehad van het programma als zij een zorgpas ontvingen, omdat uit de re-
sultaten blijkt dat zij niet van de aanbodsimpuls proÞteerden. Uiteindelijk hebben de
niet-armen het meest geproÞteerd van het totale programma, terwijl de zorgpassen voor-
namelijk onder de armen zijn verdeeld. Dit benadrukt dat bij gebrek aan duidelijke aans-
poringsmechanismen voor zorgaanbieders algemene verhogingen van publieke uitgaven
weinig eﬀectief zijn in het bereiken van de armen. Een sterker verband tussen het aan-
bieden van voorzieningen en het budget zou het bereiken van de armen hebben verbeterd.
De methodologie en resultaten in dit proefschrift dragen bij aan de discussie omtrent
de eﬀectiviteit van sociale vangnet interventies ten tijde van een economische crisis. Dit
is van belang omdat de mate van transparantie in de implementatie en management
van crisisinterventies en de kosteneﬀectiviteit hiervan vaak punten van kritiek zijn. Om
echter een compleet beeld te krijgen van de kosteneﬀectiviteit van dergelijke interven-
tieprogrammas zal toekomstig onderzoek zich moeten richten op hoe de korte termijn-
eﬀecten van studietoelagen, prijssubsidies en macro-economische schokken zich vertalen
in lange termijneﬀecten op scholing en gezondheid van de armen. Daarnaast blijft het
de vraag of sociale vangnet interventies eﬀectiever zijn als ze al voor een eventuele crisis
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voorbereid zouden zijn. Er is meer onderzoek nodig om te analyseren of een dergelijke
preventieve aanpak ßexibeler en eﬀectiever is in het identiÞceren en bereiken van de ar-
men en het verzachten van het crisisleed, en hoe locale informatie het meest eﬀectief kan
worden toegewend bij het signaleren van armoededynamiek.
Ringkasan (Summary in Indonesian)
Ketika krisis ekonomi menghantam, perhatian kebijakan yang utama di negara-negara
berkembang adalah bagaimana supaya bidang-bidang pelayanan sosial bisa tetap terjaga,
lebih khusus lagi, bagaimana supaya akses masyarakat miskin terhadap pelayanan sosial
bisa tetap terpenuhi. Subsidi-subsisi harga yang terarah dan kemudahan-kemudahan bagi
kelompok-kelompok rentan seringkali digunakan sebagai suatu respon kebijakan ketika
berhadapan dengan goncangan-goncangan ekonomi makro. Dengan menggunakan studi
kasus Indonesia, disertasi ini berupaya untuk menyelidiki keefektifan dari intervensi-
intervensi terarah seperti ini di bidang kesehatan dan pendidikan sebagai sebuah alat
untuk melindungi akses masyarakat miskin terhadap pelayanan-pelayanan sosial tersebut
di saat krisis ekonomi. Lebih khusus, studi ini menyelidiki apakah intervensi-intervensi
yang terarah secara sempit cocok diterapkan di suasana krisis, ketika pembuat kebijakan
dihadapkan kepada informasi-infomasi yang sangat tidak memadai dan persoalan keter-
batasan waktu. Studi ini juga menyelidiki bagimana intervensi dari sisi permintaan ini
jika dibandingkan dengan intervensi dari sisi penawaran yang ditargetkan secara lebih
luas.
Di tahun 1997, Indonesia dihantam oleh krisis ekonomi yang amat parah dan tak ter-
duga, krisis ini dipicu oleh krisis keuangan yang dirasakan di seluruh kawasan Asia Teng-
gara. Krisis ini menyebabkan Produk Domestik Bruto (PDB) menyusut sebesar 14 persen
di tahun 1998, kemiskinan meningkat tajam, harga kebutuhan pokok melambung naik dan
belanja negara untuk bidang sosial berkurang banyak. Menjelang terjadinya krisis, hasil
pembangunan bidang pendidikan dan kesehatan di Indonesian meningkat dengan stabil.
Di saat krisis, yang menjadi perhatian penting adalah apakah pencapaian-pencapaian
yang telah diraih di sekor sosial selama beberapa dekade terakhir dapat dipertahankan.
Untuk menjaga agar pendapatan riil dan akses terhadap pelayanan sosial masyarakat
miskin tidak memburuk, pemerintah Indonesia dengan bantuan lembaga-lembaga donor
meluncurkan progam Jaring Pengaman Sosial (JPS, Social Safety Net) yang mencakup
program kesehatan dan pendidikan.
Bab 2 memberikan latar belakang bagi bab-bab selanjutnya dengan menjelaskan
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konteks dari program Jaring Pengaman Sosial (JPS). Bab ini mengambarkan distribusi
pelayanan kesehatan dan pendidikan sebelum krisis, dan perubahan-perubahan dalam
pemanfaatan layanan kesehatan dan partisipasi sekolah selama krisis, berdasarkan hasil
Survei Sosial Ekonomi Nasional (Susenas).
Kelihatannya, secara umum, krisis tidak menghentikan perkembangan positif dari
angka partisipasi sekolah, tetapi krisis telah menggangu perbaikan angka partisipasi seko-
lah di tingkat pendidikan dasar dan menengah selama satu tahun. Terdapat pula bukti
yang menunjukkan bahwa terjadi pengurangan pengeluaran untuk kesehatan dan pen-
didikan demi menjaga tingkat konsusmsi selama krisis, terutama di kalangan kaum miskin
pedesaan. Akan tetapi, di tahun 1999 angka partisipasi sekolah telah bangkit dari keadaan
di tahun 1998, mencapai keadaan yang lebih baik dibanding situasi sebelum krisis.
Dampak krisis juga bisa diamati dari penggunaan pelayanan kesehatan oleh rumah
tangga. Meningkatnya biaya pelayanan kesehatan, merosotnya pendapatan, dan mem-
buruknya pelayanan kesehatan diikuti oleh penurunan tajam dari penggunaan fasilitas
layanan kesehatan, khususnya pelayanan kesehatan publik (milik pemerintah). Membu-
ruknya kualitas dan jumlah dari pelayanan kesehatan publik disebabkan oleh meningkat-
nya biaya obat-obatan dan menurunnya anggaran pemerinyah untuk kesehatan. Hal
ini menyebabkan masyarakat berpaling dari pelayanan kesehatan publik. Penggunaan
pelayanan kesehatan publik membaik di tahun 1999, sedangkan pada saat yang sama,
pengunaan pelayanan kesehatan swasta belum pulih.
Di tahun 1998, program kesehatan dan pendidikan berskala nasional diluncurkan, di-
mana keduanya merupakan bagian dari program yang lebih besar yaitu Jaring Pengaman
Sosial (JPS). Kedua program JPS tersebut ditujukan untuk melindungi akses masyarakat
miskin terhadap pelayanan kesehatan dan pendidikan selama krisis. Desain dan pelak-
sanaan dari program kesehatan dan pendidikan tersebut dibahas di Bab 3.
Program pendidikan berupa program beasiswa tunai dimulai pada bulan Agustus 1998,
yang bertepatan dengan awal tahun ajaran 1998/1999. Hampir 4 juta murid sekolah dasar
dan menengah mendapatkan beasiswa, dimana nilai beasiswa per murid mencapai sekitar
7 hingga 18 persen dari rata-rata konsumsi per keluarga.
Program pelayanan kesehatan diluncurkan di kuartal terakhir tahun 1998. Program ini
berupa subsidi harga terarah yang dikombinasikan dengan komponen pengeluaran publik.
Subsidi harga dioperasionalisasikan dengan skema Kartu Sehat. Kartu sehat ini ditujukan
bagi rumah tangga yang dinilai sangat rentan terhadap krisis ekonomi. Dengan kartu
ini, seluruh anggota keluarga berhak mendapatkan subsidi harga ketika menggunakan
fasilitas pelayanan kesehatan publik. Pusat layanan kesehatan yang melayani pengguna
kartu sehat mendapatkan anggaran tambahan. Akan tetapi, terdapat keterkaitan yang
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lemah antara pemanfaatan kartu sehat dan konpensasi yang diterima oleh pusat pelayanan
kesehatan. Anggaran diberikan kepada penyedia-penyedia layanan kesehatan berdasarkan
estimasi jumlah rumah tangga miskin di daerah pelayanan mereka. Sebagai hasilnya,
melayani seorang pengguna kartu sehat tidak akan mendatangkan keuntungan Þnansial
lansung bagi penyedia layanan kesehatan.
Untuk kadar tertentu, kedua program tersebut - beasiswa dan kartu sehat - dialokasikan
dengan proses yang terdesentralsisai, dengan menargetkan individu penerima program
berdasarkan sebaran geograÞs dan kelompok komunitas. Kabupaten/kota yang lebih
miskin menerima lebih banyak alokasi beasiswa dan kartu sehat. Di wilayah suatu kabu-
paten/kota, penerima program diarahkan ke sekolah-sekolah dan pusat pelayanan kese-
hatan di tingkat komunitas, yang pada gilirannya menyeleksi murid dan rumah tangga
penerima beasiswa dan kartu sehat.
Program-program tersebut diimplementasikan dengan kecepatan yang luar biasa. Ber-
dasarkan Susenas tahun 1999, yang dilaksanakan di bulan Februari 1999, sekitar 22 juta
penduduk (sekitar 11 persen dari total penduduk Indonesia) tinggal di rumah tangga yang
menerima kartu sehat, dan 2.1 juta anak-anak usia 10-18 tahun (sekitar 5 persen dari
jumlah anak dalam kelompok umur tersebut) menerima beasiswa. Desain program yang
terdesentralisasi kelihatannya menjadi alasan mengapa reaksinya begitu cepat, dengan
mengandalkan infrastruktur administratif dan operasional yang telah ada di tiap kabu-
paten/kota. Akan tetapi, dalam waktu yang demikian pendek, data mengenai dampak
krisis yang terpercaya antar kabupaten/kota belumlah tersedia. Kriteria target alokasi
geograÞs didasarkan pada estimasi tingkat kemiskinan sebelum krisis, yang boleh jadi
mereßeksikan tingkat kemiskinan aktual, tetapi belum mempertimbangkan dampak kri-
sis. Hal ini mengakibatkan timbulnya kesalahan penargetan yang tercermin dari tidak
adanya korelasi antara tingkat kemiskinan sebelum krisis dengan besaran dampak krisis
tersebut. Lebih jauh lagi, harga-harga relatif berubah selama krisis, yang berpengaruh
terhadap desain penargetan ketika menggunakan estimasi kemiskinan sebelum krisis se-
bagai patokan alokasi.
Kinerja penargetan dari program beasiswa sangat berbeda antar jenjang pendidikan.
Untuk jenjang Sekolah Dasar (SD) dan Sekolah Lanjutan Tingkat Pertama (SLTP) target
sasaran terarah kepada kelompokmiskin, dengan sedikit kebocoran kepada kelompok yang
lebih berada. Di jenjang Sekolah Lanjutan Tingkat Atas (SLTA), program beasiswa sama
sekali tidak terarah kepada kelompok miskin, tetapi terdistribusi secara cukup merata di
tiap kuintil kelompok konsumsi per kapita.
Program kartu sehat sudah terarah pada kelompok miskin dalam artian bahwa si
miskin memiliki peluang yang lebih besar untuk menerima kartu sehat dan menggunakan-
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nya untuk mendapatan pelayanan kesehatan gratis, sehingga dengan demikian mereka
menjadi lebih sehat. Akan tetapi, walaupun sudah ditargetkan untuk golongan miskin,
banyak juga kartu sehat yang jatuh ke tangan orang berada. Penyedia layanan ke-
sehatan kelihatannya mendistribusikan kartu sehat berdasarkan status kesehatan dan
kepada pasien yang datang meminta pelayanan tersebut.
Di tingkat lokal, program kartu sehat tidak menghilangkan semua kendala yang meng-
halangi akses masyarakat miskin terhadap pelayanan kesehatan. Pengunaan pelayanan
kartu sehat kurang berpihak terhadap orang miskin dibanding kepemilikan kartu sehat.
Ini berarti, tergantung pada kepemilikan, si kaya memiliki peluang yang lebih besar untuk
menggunakan kartu sehat yang mereka miliki. Biaya langsung dan tidak langsung dari
penggunaan kartu sehat relatif lebih tinggi di daerah yang lebih terpencil dan di pedesaan
yang terbatas aksesnya terhadap sarana pelayanan kesehatan publik.
Di Bab 4, sebuah pendekatan berdasarkan simulasi mikro diaplikasikan kepada anali-
sis prevalensi manfaat marjinal dinamis (dynamic marginal beneÞt incidence analysis) dari
program JPS beasiswa dan kartu sehat dalam kurun waktu 1999-2002. Metode ini diban-
gun berdasarkan pengembangan terakhir dari dekomposisi Oaxaca-Blinder, yang mem-
berikan pemahaman lebih baik atas faktor-faktor penyebab yang mendorong perubahan-
perubahan yang teramati dalam kinerja penargetan. Lebih khusus, dalam seting desen-
tralisasi, metode yang ada saat ini untuk prevalensi manfaat marjinal dinamis masih
menyisakan beberapa pertanyaan yang belum terjawab sehubungan dengan dampak dari
perubahan-perubahan dalam hal sebaran geograÞs penargetan. Metode yang diajukan ini
secara mudah bisa diaplikasikan pada instrumen-instrumen kebijakan sosial lainnya, dan
dalam konteks-konteks lainnya.
Dari tahun 1999 hingga 2002, program beasiswa dan kartu sehat mengalami per-
luasan. Setelah tahun 1999, aturan penargetan geograÞs dirubah, dengan tersedianya
informasi yang lebih akurat mengenai kemiskinan antar daerah selama krisis. Tetapi
dengan perluasan, perubahan marjinal dalam distribusi beasiswa dan kartu sehat mem-
perlihatkan pola-pola yang cukup berbeda. Kelompok miskin menjadi sasaran utama dari
meningkatnya program beasiswa, sedangkan perluasan program kartu sehat tidak berpi-
hak pada golongan miskin. Simulasi berdasarkan pendekatan dekomposisi memungkinkan
untuk menyelidiki sejauh mana distribusi hasil dari perluasan program adalah merupakan
hasil dari perubahan penargetan secara geograÞs, perubahan-perubahan dalam penarge-
tan lokal, atau hanya karena perluasan dari program tersebut.
Metode simulasi ini bisa memberikan nuansa yang lebih pada pola-pola yang teramati
dalam penargetan program-program bidang sosial, dan memberi ruang bagi penafsiran
atas hasil prevalensi manfaat marjinal konvensional. Untuk kasus program beasiswa,
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pengukuran yang ada saat ini untuk prevalensi manfaat marjinal dinamis memberikan
arahan yang keliru untuk pengambilan kebijakan. Prevalensi marjinal yang berpihak
pada kaum miskin yang teramati dari program beasiswa kelihatannya lebih didorong oleh
perbaikan lokal dan geograÞs dari waktu ke waktu. Perluasan program tanpamemperbaiki
proses penargetan secara simultan akan meningkatkan kebocoran pada kalangan berada.
Untuk program kartu sehat, hasil dekomposisi tidak bertentangan dengan hasil prevalensi
manfaat marjinal. Bahkan, hasil dekomposisi menyoroti instrumen penargetan yang mana
yang paling efektif dalam me-re-alokasikan kartu sehat kepada kelompok miskin.
Bab 5 menganalisis efektiÞtas dari program beasiswas JPS selama krisis, dengan
menunjukkan bahwa program tersebut efektif dalam menjaga akses terhadap pendidikan
walaupun banyak kendala di tahun awal program tersebut sehubungan dengan wilayah
geograÞs penargetan.
Tantangan utama dari evaluasi setelah program berjalan (ex-post evaluations) adalah
mendapatkan estimasi yang terpercaya dari kondisi konterfaktual (counterfactual): apa
yang akan terjadi jika program JPS tidak dilaksanakan? Evaluasi ex-post membutuhkan
metode non-eksperimental untuk menjawab pertanyaan tersebut, karena penempatan pro-
gram yang tidak acak dan keterbatasan data.
Dampak program diidentiÞkasi dengan memanfaatkan struktur yang terdesentralisasi
dari desain program, dan kenyataan bahwa, pada tahap awal, yang tersedia bagi pem-
buat kebijakan hanyalah berupa informasi yang tidak lengkap mengenai dampak krisis.
Informasi yang tidak lengkap mengenai sebaran kemiskinan antar daerah berpengaruh
pada tingginya tingkat kekeliruan dalam penargetan secara geograÞs. Variabel-variabel
instrumen (instrumental variables) dibangun berdasarkan kesalahan penargetan ini den-
gan memanfaatkan data tentang aturan pemilihan wilayah dan informasi ex-post tentang
proÞl kemiskinan antar daerah. Ketersediaan data sebelum intervensi memungkinkan hal
tersebut untuk memferiÞkasi keakuratan dari asumsi pengidentiÞkasian dan validitas dari
instrumen tersebut.
Tanpa program JPS, angka partisipasi sekolah akan menurun secara cukup signiÞkan,
khususnya pada tingkat sekolah dasar. Sebanyak 10 persen peserta program beasiswa usia
10 hingga 12 tahun akan terpaksa keluar dari sekolah (drop out) jika mereka tidak men-
dapatkan beasiswa. Walaupun dengan estimasi yang tidak sepenuhnya akurat, agaknya
terdapat dampak positif bagi anak-anak usia 13 hingga 15 tahun yang masih berada di
bangku sekolah dasar. Hal ini merupakan capaian yang penting karena pada kelompok
umur ini umumnya murid berada pada masa transisi dari jenjang SD ke SLTP. Periode ini
adalah masa transisi dimana banyak murid tidak melanjutkan pendidikan. Sangat sedikit
sekali dampak dari program beasiswa terhadap tingkat partisipasi sekolah untuk jenjang
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SLTP dan SLTA.
Program beasiswa khususnya efektif bagi anak-anak yang keberlangsungan sekolah
mereka sangat rentan akibat dampak krisis. Sebagai respon terhadap krisis, rumah tangga
miskin di pedesaan - ditengah keterbatasan sumberdaya yang mereka miliki - mengu-
rangi pengeluaran investasi untuk pendidikan anak-anak yang lebih kecil dalam keluarga
demi menjaga konsumsi dan menjaga keberlangsungan sekolah anak-anak yang lebih be-
sar. Hal ini mereßeksikan perbedaan dari pendapatan yang diharapkan dari pendidikan
dasar dan menengah, dimana faktanya bahwa rumah tangga telah berinvestasi untuk
pendidikan menengah anak-anak yang lebih tua, dan relatif rendahnya angka pertisipasi
sekolah tingkat SLTP dan SLTA bagi anak-anak dari kalangan keluarga miskin. Dampak
paling kuat dari program beasiswa adalah pada murid-murid sekolah dasar di daerah
pedesaan yang berasal dari keluarga miskin.
Program JPS juga berdampak pada keputusan apakah anak-anak sekolah akan datang
ke sekolah atau memilih untuk pergi bekerja. Penerima beasiswa lebih cenderung untuk
pergi bersekolah dibanding pergi bekerja, tetapi kecenderungan ini hanya ditemui pada
kelompok umur sekolah menengah. Walaupun bukan merupakan tujuan spesiÞk dari pro-
gram beasiswa, program ini telah meningkatkan kondisi upah untuk anak-anak sekolah.
Transfer tunai beasiswa telah mengurangi tekanan yang dialami keluarga untuk mem-
perkerjakan anak-anak yang masih bersekolah demi kelangsungan konsumsi. Dampak
dari buruh anak-anak paling besar pada kalangan miskin, yang berarti bahwa kondisi
upah di kalangan miskin lebih rendah dibanding kalangan non-miskin.
Dalam pengertian absolut, suplai tenaga kerja lebih sensitif terhadap partisipasi pro-
gram dibanding kehadiran di sekolah. Hal ini berbeda dari studi-studi lain yang mene-
mukan bahwa hanya sebagian dari meningkatnya pendidikan yang dapat diterangkan oleh
pengurangan buruh anak-anak. Perbedaan hasil-hasil ini sangat mungkin diterangkan
oleh seting yang sangat berbeda dari krisis ekonomi di Asia Timur. Dalam situasi seperti
ini tekanan bagi rumah tangga untuk mempekerjakan anak-anak meningkat dengan kuat.
Hasil estimasi mengatakan bahwa hal ini hanya sebagian yang berasal dari berkurangnya
tingkat kehadiran di sekolah, hal ini mendukung kenyataan bahwa bersekolah dan bekerja
paruh waktu seringkali berjalan secara bersamaan di Indonesia.
Secara umum, program beasiswa JPS terbukti menjadi intrumen yang efektif untuk
melindungi akses terhadap pendidikan. Di sisi lain, komite yang menangani alokasi bea-
siswa tidak sepenuhnya mampu mengidentiÞkasi golongan miskin. Sebagian besar dana
dialokasikan untuk murid yang tidak akan mengalami drop out seandainya mereka tidak
menerima beasiswa. Penargetan yang lebih akurat akan sangat meningkatkan efektiÞtas
dari program ini. Lebih jauh, prioritas seharusnya diberikan pada upaya menjaga par-
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tisipasi sekolah di tingkat sekolah dasar, dimana manfaat beasiswa kelihatannya paling
efektif dan dengan menyediakan dukungan bagi anak-anak dari keluarga paling miskin
disaat transisi dari jenjang pendidikan dasar ke pendidikan menengah.
Bab 6 menampilakan evaluasi dampak (impact evaluation) dari program kartu sehat
sebagaimana program tersebut dioperationalisasikan di bulan-bulan awal pelaksanaan-
nya. Keterkaitan yang lemah antara kompensasi Þnansial dan penyediaan layanan ke-
sehatan gratis bagi pemegang kartu sehat memungkinkan untuk memperlakukan kedua
komponen tersebut sebagai program intervensi terpisah, dan membandingkan keefekti-
fan dari bantuan biaya kesehatan dengan bantuan dari sisi penawaran yang ditargetkan
secara luas. Transfer kepada penyedia layanan publik memberikan manfaat bagi semua
pengguna potensial dari layanan tersebut, sedangkan subsidi harga hanya tersedia bagi
pemegang kartu sehat. Dalam Bab 6 ini, diupayakan untuk memisahkan dampak dari ke-
dua program tersebut. Ini merupakan analisis setelah program berlangsung (ex-post) dari
suplai layanan kesehatan dan intervensi permintaan, hal ini melengkapi literatur tentang
permintaan terhadap layanan kesehatan, yang sejauh ini lebih mengandalkan pemodelan
struktural sebelum program berjalan (ex-ante structural modelling).
Temuan-temuan yang dihasilkan memberikan pesan yang beragam. Pertama, subsidi
harga jelas efektif untuk meningkatkan permintaan terhadap layanan kesehatan di kelom-
pok miskin, sebagaimana kartu sehat telah meningkatkan penggunaan layanan kesehatan
dan memberikan efek substitusi dari pelayanan swasta ke pelayanan publik. Kartu se-
hat untuk kalangan yang tidak miskin hanya berdampak pada pilihan mereka akan jenis
pelayanan kesehatan tanpa meningkatkan tingkat penggunaannya secara umum. Hal ini
menyoroti dampak potensial dari program intervensi terhadap kombinasi pelayanan kese-
hatan publik/swasta jika desain program tidak memperhitungkan dampak subsitusinya.
Kedua, pulihnya penggunaan layanan kesehatan publik di tahun 1999 bisa dikatakan
merupakan hasil dari program JPS bidang kesehatan, tetapi sebagian besar dampak ini
merupakan hasil dari meningkatnya kualitas dan tambahan suplai obat-obatan melalui
dukungan anggaran bagi penyedia layanan publik. Subsidi harga menyumbang hanya
20 persen dari total dampak program JPS bidang kesehatan. Ketiga, dengan ketiadaan
mekanisme insentif yang jelas bagi penyedia layanan kesehatan, peningkatan secara umum
dari pengeluaran publik tidak efektif dalam menjangkau golongan miskin. Dampak lanju-
tan dari peningkatan penawaran kelihatannya terkonsentrasi di kelompok non-miskin. Go-
longan miskin responsif terhadap subsidi harga, tetapi tidak responsive terhadap rangsan-
gan di sisi penawaran, sedangkan pemanfaatan oleh kelompok non-miskin lebih banyak
didorong oleh sisi penawaran.
Kelemahan dari dampak program terutama karena keterkaitan yang lemah antara
202 RINGKASAN (SUMMARY IN INDONESIAN)
penggantian biaya (reimbursement) yang dikeluarkan oleh penyedia layanan publik dan
pemanfaatan kartu sehat. Mereka yang berada di kuintil termiskin hanya akan menikmati
manfaat program jika mereka menerima kartu sehat, sebagaimana hasil studi ini mengindi-
kasikan bahwa mereka tidak merasakan manfaat dari rangsangan dari sisi penawaran.
Akhirnya, kelompok non-miskin menikmati sebagain besar dari keseluruhan program JPS
bidang kesehatan ini. Ini menekankan bahwa ketiadaan mekanisme insentif yang jelas
bagi penyedia layanan kesehatan dan peningkatan secara umum dari pengeluaran publik
relatif tidak efektif dalam menjangkau golongan miskin. Keterkaitan yang lebih kuat
antara penyediaan layanan dan anggaran akan memperbaiki sasaran menjangkau kaum
miskin.
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